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ABSTRACT
This study examines the coherence the Foucauldlan 
archaeology as a method of discursive analysis and 
scrutinizes the possibilities i t  holds for a m aterialist 
lite ra ry  history. The analysis of Foucault's archaeologies 
of the asylum, the c lin ic  and the human sciences traces the 
manner in which the archaeology dissociates its e lf  from 
the domains of Marxism and structuralism, and establishes 
its  specific domain of operation. The conceptual apparatus 
constructed within that domain is scr jtlnl.-ed for coherence 
and the criticisms and misconceptions of the archaeology 
are discussed. The existing domain of lite ra ry  history is 
analyzed and found to be in a state of cris is  due to the 
epistemological weaknesses of empiricism and historicism  
that are uncovered at the level of the problematic. Foucault's 
concepts of a general history and of knowledge (savoir) are 
analyzed and found to be wrought in resistance to these weak­
nesses. Lastly, the study proposes directions for the 
historical analysis of lite ra ry  texts through the application 
of the archaeology, specifically the concepts of the statement 
the discursive formation and the episteme, to two lite ra ry  
texts showing the changes in the function of language between 
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Introduction
The Impact of Michel Foucault's work has extended over many 
disciplines from philosophy, social and po litica l studies, 
history and discursive studies. His work fa lls  into two 
main theoretical pursuits: the archaeology, which focusses 
upon the function of discourse: and the geneology which 
centres upon the concept of power in relation to discourse 
and the social Institutions and apparatuses that propagate 
I t . 1 This study undertakes to assess the cohesion and 
coherence of the archaeology on the theoretical level and 
the possibilities I t  holds for the practical analysis of 
lite ra tu re .
The decision to scrutinize the archaeology for Its  points 
of application to lite ra ry  discourse rather than to concen­
tra te  on the more recent geneolpglcal theory rests upon two 
related reasons. F irs tly , the archaeology pertains directly  
to discourse and the analysis of its  historical functioning, 
whereas the geneology Is more contentious In its  Inclusion 
of the concepts of power and social regulation. The archaeo­
logy therefore remains on the level of discourse Its e lf ,  and 
its  conceptual framework Is constructed to that end. Secondly, 
I t  Is arguable that the geneology is constructed on the basis 
of the archaeological analysis of discourse, taking the con­
ceptual framework constructed there as Its  point of departure 
into a new domain. I t  seems appropriate, therefore, that an 
assessment of the archaeology In terms of Its  possible contri­
bution to th i analysis of literatu re  should be conducted as a 
prerequisite to an approach to a geneology of lite ra ry  
production.
This study fa lls  into three parts which trace the stages that 
the research has followed. The f ir s t  question one faces with
regard to the archaeology with Its  claims to novelty Is that of
where I t  came from. Thus the f ir s t  part of this dissertation
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scrutinizes Foucault's early texts which refer to tnemselves 
as archaeologies. These early works exhibit the modifications 
and the refinements that the archaeology as a methodology and 
a praxis underwent in order to demarcate its  object and the 
theoretical domain specific to i t .  Hare Foucault is apparently 
struggling to free himself from the constraints of the two 
major te rrito ries  of Marxism and Structuralism which had hither­
to dominated the analysis of discourse. The emergence of the 
archaeology through these early works to its  form in The Order 
of Things'* is important to the assessment of its  claim to be 
operating within its  ?wn problematic or theoretical domain. 
Furthermore, The findings of The Order of Things as an archaeo­
logy of the human sciences inform much of the criteriology of 
The Archaeology of Knowledge* which appeared as the former 
work's postscript. This la te r work lays out the register of 
conceptual tools that fa c ilita tes  the archaeological methodo­
logy as practiced in The Order of Things.
The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to the analysis 
of The Archaeology of Knowledge. Here the coherence of the 
theoretical architecture constructed in this work is scrutinized 
and evaluated as a prerequisite to an attempt to transfer i t  to 
the domain of lite ra ry  discourse. The work, written as a theo­
retical postscript, was produced into the centre of c rit ic a l 
polemics that erupted after The Order of Things, and as iuch, 
i t  is convoluted and complex in its  organization. This leads 
to the admittance of 'grey' areas in which the articulation of 
such concepts as the statement and the discursive formation is 
not fu lly  transparent. As these concepts are crucial to the 
praxis of archaeology, i t  was found to be necessary to extra­
polate from the work its e lf  and corns to some decision as to how 
such a connection operates. Furthermore, the relationship of
the eplsteme - a c ncept of prime Importance In The Order of 
Things - to the archaeology has been called Into question by 
the c ritic a l reception of Foucault, and this too demanded 
attention before the question of the fe as ib ility  of the 
archaeology as a method of lite ra ry  analysis could be posed.
Our approach to the domain of lite ra ry  history finds the 
domain in disarray and cris is . The causes of this crisis  
are traced to the problematic that underlies the variety of 
methodologies employed there. Cnee these causes have been 
uncovered, I t  Is clear that Foucault's archaeology operates 
antithetica lly  to the traditional persoectiyes of lite ra ry  
history, and that a new concept of history and a new concept 
of knowledge suth as those proposed hy Foucault are necessary 
i f  one is to extract the historical analysis of lite ra tu re  
from the Impasse that i t  currently faces. To this end, the 
archaeology's points of departure from the traditional prob­
lematic of the history of ideas (under which lite ra ry  history 
is subsumed5) are mapped and the consequences of this depar­
ture are scrutinized. This leads to the possibility of 
speaking of lite ra tu re  as a discursive positiv ity  among other 
regularities in the archive. The importance of this is 
tantamount to the transference of the archaeological method 
to the domain of lite ra tu re  as i t  deconstructs the 'ivory 
tower' which has constrained the analysis f lite ra ry  produc­
tion, holding i t  separate from other discourses and maintaining 
its  false innocence in the face of knowledge. Correlative to 
th is , the acceptance of lite ra tu re  as discourse allows i t  to 
be analyzed in terms of the eplsteme.
On the basis of th is , the conceptual apparatus of the archaeo­
logy - specifically the concepts of the statement, the discursive 
formation and the eplsteme - is employed with regard to the 
lite ra ry  regularities of Henry Fielding's The Life of Mr. Jonathan
c
Wild  the Great and Laurence Sterne's The Life and Opinions of 
Tristram Shandy .7 Our examination of these texts is necessarily 
cursory, for to conduct a fu ll archaeological analysis of them 
would demand a study in its  own right. However, i t  suffices to 
show some of the directions that „n archaeology of lite ra ry  texts 
would take through the employment of the statement, discursive 
formation and episteme.
The dissertation is necessarily open-ended, as a fu ll application 
of the archaeology to lite ra ry  texts requires a study in its  own 
righ t. However, i t  is proposed that the ground for such an appli­
cation has been prepared in that the close scrutiny of the 
criterio logy of the archaeology has revealed i t  to be coherent 
and capable of surpassing the traditional methodologies of literary  
history by opening up a new domain for discursive analysis.
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PART I: The Early Works
1.1: An Archaeology of Silence: The History of Madness and 
C iviliz a tio n
Michel Fouc:ult began his Intellectual training In philosophy, 
#ros, which he moved Into psychology and psychopathology. After 
teaching psychopathology, he published a short work entitled  
Mental Illness and Psychology.1 This f ir s t  work, which received 
l i t t l e  attention, gives an account of mental Illness through the 
concepts of psychopathology. Foucault's next publication.
Madness and C ivilization: A History of Insanity In the Age of 
Reason2 came out In 1961 a fte r being presented as his doctoral 
thesis. Thl* work was a reversal of the exposition offered in 
Mental Illness and Psychology, for In i t  the categories of 
psychopathology and Its  definitions of madness are rejected. 
Madness and C ivilization Is *n analysis of Reason's domination 
of Unreason and the subjection of the la tte r  to silence. What 
Is at stake here, is that madness is no longer a fact of history 
which would amount to the imposition of a modern set of terms 
upon the past, but rather madness Is a judgement that is h is to ri­
cally constituted In the European setting. Foucault explains his 
Intentions to analyze the present silence of madness in the face 
of the scientific  privilege of psychiatry:
"The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of 
reason about madness, could be established only on the 
basis of such a silence.
I have not tried to write the history of that language,
but rather the archaeology of that silence." 
(MC Preface pp.x-xi)
Such an endeavour, Foucault proposes, sets out to return to "that 
zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an 
undifferentiated experience, a not yet divided experience of 
d iv is ion  i t s e l f . "  (MC p .ix  Preface) The book thus opens with a 
description of the exclusion of lepers in the Middle Ages, an 
exclusion which had a dual significance. F irs t ly ,  lepers were 
regarded as both dangerous, fo r the disease with which they were 
stricken was considered highly contagious; and wicked, as they 
had been severely punished by God in contracting the horrific 
disease, .lowever, alongside th is a second significance existed, 
that o f a symbolic reminder of Divine power and the Christian 's 
moral obligations of hum ility and charity . This dua lity  was 
echoed by the spatial exclusion, the s ite , o f  the leprosariums 
which were to be found on the lim its  of the it ie s  of Europe: 
fa r enough from social l i f e  to stave o ff  danger but close enough 
to remind society of Divine omnipotence and Christian duty. At 
the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy became rare and the lepiosa- 
riums fe l l  empty. Their existence as sites o f exclusion lay 
dormant fo r two to three centuries before a d iffe re n t form of 
Western culture u tiliz e d  them again to exclude the Indigent, the 
criminal and the madman:
"With an altogether new meaning and in a very d iffe re n t 
cu ltu re , the forms would remain - essentia lly that major 
form of a rigorous d iv is ion which is social exclusion 
but sp iritu a l re in tegra tion ." (MC p .7)
During the Renaissance, the madman existed on the periphery of 
society. Driven from the c i t ie s ,  he wandered free ly  about the 
countryside or was entrusted to merchants who removed him from 
the c ity  and took him on a quest fu r sanity along the waterways 
of Europe. Foucault's discussion of th is  period is centred upon
the image of the Narrenschiff, the Ship of Fools, that abruptly 
emerged in the lite ra ry  and a rtis tic  landscape of the early 
fifteenth century. For Foucault, this phenomenon in Renaissance
art "symbolized a great disquiet". (KC p .13) I t  is here, in the
apprehension of madness by the visual arts and lite ra tu re  that 
the f ir s t  signs of a division become apparent.
"Between word and image, between what is depicted by 
language and what is uttered by plastic form, the
unity begins to dissolve; a single and identical
meaning is not immediately common to them Figure
and speech s t i l l  illu s tra te  the same fable of fo lly  
in the same moral world, but already they take two 
different directions, indicating in a s t i l l  barely 
perceptible scission, what w ill be the great line  
of cleavage in the Western experience of madness."
(MC p .18)
In the visual arts , in the works of Bosch, D'urer, Grunewald and 
Brueghel, the fear of madness was expressed. With the collapse 
of the divinely ordered knowledge of the Middle Ages, Images of 
bestia lity  that were once enmeshed in myth and moral illustration  
in the form of human values were released. These images became, 
in the Renaissance, symbolic of enclaves of forbidden knowledge, 
of linn's inner qualities , of the threats and secrets of the 
world and of the tragic experience of madness. In lite ra tu re , 
madness is apprehended with irony; i f  i t  is aligned with know­
ledge, i t  is as a punishment for a disordered science, not as 
the warden of a forbidden knowledge. Madness in lite ra tu re  rules 
"all that is easy, joyous, frivolous in the world". (MC p .25) I t  
is linked to man's weaknesses, to his dreams and therefor*, to 
illus ion. Madness is thus viewed from the safety of an elevated 
c ritic a l consciousness which watches its  play over the surface of 
appearances, and illusions. The tragic depictions of the experience 
of madness invoking the world's end found in the painting of the 
Renaissance, and the c ritic a l consciousness of its  lite ra tu re  that
praises fo lly  from a safe distance form the two poles of the early 
Renaissance experience of madness. Gradually, the la tte r  form 
supersedes the former, drawing the depiction of madness in from 
the peripheral position I t  held In relation to l i f e  until in the 
early seventeenth century,
" It  occupies, by preference, a median place; i t  thus 
constitutes the knot more than the denouement, the 
peri pity rather than the final release. Displaced in 
the economy of narrative and dramatic structures, i t  
authorized the manifestation of truth and the return 
of reason." (MC p .32)
In this way, madness becomes a web of error and illusion under 
the spotlight of Reason. I t  loses the threatening tragic power 
that accompanied I t  In the paintings of the fifteenth  century, 
and In Its  disarmed state, i t  enters the Age of Reason, bound 
to the c ritic a l consciousness of discourse.
The historical event which marks the sudden disappearance of 
madness from the l i fe  of the society Is the establishment of the 
Hdpltal Generale In 1656. Within a few decades, workhouses, 
Zuchthauser and hopltaux generaux had sprung up in nearly every 
c ity  in Western Europe. (MC pp.39-45) In these Institutions, 
the Indigent, the vagabond, the criminal and the madman existed 
as members of the same group, which was defined by a new mode 
j f  perception based on labour. The non-productive elements of 
society became threatening as regard both the moral censure 
against Idleness and as a source of social In s ta b ility . Foucault 
stresses that this "great confinement" cannot be regarded as the 
presclentiflc origin of the asylum. His is not an account of 
scientific  progress, but rather of the birth of a space of con­
finement within which the sciences of man could refind themselves
"By a strange act of force, the classical age was to 
reduce to silence the madness whose voices the 
Renaissance had just liberated, but whose violence 
i t  had already tamed." (MC p .38)
through observation of the confined. At the beginning of the 
Classical Age, this space Is not a medical one, rather I t  is 
politico-economic:
"The unemployed person was no longer driven away or 
punished; he was taken in charge, (not)3 at the 
expense of the nation but at the cost of his ind iv i­
dual lib e rty . Between him and society, an im plicit 
system of obligation was established: he had the
right to be fed, but he must accept the physical and 
moral constraint of confinement. Therefore 1t 
(confinement) constituted one of the answers the 
seventeenth century gave to an economic crisis that 
affected the entire Western world: reduction of wages,
vnemployment, scarcity of coin - the coincidence of 
these phenomena probably being due to a crisis in the 
Spanish economy." (MC pp.48-49)
By ..«e end of the eighteenth century, the collective group of 
the confined had begun to divide. The poverty-stricken were 
freed from the moral confusion which bound them to criminal 
elements and the insane as poverty became a phenomenon specific 
to economics. Now the poor who were w illing to work for low 
wages were regarded as essential to the nation's wealth. With 
the sudden upsurge of Industrial growth, the indigent were once 
more called upon to play a part In society. The 'prisoners', 
those who had forfeited their liberty  in to to , were s t i l l  thrown 
together. Foucault denounces the claims of a nineteenth century 
positivism to have been responsible fcr in itia tin g  the division 
between the guilty criminal and the Innocent madman. I t  was not 
a call from society's Reason, but rather the violent protestations 
of the criminals which drew attention to the mixing of Insanity 
and crim inality. The criminal objected to this state of affa irs  
as the madmen In their midst became a symbol of their humiliation. 
They demanded a separation between themselves and those trans-
gressors of the laws of Nature, who were perceived as wild beasts. 
In this manner, madness was singled out and recognized for its  
specific features. I t  became circumscribed for a perception that 
would fin a lly  apprehend i t  as an object of knowledge. With the 
transfer of the notion of labour from the realm of morality to 
that of economics and potential wealth, the perception of confine­
ment changed from social necessity to gross error. The insane, 
now severed from the indigent and the criminal and specified as an 
object, were subjected to the prevailing notion of rehabilitation  
and cure. Foucault's discussion of the English Quaker, Tuke, and 
the French ra tio n a lis t, P inel, centres upon the importance they 
placed upon medical intervention. The physician was more a 
juridico-moral figure than a scientist, emphasis being placed upon 
his trustworthiness rather than his sc ien tific  status. Because 
his curative power rests upon the authority of order, morality and 
the family structure as the bastion of bourgeois society and its  
values, i t  was these that came into play within the doctor - 
patiei t relation. The last nexus of transformation that Foucault 
discusses, is Freud. Freud exploited the structure that enclosed 
the physician by emphasizing the doctor -  patient relation.
Foucault's analysis of the history of Reason's domination of 
Unreason concludes with a discussion of the forms of the Other 
which have escaped the moral confinement he has traced in his 
analysis. The "mad" painters Goya and Van Gogh and the "mad" 
poets and writers Sade, Nietzsche, H&lderlin, Nerval and Artaud 
indicate the experience of unreason which contests the lim its of 
society, of reason and science. However, in his conclusion, 
Foucault tentatively sounds the lim its of what we recognize as 
the history of Western culture. Within this history, a history 
dominated by Reason, identity presides in the articulation of the 
collective "we", the purveyors of that culture. However, conse­
quent upon this identity is a set of exclusions which demarcate 
that culture and its  history as f in ite . I t  is towards this
lim itation that Foucault's analysis of the opposition of reason/ 
same and unreason/other as the summation of identities and exclu­
sions tends:
"What realm do we enter which Is neither the history of 
knowledge, nor history its e lf ;  which is controlled by 
neither the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence 
of causes, since causes have value and meaning only 
beyond the division? A realm, no doubt, where what is 
in question Is the lim its rather than the identity of 
a culture." (MC p .x i)
In this regard, Foucault asserts that the history of madnnst ii< 
the history of the possibility of history.*
I t  is on this assertion that Derrida focuses his p e r s u a s iv e  
argumentative challenge of the presuppositions of Foucaul■'s 
history of madness. For Derrida, Foucault's intercion to s itin g  
a history of madness its e lf  is "the greatest mer. • ,  , ut also the 
very In fea s ib ility  of his book".5 A contradiction at the very 
root of this intention certainly appears to undercut the project.
On the one hand, Foucault Intended madness to be the subjer* of 
the book In both the senses, that i t  is the content matter and 
also the speaker, te llin g  of its  experiences in its  own terms and 
not in those of Reason, or of psychopathology, for those are the 
terms of its  objectification. Derrida observes, however, that 
throughout M&dness and C iv iliza tio n , madness is linked to silence, 
and that this history of madness, or archaeology of silence, is a
history of silence. I t  is here that Derrida finds that the
in fea s ib ility  of the project becomes apparent, for to write a
history is to employ the language of order. Although Foucault is
Intent upon denouncing the historical gu ilt of Reason, he is 
Implicated in this t r ia l by his use of the logic of language. "Order 
is then denounced within order". Thus argues Derrida,
" . . .  the silence of madness cannot be said, cannot be said 
in the logos of this book, but is d irec tly , metaphorically,
lim itation that Foucault's analysis of the opposition of reason/ 
same and unreason/other as the summation of identities and exclu­
sions tends:
"What realm do we enter which is neither the history of 
knowledge, nor history Its e lf ;  which is controlled by 
neither the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence 
of causes, since causes have value and meaning only 
beyond the division? A realm, no doubt, where what is 
in question is the lim its rather than the identity of 
a culture." (MC p .x i)
In this regard, Foucault asserts that the history of madness is 
the history of the possibility of history.*
I t  is on this assertion that Derrida focuses his persuasive 
argumentative challenge c*1 the presuppositions of Foucault's 
history of madness. For Derrida, Foucault's intention to writing 
a history of madness its e lf  is "the greatest merit, but also the 
very In fea s ib ility  of his book".5 A contradiction at the very 
root of this intention certainly appears to undercut the project.
On the one hand, Foucault Intended madness to be the subject of 
the book in both the senses, that i t  is the content matter and 
also the speaker, te llin g  of its  experiences in its  own terms and 
not in those of Reason, or of psychopathology, for those are the 
terms of its  ob jectification. Derrida observes, however, that 
throughout Madness and C iv iliza tio n , madness is linked to silence, 
and that this history of madness, or archaeology of silence, is a
history of silence. I t  is here that Derrida finds that the
in feas ib ility  of the project becomes apparent, for to write a
history is to employ the language of order. Although Foucault is
intent upon denouncing the historical g u ilt of Reason, he is 
implicated in this t r ia l  by his use of the logic of language. "Order 
I;: then denounced within order". Thus argues Derrida,
" . . .  the silence of madness cannot be said, cannot be said 
in the logos of this book, but is d irec tly , metaphorically.
made present by Its  pathos -  taking this word 1n Its  
best sense. A new and radical praise of fo lly  whose 
Intentions cannot be admitted because the praise of 
silence always takes place within logos."* 
but Derrida's arguments regarding the philosophical presuppositions 
of Foucault's book do not amount to a rejection of I t .  Rather, 
Madness and C1v111zatIon Is regarded as Illuminating the crisis  
that exists In philosophy whereby reason is "madder than madness"
In Its  attempts to overcome the danger of unreason by burying 
origins under the rubric of objectivism.' Derrida's arguments 
regarding the contradiction rooted In the stated intention behind 
the book are not denied by Foucault. On the contrary, in the 
preface to the French orig ina l, Histoire de la Fo lie , Foucault 
acknowledges that the task is “no doubt and doubly Impossible" 
because, on the one hand. I t  sets out to reconstitute "the dust 
of actual suffering, of senseless words anchored by nothing in 
time";3 and on the other, the task is re lian t upon the use of
language which by its  nature. Is complicit in the exclusion of
madness, In denouncing and mastering i t .  But what is of Interest 
her*, Is the probing of the lim its  of writing. Foucault's his- 
tor >al analysis Illuminates and therefore questions the status 
of Iscourse i ts e lf ,  as a vehicle of objectiviiatlon and exclusion.
Roland Barthes also recognizes the deep seated contradiction In 
Foucault's stated In ten tion ;
"The history of madness could be 'true' only i f  I t  were 
naive, i . e . ,  written by a madman; but then i t  could not 
be written in terms of history, so that we are le f t  with
the incoerclble bad fa ith  of knowledge. ...each time men
speak about the world, they enter into a relation of ex­
clusion, even when they speak in order to denounce It."®  
Madness and C iv iliza tio n , according to Barthes, is of Interest 
because i t  shows decisively that knowledge is never innocent, that 
the pursuit of knowledge simultaneously Incorporates a "taking
of sides". Foucault's history of madness, in not relying upon 
nosography, treats madness in terms of a relational re a lity , 
his retracing of the division between reason and unreason, 
uncovers the nexus of functional relations combining the 
identities of reason and culture in history to the exclusion of 
madness. Madness is therefore not a natural, ' transcendental’ 
category, but a spaca beyond the lim its of cultural acceptance. 
Barthes regards Foucault's analysis of this space as a construc­
tion of a sign system in which certain signiflers are grouped 
into 'sense units' and excluded from society. Foucault's 
diachronic narrative operates simultaneously to reconstruct 
these sense units which define the period. The linkage of the 
economic crisis and the coincident "great confinement" for example, 
is a signifying link by which the sense unit vagabond, indigent, 
crim inal, madman Is formed.^
This explanative relation of socio-economic phenomena to the 
changes in the perception of madness and its  status within
society is particular to Madness and C iv iliza tio n . The two
major shifts or discontinuities of the history of madness -  the 
birth of the house of confinement and the proposed 'liberation ' 
of the mad by Tuke and Pinel - are clearly associated with the 
economic conditions of society. The emergence of the Hopital
General is regarded as a response to the economic crisis of that
time and to the emerging bourgeois notion of the imperative of 
labour, while the sudden loss of fa ith  in the necessity of con­
finement is perceived as contingent upon the newly formed capi­
ta lis t  conception of the necessity and importance of poverty in 
the Increasingly industrialized landscape of the early nineteenth 
century. In this early book, the causal relationships of economic 
practices to other social practices is d istinctly  Marxian. In his 
la te r works, Foucault is rarely as exp lic it about the causal 
relationship between the economic conditions of society and super­
structure! practices; these are problematized rather than accepted
as a backdrop to the h is to rica l action focussed upon.
Despite this difference between Madness and C ivilization and the 
la te r works, a number of features apparent in this book are pre­
cursive of Foucault's developed historical methodology. The f irs t  
methodological proposition of Foucault's analysis Is that within 
a mass of phenomena, a specific problem exists; in this case the 
origin of the division between Reason, culture, history and 
Unreason, non-meaning and non-be1ng; and the functional relation­
ships that bind them in various forms. Foucault grasps historical 
events, hitherto unaccounted fo r. as a set of discontinuous units 
governed by an economy, a coherence which pervades throughout the 
system. In this regard, a certain nexus of relations, or a 
loca lity  may be circumscribed and analyzed.^
A second feature which prevails throughout Foucault's work is 
that his historical analyses are focussed upon events marking 
ruptures In the fabric of history. In Madness and C iv iliza tio n , 
two major points of discontinuity are highlighted -  that -n ltla tlng  
the analysis of Unreason in the Age of Reason, the "great confine­
ment"; and the disruption which severs the perception of madness 
from our present perspective, the 'liberation  of the mad by 
philanthropists which was not a procedure of freeing at a l l ,  but 
the process by which the madman became an object of the specific 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry. These two events marking 
the irreparable discontinuity of the history of the perception of 
madness are described, and explained with reference to the socio­
economic conditions of European society of the respective periods. 
However, Foucault's depiction of the various forms that the 
perception of madness took are not explained, and the question of 
why these forms appeared rather than others is le f t  untouched.
This problem of the conditions of p o s s ib i l i t y  becomes a focus In 
his la ter work.
Contingent upon Foucault's emphasis on the d iscontinu ity o f h istory.
as a backdrop to the h is to rica l action focussed upon.
Despite this difference between Madness and C iv ilization  and the 
la te r works, a number of features apparent in this book are pre­
cursive of Foucault's developed historical methodology. The f ir s t  
methodological proposition of Foucault's analysis is that within 
a mass of phenomena, a specific problem exists; in this case the 
origin of the division between Reason, culture, history and 
Unreason, non-meaning and non-being; and the functional relation­
ships that bind them in various forms. Foucault grasps historical 
events, hitherto unaccounted fo r, as a set of discontinuous units 
governed by an economy, a coherence which pervades throughout the 
system. In this regard, a certain nexus of relations, or a 
loca lity  may be circumscribed and analyzed.^
A second feature which prevails throughout Foucault's work is 
that his historical analyses are focussed upon events marking 
ruptures in the fabric of history. In Madness and C iv iliza tio n , 
two major points of discontinuity are highlighted -  that in itia tin g  
the analysis of Unreason in the Age of Reason, the "great confine­
ment"; and the disruption which severs the perception of madness 
from our present perspective, the liberation' of the mad by 
philanthropists which was not a procedure of freeing at a l l ,  but 
the process by which the madman became an object of the specific 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry. These two events marking 
the irreparable discontinuity of the history of the perception of 
madness are described, and explained with reference to the socio­
economic conditions of European society of the respective periods. 
However, Foucault's depiction of the various forms that the 
perception of madness took are not explained, and the question o. 
why these forms appeared rather than others is le ft  untouched.
This problem of the conditions of possibility becomes a focus in 
his la te r work.
Contingent upon Foucault's emphasis on the d iscontinu ity of h istory.
is the comparative nature of his analyses. In Madness and 
C iv iliia tio n  as in the works that would folio , i t ,  Foucault's 
methodological procedure for distinguishing the point of 
rupture relies upon the constant comparison of the elements of 
discourse and practice from one moment in history to the next.
In this way, the transformation of these elements in relation  
to one another may be traced within a continuity on the one 
hand, and across the breaks that separate one form of perception 
from another. I t  is through the comparison of forms residing on 
either side of the break that the various structures of perception 
are reconstructed. In this respect, Foucault is similar to 
Serres12 in his most basic methodological presuppositions.
Serres1 work, which is best described as 'comparative structuralism', 
is characterized by the presence of two or more discourses which 
are simultaneou ly scrutinized on the level of their structure. 
Serres' method of dealing with texts may be called 'encyclopaedic' 
as i t  deals with a spectrum of knowledges that appear in a number 
of distinct discourses - sc ie n tific , philosophical, mythical and 
lite ra ry . Likewise, Foucault's Madness and C iv iliza tio n , and the 
la te r works in which the archaeology is developed, move from 
scientific  to philosophical and lite ra ry  discourse without erecting 
a hierarchy of discourse bared upon the scientific /non-scientific  
distinction. Madness and C iv iliza tio r exemplifies this: the work
is framed by discussions of lite ra ry  representations of madness, 
while the material providing information for the main body of the 
book ranges from medical and philosophical treatises to sermons, 
le tters and memories. Both Foucault and Serres reject the history 
of science as a history of progress, and in so doing, do not treat 
the texts which they analyze according to any criterion of truth- 
value. In this regard, classical medical treatises are not 
regarded ,s the ideological or p re -srien tific  precursors of true 
sciences; on the contrary, a ll texts, both modern and outdated, 
are subjected to the same c ritic a l gaze. There is no hierarchy 
of discourse based upon an allotted truth-value, none are placed
above others or on t i *  periphery of others. All discourse, 
whether philosophical, lite ra ry  or sc ien tific , are systems 
which articulate a common set of problems that emerge from  ^
the immediate, often unreflective experience of a period.
Serres rejects the claims of French positivism with regard to 
its  a b ility  to analyze science through reflection upon its  
history. shows that this history of science is in rea lity  
either the history of a science to the exclusion of others, or 
a general history of ra t io n a lity .^  In place of this history 
of science. Serres analyz discourses in relation
to other types of disct rder to show that a ll spheres
of knowledge in a certair. iod are isomorphic, that they are 
a ll models of the same structure. Foucault's history of madness 
bears sim ilarities to this kind of project, for his history 
undercuts the notion of a history »>f science by parenthesizing 
the terms in which madness is spoken for by science and by 
treating not a pre-given scientific  object, madness, but the 
changing relations of Reason and Unreason by whi•h that object 
is constructed.
Madness and C iv ilization  may thus be regarded as the f ir s t  
formative sketch from which Foucault was la ter to develop the 
archaeology as a method of the historical analysis of discursive 
events. I t  is significant that in this book, Foucault probes 
the boundaries of history and philosophy, and in so doing, he 
finds himself questioning the status of discourse Its e lf  posed 
as a "simple problem of elocution". In probing the lim its of 
Reason in the hope of catching a glimpse of the "sovereign 
enterprise of unreason", he finds himself at the lim it of culture 
and therefore of rational thought. I t  is a space which Foucault 
cannot escape, for to do so would be to forsake the project of c. 
history and relinquish the a b ility  to speak at a l l .  Madness is 
always the 'beyond' of language; wherever there is madness, 
language and discourse is somewhere else. Hence Foucault found
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himself in an Impasse, In which language and the practice of 
w riting  poses the essential problem. In the books that followed 
Madness and C iv iliza tio n  th is  problem became increasingly 
focussed upon as Foucault, realized the central importance of 
discourse and he function of language.
1.2 Space/Language/Death: The Birth of the Clinic
"This book is about space, about language, and about
death . . . "  (BC p.ix  Preface)
This opening to The Birth of the C lin ic16 indicates that there 
is a certain continuity between Madness and C ivilization and this 
book which f ir s t  appeared in French in 1963. The concept of space 
was utilized  in the earlie r book with regard to the institution of 
confinement - the space of madness to which Foucault could find no 
access but which taunted him as that wh ch lay on the other side 
of the lim its of thought. Here i t  is the space of the body - a 
readily available object to the gaze of the medical doctor that 
attracts his interest. In this la ter book, the attraction of the 
absolute lim it again comes into play; no longer as the lim it to 
philosophy and history, but as the very finitude of being - death 
I ts e lf .  Yet a new element, language, now appears between these 
two notions. Language has come into focus in its  own right; that 
is to say, i t  is not relegated to the wings by the problem focussed 
upon in the project, but the central core of the project its e lf .
This emergence of language as the pivot of Foucault's h istory of 
c lin ic a l medicine coincides with a subterranean s h ift  in his 
approach. In Madness and C iv i l ization, the focal point of the 
book is only sup e rfic ia lly  "madness i t s e l f  ; more precisely i t  
is  a fundamental otherness that circumscribes society. Hence 
the work constantly proceeds towards a point which is unattainable.
since madness Is regarded as a dark, enigmatic experience, an 
unknowable quality. As Dreyfus and Rablnow point out:
" It  1s only a slight distortion of the text to sub­
s titu te  'madness' for 'the word of God' and apply 
Foucault's own criticism  of hermeneutics ..  to his 
suggestion that madness Is a deep secret experience, 
masked by rationa lity  and discourse, of what 1t is 
to be human."
While the space that was to be charted in Madness and C iv i l i ­
zation was one which Is beyond actual ex>er1ence, the space 
which Foucault 1s concerned with in The Birth of the Clinic 
Is empirically available In that i t  is the space of the body 
and the eplstemologlcal configurations that are superimposed 
upon i t .  Foucault's book traces the mutations of these confi­
gurations that occur over the space of the body; from the 
medicine of symptoms to anatomo-clinical medicine.
The book opens with the comparison of two passages quoted from 
Pomme and Bayle; the former who wrote in the mid-eighteenth 
century and the la tte r  1n the 1820 's. The astounding difference 
in the language and the perception of the diseased body in these 
two quotations offsets the substance of the book. In the f ir s t  
of these, radical perception is governed by an o‘ ,at1on pro­
cess of external, and therefore v is ib le , combi uns of symptoms. 
Language and the object, words and things are related in an 
exterio rity ; that Is , by a representative function in which the 
symptoms which occur on the exterior surface of the body represent 
disease as opposed to health. The exerpt from Bayle's writing is 
typical of anatomo-clinical medicine, in which the space of the 
body is penetrated by language. A new criterion of objectivity  
which is based upon a correlation of the visible and the expressible. 
This medical experience is governed by the distinction between 
normal and abnormal functioning which, in turn, is rooted in the 
advent of morbid anatomy whereby i t  is the corpse that is central 
to the clin ical experience and which offers up knowledge of disease.
since madness Is regarded as a dark, enigmatic experience, an 
unknowable quality. As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out:
" I t  Is only a slight distortion of the text to sub­
s titu te  'madness' for ' the word of God1 and apply 
Foucault's own criticism  of hermeneutics . .  to his 
suggestion that madness Is a deep secret experience,
masked by rationality  and discourse, of what 1t Is
.  u u ,,17 to be human.
While the space that was to be charted In Madness and C iv i l i ­
zation was one which Is beyond actual experience, the space 
which Foucault Is concerned with in The Birth of the Clinic  
Is empirically available in that i t  is the space of the body 
and the epistemological configurations that are superimposed 
upon i t .  Foucault's book traces the mutations of these confi­
gurations that occur over the space of the body; from the 
medicine of symptoms to anatomo-clinical meoicine.
The book opens with the comparison of two passages quoted from 
Pomme and Bayle; the former who wrote in the mid-eighteenth 
century and the la tte r  in the 1820's. The astounding difference 
in the language and the perception of the diseased body in these 
two quotations offsets the substance of the book. In the f ir s t  
of these, medical perception is governed by an observation pro­
cess of external, and therefore v is ib le , combinations of symptoms. 
Language and the object, words and things are related in an 
exteriority ; that is , by a representative function in which the 
symptoms which occur on the exterior surface of the body represent 
disease as opposed to health. The exerpt from Bayle's writing is 
typical of anatomo-clinical medicine, in which the space of  the 
body is penetrated by language. A new criterion of objectivity  
which is based upon a correlation of the visible and the expressible. 
This medical experience is governed by the distinction between 
normal and abnormal functioning which, in turn, is rooted in the 
advent of morbid anatomy whereby i t  is the corpse that is central 
to the clin ical experience and which offers up knowledge of disease.
No longer Is the medical gaze the "speaking eye" focussed upon 
the body's surface where the combination of symptoms exposed 
there are available to Interpretative description; rather i t  
Is the objective gaze upon the "invisible v is ib ility "  of the 
space of the corpse now dissected, opened to view and so also 
to language. The medical gaze, now re lian t upon death for the 
space of the body and the course of disease inscribed upon i t  
to become available to description, objectifies the body of 
the individual 1n its  claims to s c ie n tiflc ity . This linkage 
of the body, death and knowledge, Foucault argues, reveals 
medical practice as the foundation of the human sciences. I t  
1s the f ir s t  means of studying man as an object where he is 
also the knowing subject. When death was Introduced as the a 
priori of medical knowledge, the Aristotelian law prohibiting 
scientific  discourse on the individual fe ll  away. Death con­
stantly reminds man of his lim it , his fin itude, but i t  is also 
exorcised throiigh the positive power that I t  authorizes, the 
positive power of discourse on "that technical world that is 
the armed, positive, fu ll form of his fin itude". (BC p .198) 
Contingent upon this Is the theme of death and the individual 
that pervade what Is generally called Romanticism. The dark, 
secret In te rio rity  of the individual is opened In the same 
movement as that In which man found the means to obtain positive
knowledge of himself:
" . . .  Is I t  surprising that the figures of knowledge 
and those of language should obey the same profound 
law, and that the eruption of finitude should domi­
nate, In the same way, this relation of man to death, 
which. In the f ir s t  case, authorizes a scientific  
discourse in a rational form, and In the second, opens 
up the source of a language that unfolds endlessly in 
the void le ft  by the absence of the gods." (BC p .198) 
These two themes link The Birth of the Clinic more to Foucault's 
next major work, The Order of Things than to Its  predecessor, 
Madness and C iv iliza tio n . In this next work, Foucault was to
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write an archaevi.yy j *  the human sciences, and in so doing, 
further scrutinize the configuration of language, death and the 
knowledge of the individual in modernity.
The importance of the practice of writing is undoubtedly apparent 
in the opening discussion of Bayle and Pomme. Yet the treatment 
of discourse in The Birth of the Clinic is d istinctly  different 
from that in its  predecessor. In his Preface, Foucault includes 
a short discussion of tht short-fa l1s of commentary:
"Commentary questions discourse as to what i t  says and 
intended to say; i t  tries  to uncover that deeper 
meaning of speech that enables i t  to achieve an identity  
with i ts e lf ,  supposedly nearer to its  essential truth; 
in other words, in stating what has been said, one has 
to re-state what has never been said." (BC p.xvi)
The sim ilarity of the project of Madness and C ivilization  to this 
description of commentary is clear, for Foucault's history of 
madness was indeed a search to uncover a deeper meaning, an unsaid 
or silence through the speech (parole) of those who addressed the 
object of Unreason or madness. The terms Foucault uses .n his 
description of commentary are s ignificant, for they point to his 
appropriation of structuralism which was in wide circulation at
that time. He suggests that:
" . . .  to comment is to admit by definition an excess of
the signified over the s ign ifie r . . .  S ignifier and 
signified thus assume a substantial autonomy that 
accords the treasure of a virtual signification to 
each of them separately; one may even exist without the 
other, and begin to speak of Its e lf :  commentary resides
in that supposed space." (BC p.xvi)
Foucault, having rejected the practice of commentary, attempts a 
"structural analysis" of the discourse of medical experience.
Such an analysis, he believes, w ill avoid the failures of commentary, 
for the facts of discourse would be "treated as events and functional 
segments gradually coming together to form a system". The treatment
of discourse as function Is explained further:
"The meaning of the statement would be defined not 
by the treasure of Intentions that I t  might contain,
. . .  but by the difference that articulates i t  upon 
the other real or possible statements, which are 
contemporary to I t  or to which i t  Is opposed In the 
linear series of time. A systematic history of 
discourses would then become possible." (BC p.xvll)
In the same year that Foucault's book was published, Roland
Barthes' essay "The Structuralist Activity" appeared.^9 The
parallels between Foucault's prefatory note regarding method
and Barthes' thoughts on structuralism are significant.
Barthes points out that structuralism is an activ ity  which has
as Its  goal the reconstruction of an object In such a manner
20that the rules of the object's functioning are manifested.
This activ ity  Involves two operations, namely dissection and 
articulation. The object Is dissected to discover "certain
mobile fragments whose d ifferentia l situation engenders a
21certain meaning". These basic elements have no meaning in 
themselves, but are parts of the syntactical chain producing 
meaning, and thus a change affecting an element affects a change 
In the whole. This bears a great resemblance to Foucault's 
"functional segments' which together may be articulated Into 
a system. A further sim ilarity  that may be found In Barthes' 
essay and Foucault's notion of a structural analysis of dis­
course, Is the importance of difference. The operation of 
articulation which binds the dispersion of objects into a 
system Is not a homogenizing process. The elements of the system 
are governed by rules of association which are based not upon 
Identity alone, but upon the difference that dictates their 
dispersion. Another point at which Barthes' essay and Foucault's 
prefatory notes are comparable is their assigning of importance 
to the analysis of the possibility of meaning. Barthes proposes: 
"Ultimately, one might say that the object of struc-
tu ra l1sm Is not man endowed with meanings but man 
fabricating meanings, as I f  I t  could not be the 
content of meanings which exhausted the semantic 
goals of humanity, but only the act by which these 
meanings, historical and contingent variables, are 
produced."22
Likewise, In The Birth of the C lin ic , Foucault Is not concerned 
with the truth value of the discourses he analyzes, rather his 
project "sets out to disentangle the conditions of Its  history 
from the density of discourse". (BC p.xlx) Foucault continues: 
"What counts in the things said by men Is not so much 
what they may have thought or the extent to which 
these things represent their thoughts, as that which
systematizes them from the outset, thus making them
thereafter endlessly accessible to new discourses and 
open to the task of transforming them." (BC p.xlx)
As medical perception, like  psychiatry, possesses a history, 1t 
cannot possess an absolute Truth. I t  is here that Foucault's 
analysis begins to take on Its  own uniqueness. Unlike the 
majority of structuralist writings, Foucault's works emerge 
out of the questioning of present systems, a questioning which
Is directed at their historical conditions of existence. In
this way, his analyses are focussed upon the ruptures that occur 
in the apparently continuous thread of the histories, of madness 
and the c lin ic . What 1s at stake In these analyses and what 
differentiates them from structuralism per se. Is that the
structures being scrutinized are not stable and atemporal, but
23in the throes of rearticulation.
In this regard The Birth of the Clinic Is an attempt at deter­
mining the historical conditions of possibility of modern medical 
experience, of both Its  practice and Its  discourse and the manner 
in which these Interrelate within the space of the body. The 
search for a means by which the secret experience of the "other", 
madness, might be charted had led Foucault to the problem of
language. His f ir s t  major publication had approached this 
problem through a type of hermeneutics, the only method that 
could attempt to plumb the depths of such an Illus ive  subject.
The Birth of the Clinic reveals a change of direction. The 
tools of hermeneutics are rejected, and In their place, the 
terms of structuralism are u tilized . Yet the project Its e lf  
is not s tric tly  in keeping with the more widely accepted notion 
of a structuralist a c tiv ity , for the point of interference 
that Foucault u tilizes  Is not the system j r  structure Its e lf ,  
but the historical Interstices at which one structure gives 
way to another. A1ready, in this work, Foucault is moving 
towards a clearer definition of the archaeology as a specific 
method of analyzing discourse. This movement Is encapsulated 
In a question Foucault poses:
"Is I t  not possible to make a structural analysis of 
discourses that would evade the fate of cormentary 
by supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what 
has been said, but only the fact of Its  historical 
appearance?" (BC p .x v ll)
This treatment of the fact of discourse as a specifically  
historical event removes the archaeological analysis from 
that of structuralism, from the constant play of the s lgn lfler  
and the signified. The discursive event 1s apprehended at a 
level where the relations governing Its  possibility of appearance 
may be traced. Its meaning and t-uth-value are relegated to 
the periphery as the focus of the analysis Is upon the conditions 
of Its  production. The archaeological method treats a ll discourse, 
both archaic and modern, at this level where I t  Is regarded as a 
meaningless object. Here, what seems as Incomprehensible as 
Pomme's "language of fantasy" Is to modern medical experience. Is 
found to be within a systematic order of Its  own, separated from 
the present configuration of knowledge by an irreparable scission.
1.3: Words and Things: The Order of Things
Three years a fter The Birth of the C lin ic , Foucault published 
his major work The Order of Things. 24 Foucault regarded 
the work as the study of "a re lative ly  neglected f ie ld " , (OTp.lx) 
as historians of science had hitherto concerned themselves with 
the exact sciences of mathematics and physics, Foucault's work 
centres upon the empirical sciences, philology, biology and 
po litica l economy. The range of the project together with the 
novelty of the claims that are made in i t ,  lent the work an 
immediate attraction to critics  on both sides of the A tlantic, 
and i t  was undoubtedly this work that drew the attention of 
Anglo-American academics to the work of Foucault.25
In a foreword to the English edition, Foucault offered the 
following account of his aims in The Order of Things:
"What I wished to do was to present, side by side, 
a definite number of elements: the knowledge of
living beings, the knowledge of the laws of language, 
and the knowledge of economic facts, and to relate 
them to the philosophical discourse that was contem­
porary with them during a period extending from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century." (OT p.x)
This concern with the articulation of knowledge and discourse 
is not surprising given the nature of Foucault's ea rlie r work. 
However, i t  does appear that a sh ift has taken place between 
The Birth of the Clinic with its  concern with language and the 
knowledge of the body and The Order of Things in which discourse 
appears to predominate. The question arises as to whether dis­
course replaces language as a concept, or whether the treatment 
of the practice of writing and speaking in the two works is the 
same, and that the change in terminology amounts to a mere 
c larifica tio n . The la tte r proposition seems to make more sense 
i f  one returns to the comparison of Bayle and Pomme in The Birth 
of the C lin ic , for Foucault's treatment of these exerpts is in
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the ligh t of the transformation of medical discourse and is not 
in terms of a linguistic analysis. I t  is important to note that 
in the foreword to the English edition Foucault disclaims any 
relation to structuralism. The terminology of structuralism in 
The Birth of the C lin ic is no longer in evidence in The Order 
of Things and i t  is possible that "language"* has likewise been 
replaced by the more exact term "discourse" with an emphasis 
upon the function of language rather than its  structural analysis 
in order to maintain the distance that Foucault Inaugurates 
between his own work and structural ism.
At the point of articulation of discourse and knowledge, Foucault 
posits the concept of the episteme, or the "epistemological field"  
In which discourse and knowledge find the ir conditions of possi­
b i l i ty .  As in The Birth of the C lin ic, Foucault problematizes 
the emergence of a discourse and questions i t  not for its  truth- 
value or meaning in relation to a real referent, but regarding 
the possibility of its  appearance. The episteme is the sub­
terranean level at which these conditions of emergence may be 
apprehended:
"In any given culture and at any given moment, there 
is always only one episteme that defines the conditions 
of possibility of a ll knowledge, whether expressed in 
a theory or s ilen tly  invested in a practice." (OT p.168) 
Thus i t  is upon the level of the episteme that the relations 
between the discursive practices of empirical sciences and philo­
sophical discourse w ill be inscribed. The episteme is thus a 
space in which knowledge is constituted and in which i t  is 
sustained by discursive practices operating as a set of historical 
rules regulating the production of discourses.
Foucault's point of departure is thus radically different from 
that of traditional historians of science. Whereas histories of 
science describe what Foucault calls the "negative" unconscious 
of science, and describes as "that which resists i t ,  deflects i t ,
or disturbs i t " ,  (OT p .x l) ,  the archaeology Is proposed as a 
description of the 'positive' unconscious of knowledge. Through 
this distinction, Foucault refers somewhat obliquely to the 
specificity of the archaeological leve l, at which no account is 
taken of the consciousness of any individual scientist cr the 
effects of influence or trad ition . In positing the episteme, 
Foucault claims to focus purely at the level of discourse, yet 
through the comparative analysis of different positiv ities of 
knowledge, he attempts to reveal the ir shared conditions of 
emergence and mutation.
The subtitle of the book, An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 
indicates the problem towards which Foucault 1? working. The 
Order of Things is structurally sim ilar to Madness and C iv ili ­
zation and The Birth of the Clinic since a ll three end with the 
discussion of a modern problem which is the point of interference 
from which the book results. Foucault's procedure is thus the 
delimitation of r problem, from which he embarks backward* through 
time in order to trace out the conglomeration of relations that 
constitute that problem. In the case of The Order of Things, i t  
is the present inefficacy of the human sciences that is the 
impetus behind the book. Thus in each of the epistemes - the 
Renaissance, Classical and Modern - Foucault traces the confi­
guration of the subject in relation to knowledge and discourse.
1.3.1: The Renaissance Episteme
The Order of Things begins i t  archaeological analysis of the human 
sciences with a discussion of the conditions of knowledge in the 
Renaissance. This epistemic configuration is shaped by the notion 
of resemblance which governed the network of correspondences 
between words and things. Knowledge was therefore the discernment 
of such connections. Foucault describes the semantic web of the
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Renaissance in terms of four principle figures: convenientia,
aemulatio, analogy, sympathy and antipathy which operate as 
forces in tension. Together these figures define the space 
of resemblance in which man occupies a central position:
"He is the great fulcrum of proportions - the centre 
upon which relations are concentrated and from which 
they are once again reflected." (OT p .23)
Man is thus a privileged point in that he occupies the site  
most saturated by these relations of resemblance, but i t  is 
only as the grid through which the figures of resemblance enter 
knowledge that Man is central in this network.
The f ir s t  principle of Renaissance knowledge was that a Divine 
order was operative in the world, which could be uncovered by 
knowing the order of resemblance. This knowledge of similitudes 
was gained through signs le f t  by God which had to be recognized 
and Interpreted. The centrality  of Man in this order fac ilita ted  
the acquisition of this knowledge. All things in the world have 
a signature which, whr ^ciphered, would provide the place of 
the object in the order of the world, revealing its  function and 
meaning. The sign system, of the Renaissance was thus ternary, 
consisting of its  meaning content, its  signature and its  relative  
position to other things as a sim ilitude. Man occupied his p riv i­
leged position only by virtue of his God-given power to recognize 
t!.a signature, synthesize similitudes and Interpret the meaning 
of the object.
As nature wa% considered divinely ordered, so too was language 
ordered in a direct relation of resemblance to things in the 
world. Words existed as absolute and transparent signs for things, 
but this order of language mirroring the order of things had been 
fragmented as a result of the F a ll. The function of knowledge in 
the Renaissance was thus that of reconstructing the signs of the 
world and language in order to reacquire total knowledge. The 
form of discourse that fac ilita ted  this reconstruction was commentary.
which called into being beneath the existence of things and words 
another more fundamental discourse paramount to a Primal Text 
Inscribed by the hand of God. Knowledge was thus caught between 
the Primal Text I t  sought to a tta in , and the confusion of the 
world; between the in fin ity  of interpretation and the never- 
ending search i ■ resemblances. I t  is this problem of how the 
sign is linked to the signified that heralded the Classical 
episteme as a new configuration of knowledge whose answer was 
the analysis of representation.
At the juncture between the Renaissance and the Classical epistemes, 
Foucault places Cervantes' Don Quixote:
"With a ll their twists and . ns, Don Quixote's adventures 
form a boundary: they ma" th . end of the old interplay
between resemblance and s idns and contain the beginnings 
of new relations. . Don Quixote is not a man given to
extravagance, but r, r a d iligent pilgrim breaking his
journey before a ll the marks of similitude. He is the
hero of the Same." (OT p.46)
Quixote's travels constitute a search in the world for the forms 
of similitude that w ill prove that what his books say s t r ie .  In 
his deciphering of the world, he finds that the language of the 
world and that of his books do not correspond; that resemblances 
and signs are not aligned. In this world of differences between 
the word and the thing, Quixote's similitudes tend towards madness 
in their deception, yet also towards the visionary or poetic.
With the sp litting  of signs and similitudes in the Classical 
episteme, language breaks with the word to enter a space of its  
own as literatu re  while resemblances are relegated to the realm 
of madness, imagination and delusion. Between them, a new fie ld  
of knowledge based upon identity and difference opens. I t  is this 
effect that Don Quixote illuminates as i t  portrays a world in 
which signs and similitudes are 1r "lay with identity and differenc
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1.3 .2 . The Classical Eplsteme
Foucault posits an 'epistemic break1 or a rupture between the 
Renaissance and Classical configurations of knowledge at the 
turn of the seventeenth century. Resemblance, once regarded 
as the touchstone in the pursuit of knowledge, is now regarded 
as error, and relegated to Baroque art with its  "trompe-1'oeil" 
painting and drama of comic illusion. While resemblance was 
rejected, the act of comparison was maintained as a form of 
knowledge. The Classical eplsteme was organized by two types 
of comparison: measurement, which entailed the division of 
the whole into parts according to a common unit upon which 
arithmetical relations of equality or inequality were ascertained; 
and order which established series of elements from the simplest 
unit to the most complex. This new space of knowledge thus no 
longer questioned the being of things, but problematized how 
they could be known.
The sign system of the Renaissance s p lit  down the middle with 
the dissociation of comparison from resemblance. On the one 
hand, the link between the sign and the signature broke as the 
notion of the signature became vestigial in the Classical con­
figuration of knowledge. This allowed arbitrariness, and the 
sign became a tool of analysis by which identity and difference 
could be discerned. On the other hand, similitudes, now sp lit  
o ff from signatures, became mere natural repetitions in the 
order of things. Consequently, where the Renaissance sign system 
had been ternary, with the expulsion of the signature, the 
Classical sign system is binary, consisting of a duplication o \  
representative functioning within the sign Its e lf .
The f ir s t  relation of representation is that of an indication, 
or the relation of thought to the object in the world. This 
relation encloses a second relation, in which the sign, the word 
or trace, has no content or function other than that which i t
represents - the representation of the representation of the 
object of thought. In this duplication, the sign is effaced 
as i t  is co-extensive with thought as a whole. Because of 
th is , no theory of signification was possible in the Classical 
episteme. There is complete transparency between the sign and 
its  content, language and thought are co-extensive:
" . . .  one might say that language in the Classical 
era does not exist. But that i t  functions: its
whole existence is located in its  representative 
role, is limited precisely to that role and fin a lly  
exhausts i t .  Language has no other locus, no other 
value than in representation . . . "  (OT p .79)
Language as a logical, successive process, plays a decisive 
role in knowledge through organizing thought. As language is 
co-existent with the space of representation and as i t  represents 
a ll representations, i t  is the element of the universal, the 
model upon which the empirical sciences find their foundation. 
Fducault summarizes the relation of language and knowledge in 
the axiom "To know is to speak correctly". (OT p.87) However, 
language is knowledge only in the unreflective form. I t  is the 
primary break with the immediate, and thus the in it ia l step 
towards the verification of each wore and each relation within 
which i t  participates. In this regard, the Classical science of 
general grammar took as its  object not language, but discourse, 
for discourse "is merely representation its e lf  represented by 
verbal signs". (OT p.81) Consequently, the Renaissance activ ity  
of commentary which constituted a search for meaning, is replaced 
by criticism  in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which 
the function of the sign is problematized, so that the analysis 
of discourse in the Classical episteme questions tU  sign in terms 
of precision and appropriateness.
As the sign system is open to arbitrariness, probability and 
combination are introduced into Classical analysis. This together
with the transparency of language and Its  co-extensiveness 
with knowledge 1s the basis for the taxonomic table within 
which the empirical sciences are organized. This table, in 
which the to ta lity  of signs are properly ordered according 
to identity and difference, makes possible the analysis of 
things in the vorld as i t  is the condition of possibility  
of the Classical general science of order. This space of 
signs delimited by, on the one side, mathesls as the science 
of calculable order of simple to complex units, and on the 
other, by genesis as the analysis of the hidden continuum of 
being into empirical series of development. In the case of 
the la tte r . Investigations were not geared towards the material 
transformations of the word, but concerned with the constancy 
of the signification, (OT p .109) as words were not situated 
In the table according to a temporality, but had their locus 
in a tropologies! space In which they could reveal the relations 
of things In the world.
At the centre of the Classical table of representation is the 
name, which organizes a ll Classical discourse as the end to­
wards which a ll discourse strives:
" . . .  to speak or to write is not to say things or
to express oneself, i t  is not a matter of playing
with language, i t  is to make one's way towards the 
sovereign act of nomination, to move, through language 
towards the place where things and words are conjoined 
in their common essence, and which makes i t  possibl- 
to give them a name." (OT p .117)
In naming, human nature transforms the confusion of nature into 
identities , through imagination and memory, and differences 
inscribed within the table of knowledge as sequences of repre­
sentations. Yet this function of human nature to name does not 
open a space specific to Man. Representation exists for the 
Classical spectator who is himself effaced from discourse or 
table of knowledge. Man appears in Classical knowledge only
as an element among other tabulated elements. Foucault argues 
tha t:
" . . .  in the Classical age, discourse is that translu­
cent necessity through which representation and beings 
must pass - as beings are represented to the mind's 
eye, and as representation renders beings visible in 
the ir truth." (0T p .311) 
ience i t  is not human nature, consciousness or Man, but iscourse 
which duplicates and expresses the representations that organize 
the table of knowledge.
As with the discourse of the empirical sciences. Classical lite ra ­
ture strives towards the ultimate c la rity  and precision of the 
name. "(OT p.118) Foucault perceives this movement towards nomination 
in the language i f  t.ie constrained confessions of Richardson's 
Pamela to the violent l i f e  of Sade's J u lie tte . All Classical 
lite ra tu re  is situateo between the figure of the name and the 
name its e lf ,  so tnat its  task, underlying its  affected refinement 
of new figures to name the same thing, is that of finding at last 
the nan*, of that v,hich has never been named before,
" . . .  those secrets of the soul, those impressions born 
at the frontier of things and the body . . .  Later Roman­
ticism was to believe that i t  had broken with the previous 
age because i t  had learned to name things by their name.
In fact a ll Classicism tended.towards this end ..."  (OTp.118) 
Thus Romanticism, for Foucault, straddles the epistemic break between 
Classicism and the Modern, containing elements of both configurations 
of knowledge. However, Foucault does not elaborate in this regard, 
rather he focusses upon the work of the Marquis de Sade in which he 
finds the lim its of the Classical episteme. In these works, desire 
is explored within the sequential ordering of Classical discourse.
The series of scenes in Sade's novels form a tabulation of lic e n ti-  
ciousness in which every conceivable form 1» named. Thus, in these
texts, Foucault finds:
" I t  is no longer the . . .  triumph of representation over
resemblance; i t  is the obscure and repeated violence 
of desire battering at the lim its of representation." 
(OT p .210)
Sade * is the last discourse which attempts to name, but in so 
doi , i t  takes nomination to in fin ity  by naming everything. 
The name become:*, both the fu lfillm ent and the substance of 
language, and i t  is this that places Sade's work at the lim it 
of the Classical episteme. Once the order of representation 
disintegrates, the elements of Sade's discourse - violence, 
l i f e ,  death, desire and sexuality - escape and extend beyond 
the dimension of the table of representation.
1.3.3: The Modern Episteme
The condition of possibility of the Classical table of rep­
resentation upon which knowledge was ordered, was the assumption 
of the continuum of being within the space o the table. This 
continuum was not questioned, or more exactly, i t  was not 
questionable, in the Classical episteme because being coincided 
with representation and was therefore transparent in the episte- 
mological framework of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Foucault posits an epistemic break at the turn of the nineteenth 
century in which the Modem episteme emerges as a distinct 
epistemological framework, which may be envisaged as a new stratum 
In the history of the empirical sciences. This epistemic rupture 
Is marked by the problematization of the notion of the continuum 
of being within representation.
The f ir s t  modern attempt to overstep the lim its of representation
was made by Kant:
"The Kantian critique . . .  questions representation, 
not in accordance with the endless movement that 
proceeds from the simple element to a ll its  possible
combinations, but on the basis of its  rightful lim its. 
Thus i t  sanctions for the f ir s t  time that event in 
European culture which coincides with the end of the 
eighteenth century: the withdrawal of knowledge and
thought outside the space of representation. That 
space is brought into question in its  foundation, its  
origin and its  lim its . . ."  (OT p.242)
With the focus of Classical criticism  upon the foundations of 
representation, the fie ld  of representation appears as a meta­
physics:
"Criticism brings out the metaphysical dimension that 
eighteenth century philosophy had attempted to reduce 
solely by means of the analysis of representation.
But i t  opens up at the same time the possibility of 
another metaphysics; one whose purpose w ill be to 
question, apart from representation, a ll that is the 
source and origin of representation, i t  makes possible 
those philosophies of L ife , the Will and the Word that 
the nineteenth century is to deploy in the wake of 
criticism ." (OT p .243)
With the dissolution of the space of representation, two new 
forms of thought emerge. The f ir s t  questions the conditions of 
the relation between representations from the point of view of 
the being or object represented, whether this object is the 
force of labour, the energy of l i f e  or the power of speech.
The conditions of existence of these objects become the basis 
upon which the conditions of possibility of experience and its  
representation are sought. The second form of thought questions 
the possibility of the relation between representations and 
appeals to the transcendental fie ld  of the subject, the analysis 
of which uncovers the basis of possible connections between 
representations. This line of thought in which the subject 
determines in its  relation to the object the possible conditions 
of experience, identifies the conditions of possibility of the
object with the conditions of possibility of experience. Thus 
labour, l i f e  and language exist outside knowledge as transcen­
dental s. The modern space of knowledge is thus characterized 
by an irremediable s p lit  between analysis and synthesis, and
is thus fragmented along two axes - that of the being of
objects and that of the transcendental subjectivity:
" . . .  the thought that is contemporaneous with us,
and with which . . .  we think, is s t i l l  largely
dominated by the impossibility, brought to ligh t 
towards the end of the eighteenth century, of 
basing syntheses in the space of representation, 
and by the correlative obligation - simultaneous 
but Immediately divided against its e lf  - to open 
up the transcendental fie ld  of subjectivity, and 
to constitute Inversely, beyond the object, what 
are for us the 'quasi-transcendentals' of L ife ,
L&bour nd Language." (OT p .250)
These quasi-transcendentals, which become the objects of the 
empirical sciences, are formulated outside the table of rep­
resentation, in the gaps that existed beyond its  sway. In 
this regard, Foucault perceives the transformation of empirical 
knowledge from Classical to Modern as an "inversion", a move­
ment from within the constraints of the space of representation 
to that space beyond i t .  These objects of the modern empirical 
sciences are thus not evolved from their classical counterparts. 
L ife , for example, is a specifically nineteenth century concept, 
the emergence of which is separated from Classical natural 
history (and its  object, the order of beings) by a rupture on 
the archaeological level. The modern biological perception of 
organic structures, whose processes during l i fe  are traceable 
after death, introduces the dichotomy of l i fe  and death into 
knowledge.26 Likewise, in Classical analyses of wealth, the 
object, wealth, was regarded as the representation of the 
exchange of objects of desire, but with the demise of represen­
tation , po litica l economy was constituted with the novel concept
of labour, which involves production time, as its  object, in 
both cases, the mutations from Classical to Modern Involve the 
formulation of the modern object of empirical science outside 
the space of representation and the introduction of a temporal 
orientation. The organizing force that deploys knowledge in 
the Modem episteme is thus no longer spatial order, but history. 
In the modern configuration of knowledge, history is both a 
body of knowledge - the empirical investigation of events - and 
the mode of beiig of empiricity Its e lf .  (OT p .219)
The collapse of representation had similar effects upon language. 
In Classicism, language was an immediate unfolding of represen­
tations - the transparent medium tnrough which thought and being
were linked. In the Modern episteme, i t  was liberated from
this site dictated by representation and acquired a being proper 
to its e lf:
"From the nineteenth century, language began to fold 
in upon its e lf ,  to acquire its  own particular density, 
to deploy a history, an ob jectiv ity , and laws of its  
own. I t  became one object of knowledge among others, 
on the same level as liv ing beings, wealth and value 
and the history of events and men . . .  To know language 
is no longer to come as close as possible to knowledge
its e lf ,  i t  is merely to apply the methods of under­
standing in general to a particular domain of objecti­
v ity ."  (OT p .296)
Constituted outside the lim its of representation, the philological 
positiv ity  no longer regarded the word as attached to a represen­
tation except in so far as i t  is a part of the grammatical 
organization by which means language defines its  own coherence. 
Four theoretical threads Indicate the constitution of philology. 
The f ir s t  of these concerns the way a language is characterized 
Internally and.distinguished from other languages. Secondly, 
with Rask, Grimm and Bopp, language was treated as a to ta lity  of 
phonetic elements and scrutinized for internal variations. A
theory of the root developed which became a d e fin ite , lim ited 
method of analysis in place of Classical general grammar s 
endless regress towards prim itive  language, here, language 
is  no longer perceived as rooted in 'th ings ' but in the 
speaking subject. Lastly, languages were scrutinized fo r 
th e ir  proximity and grouped accordingly in to systems of kin­
ship. Hence language in the nineteenth century was no longer 
a condition of knowledge existing outside of knowledge as a 
consequence of its  position re la tive  to representation, but 
was demoted to being a h is to rica l object of which knowledge 
is attainable through analysis.
This demotion was compensated fo r in a variety o* ays.
F irs t ly ,  since i t  is a necessary medium fo r * ny  s : ie n t if ic  
thought, there was in the nineteenth century, e wish to neu­
tra liz e  i t  so that i t  would exactly reflec , or-verbal 
knowledge, and a symbolic language transparent to thought 
could be devised. Secondly, language as an object with a 
h is to rica l re a lity  was regarded as uhe vehicle fo r "unspoken 
habits of thought" (OT p .297) and unconscious norms of tra d itio n . 
Hence, the nineteenth century saw the revival of techniques of 
exegesis which attempt to perceive a ll that is  being articu la ted 
through words. Foucault finds examples of th is  in the works of 
Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. (OT p .298) Philology, as the emerging 
study of language thus contained a c r it ic a l value, as the 
analysis of what is said in the depths of discourse, ( i t )  has 
become the modern form of c r it ic is m ." (OT p .298)
The las t means o f compensation that Foucault perceives, is the 
appearance of lite ra tu re  in the sense of the iso la tion of a 
form of language as " l i t e ra r y " .  He situates the b irth  of 
lite ra tu re
" . . .  at the beginning of the nineteenth century, at a 
time when language was burying i t s e l f  w ith in its  own 
density as an object and allowing i ts e l f  to be
traversed, through and through, by knowledge, I t  was 
also reconstituting Its e lf  elsewhere, In an Indepen­
dent form, d if f ic u lt  to access, folded back upon the 
enigma pf Its  own o'* and existing wholly In 
reference to pur-1 act of writing." (OT p .300) 
Literature xnd philology a. * twin figures In contestation with 
each other, for where philology Investigates the being of 
language, lite ra tu re  releases language 1n its  being and allows i t  
to play £f«!lctss1y. The function of lite ra tu re  in the nineteenth 
century was to become "progressively more differentiated from 
the discourse of Ideas, and (enclose) Its e lf  within a radical 
In tran s itiv ity" . (OT p.^OO) I t  becomes the manifestation of a 
language that refers to its e lf  alone, addressing Its e lf  to the 
affirmation of Its  own existence, designating nothing but Its e lf:  
" . . .  I t  addresses Its e lf  to Its e lf  as a writing sub­
je c tiv ity , or seeks to re-apprehend the essence of a ll 
l l te ra t jre  in the movement that brought i t  Into being; 
and thu:s a ll its  threads converge upon the finest 
points •• singular, Instantaneous, and yet absolutely 
universal - upon the simple act of writing. (OT p .300)
Language, which under the reign of representation a ll but dis­
appeared except for Its  apprehension 1n the form of Discourse, 
re-emerges at the turn of the nineteenth century as an object 
of knowledge In Its  own right under the focus of philology, as 
an organism whose opaque depth is to be plumbed by exegesis for 
the laws of Its  historical re a lity , and as an Isolated form that 
manifests nothing but Its  own being. Language reappears, there­
fore. but Is Immediately fragmented in Its  function.
But le t us return to the general configuration of modern knowledge 
to <ee where these various forms of language are situated with 
regard to the human sciences and the emerging figure of Han. The 
Modem episteme is , as we h .ve seen, Instituted by a rending of the 
two-dimensional, continuous fabric of representation. The now
configuration that en\ les 1s characterized by three axes which 
occupy a new three-dimensional space: the axis of the 'pure'
sciences of mathematics and physics (the transformation of which 
In the mutation of knowledge from Classical to Modern stretches 
beyond the scope of The Order of inlngs); the axis of the 
empirical sciences of linguistics, po litica l economy and biology 
which take as their objects of knowledge language, labour ano 
l i f e ;  and the axis of the post-Kantlan philosophy of the 
transcendental subject which takes as Its  object the problems of 
the va lid ity  and conditions of knowledge. I t  Is the sp lit 
between the empirical sciences and the philosophy of the trans­
cendental subject that interests Foucault, for I t  Is In the space 
opened by this sp lit that he situates the human sciences.
Suspended above linguistics, po litica l economy and biology are 
the human sciences of lite ra ry  studies, sociology and psychology 
respectively. These are held In suspension in this space by the 
relations they share with the empirical sciences and philosophy: 
un the one hand, they borrow the metnods of the empirical sciences 
and on the other, the ir object Is taken from the post-Kantlan 
philosophy of the transcendental subject. Hence, in the consti­
tution of the human sciences is an im plicit tension which accounts 
for their in s tab ility  and heterogeneity.
Contingent upon this deployment of the human sciences within the 
Modern eplsteme 1s Foucault's critique of the sovereign Subject, 
a critique which necessarily elucidates the arguments Foucault 
makes with regard to the Inefficacy of those sciences that take 
as their object the new eplstemologlcal figure oi Man. In the 
Classical eplsteme, there was no space specific to Man, as he 
existed within the space of the table of representation as one 
element among others. A science of Man was excluded as human 
existence was contained In the nexus of representation and being. 
This 1s best exemplified by the Cartesian "coglto ergo sum", in 
which Classical language as discourse reveals the linkage between 
representation and being. As long as the continuum of represen­
tation in language existed, the mode of being of "cogito could 
not be interrogated. The rent of the fabric of representation 
that occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century coincided 
with the appearance of Man as a oossible object of knowledge, 
and was thus the condition of possibility of those modern sciences 
that take this figure as their object.
The in ab ility  of the human sciences to attain a real level of 
s c ie n tific ity  rests in the figure of Man around which they 
gravitate. Man operates as both the subject of knowledge and 
the object of knowledge in these po s itlv ities , and i t  is this 
that is the tension upon which the human sciences are constituted 
and upon which they continually fa lte r . The quasi-transcendentals 
of Language, Labour and Life which are the objects of philology, 
politica l economy and biology respectively are replaced by Man 1i 
lite ra ry  studies, sociology and psychology. Man reflects upon 
himself, for i t  is he that speaks, that labours and lives:
" . . .  (Man), as soon as he thinks, "ely unveils him­
self to his own eyes in tne form of a being who is 
already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an 
irreducible anterio rity , a living being, an instru­
ment of production, a vehicle for words which exist 
before him. All these contents that his knowledge 
reveals to him as exterior to himself, and older .tan 
his own b irth , anticipate him, overhang him with a ll 
their so lidarity , and traverse him as though he were 
merely an object of nature, a face doomed to be erased 
in the course of history. Man's f in i t  'de is 
heralded . . . "  (OT p .313)
As knowing subject and knowable object, the figure of Man faces 
in two directions. He is determined as f in ite  by the empirical 
sciences, yet he also determines the forms and possibilities of 
knowledge which are fixed in philosophy. Through his mediation 
of the determinations of the empirical sciences upon him and his 
determination j f  the conditions of knowledge, Man claims total
self knowledge on the basis of his fin itude. Finitude is thus 
both the lim itation and foundation of knowledge in the human 
sciences. However, the duality of the figure of Man - his status 
of transcendental subject taken over from post-Kantian philosophy 
and his finitude as an empirical object - leads to the endless 
oscillation of the human sciences between defining him with 
regard to his finitude and the analytic of that finitude on the 
basis of w**t Man is . I t  is to this that Foucault refers when 
he speaks of Man as an empirico-transcendental doublet. The 
crisis of the human sciences lies  in the double nature of Man, 
for he can claim neither the immediate transparency of a "cogito" 
or transcendental category, nor the place of an object capable 
of acquiring self-knowledge.
In the Modem episteme, Man's a b ility  to think himself is crucial 
to his defin ition , but this self-consciousness is not attainable 
as a spontaneous form of knowledge:
"Man and the unthought are, at the archaeological 
leve l, contemporaries. Man has not been able to 
describe himself as a configuration in the episteme 
without thought * t  the same time discovering, both 
in its e lf  and outside I ts e lf ,  . . .  an element of 
darkness, an apparently inert density in which i t  is 
embedded, an unthought which i t  contains en tire ly , 
yet in which i t  is also caught." (OT p .326)
Thought thus becomes, as Nietzsche and Sade perceived, a 
"perilous act" (OT p .328) in which i t  moves towards unthought 
in an e ffo rt to bring i t  under the sway of thought. However, 
this attempt continually transforms the mode of being of Man, 
and renews the oscillation of his analyses between the trans­
cendental and empirical polos of his existence.
With the collapse of representation, the inversion of Clas. cal 
knowledge as formulated within the space of a table gave way 
the Modern episteme which has a temporal rather than spatial
orientation. While the new1,* formed objects of knowledge; 
Language, Life and Labour, acquired their own h is t '- Ic lt le s ,
Man's relation to his origin was likewise problematized.
This origin is not so much his beginning as the manner in 
which he articulates himself upon the already h istorically  
constituted background of L ife , Labour and Language. Against 
this background which endlessly recedes in the face of empirical 
investigation, Man is always already there. I t  is therefore 
his own a b ility  to temporalize that fa c ilita te s  the possibility  
of time and history;
" . . .  i t  is in him that things (those same things that 
hang over him) find their beginning; rather than a 
cut, made at some given moment in duration, he is the
opening from which time in general can be reconstituted,
duration can flow, and things, at the appropriate
moment, can make their appearance." (OT p .33?
Hence Man is both the product of history whose origin is irreme- 
d ia lly  obscured, and the source of that history. His inab ility  
to recover his origin serves as an empirical lim itation , echoing 
his finitude. However this lim itation is also the transcendental
source of History, the beginnings of which continually retreat
before empirical investigation.
The Modem episteme is thus dominated by the figure of Man who 
takes over from language as discourse as a condition of knowledge. 
On the one hand, the analytic of the human being presents him as 
a f in ite  and determined object, yet on the other, as the transcen­
dental subject operates as a centre which regulates knowledge. In 
this respect, modern knowledge is doomed to an endless movement 
between the empirical and transcendental lim its that pivot about 
the central figure of Man. Foucault argues that the pres nt state 
of knowledge on the archaeological level is that of a new trans­
formation in which a passage out of the impasse of the Modern 
upisteme is currently opening;
"For the entire modern epis*.eme - that which was formed
towards the end of the eighteenth century and s t i l l  
serves as the positive ground of our knowledge, that 
which constituted Man's particular mode of being and 
the possibility of knowing empirically - that entire  
eplsteme was bound up with the disappearance of 
Discourse and its  featureless reign, with the sh ift 
of language towards objectivity and with Its  reappear­
ance In multiple form. I f  this same language is now 
emerging with greater and grecter Insistence In a 
unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so,
1$ this not the sign that the whole of this configu­
ration is now about to topple and that Man is in the 
process of perishing as the being of language continues 
to shine ever brighter upon our horizon." (OT pp.385-386)
Thus the contemporary structuralist sciences, such as Lacanian
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structural psychoanalysts, Levi-Strauss' ethnology and t 
structural linguistics from Jakobson to Grtimas,*"^ are for 
Foucault the primary, faltering steps of evacuation from the 
Modem episteme as their focus upon language or signifying systems 
as objects of knowledge contain no site  specific to Man. Yet 
Foucault himself is not content to remain within the dubious 
boundaries of the structuralist project as his own methodology 
clearly shows. Instead, he situates structuralism h istorica lly , 
within the Modern episteme from which "he Foucauldian pruject 
launches its e lf .
1.4 Conclusion
The three projects of Madness and C iv iliza tio n , The Birth of the 
Clinic and The Order of Things that we have discussed thu. far 
appear as disparate and dispersed fragments flung across the 
total fie ld  of knowledge. Indeed, they appear as disconnected 
as the entries In Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia which Foucault
quotes In his Preface to The Order of Things, for where the 
entries in the Chinese encyclopaedia seem to have no reasonable 
relation with each other, so our chronological description of 
Foucault's works seems to present an entry into « new domain 
with each work discussed. However, to attempt to impose a 
causality upon the chronological appearance of these three 
books would be to misrepresent the complexity of relations 
they have with each other. Conversely, an attempt to discern 
a ready-made system would lead to the same result. Even so, 
in the comparative reading of these texts, important areas f f  
divergence and coherence appear which must be taken into accoui/. 
I t  is from these that we may start in answering the question of 
what Foucault means by referring to his historical analysis of 
the asyV m, the c lin ic  and the human sciences as "archaeologies".
F irs tly , a distinction that begs to be made is that Foucault is 
a historian of knowledge, but not a historian of science. In , 
Madness and C iv iliza tio n , the modern space of the asylum, the 
knowledge that pervades i t  and which apprehends the madman as 
object, is scrutinized for its  historical constitution, while 
in The Birth of the C lin ic , the emergence of the space of the 
body as the object of knowledge constituted in and consituting 
the modern c lin ic ian 's  discourse is investigated with regard to 
the changing function of language. Lastly, The Order of Things 
traces the historical relations that converge to admit the 
emergence of the human sciences. In each case, i t  is not the 
science its e lf  that is the object of historical description; 
the concepts of psychiatry, c lin ical medicine and the human 
sciences are not accounted for in terms of their truth and their 
development towards a closer or mere exact approximation ot 
rea lity . Hence there is no duality of ideology/prescience and 
science in Foucault's work, for the aim of the archaeologies 
is not to trace the devel -oment of a science from its  p***- 
scientific  and error-laden prehistory. Rather, Foucault's 
studies are focussed upon the point at which.discourse is
eplstemologlzcd, and at which knowledge becomes knowledge as 
such, articulating a discourse which Is both constituted by and 
constituting Its  object with respect to norms of verification  
and coherence. Thus, although Foucault's histories bear 
resemblances to the histories of science produced bv Bachelard 
and Cangullhem,30 the point of Interference that he takes Is 
entlr y different.
Despite this difference of focus, the histories that Foucault 
proposes contain a conceot of historical knowledge that resembles 
Bachelard's In Its  u tiliza tio n  of the concepts of discontinuity, 
rupture and dispersion among others. Bachelard's discontinuous 
history of science is based upon a philosophy of knowledge that 
Is p lu ra lis tic  In that the history of science Is written with 
regard to an endless confrontation between the old and the new. 
That which has been rejected continues to exist at the periphery 
of extant knowledge In the form of a circumscribing outline. 
Foucault u tilizes  this p lu ra lis tic  notion of knowledge, for 
although his histories do focus upon sites of discontinuity, he 
does net regard these ruptures as absolute, completely cutting 
that which precedes from that which follows. Rather, In focussing 
upon these sites of epistemic rupture, Foucault's histories are 
comparative In that they are structured around the 'then' and 
the 'now', showing the transformations that have occurred In 
terms of the rearticulation of discursive and eplstemologlcal 
relations. This focus upon moments of sudden and quite radical 
transformation does not necessarily have as Its  correlative the 
notion that Foucault is an historian whose theory of history Is 
founded upon discontinuity alone. In an Interview,31 Foucault 
Indicated that his archaeologies do not reject the concept 
of continuity In to to , for a discourse may undergo a gradual 
transformation that persists for a great length of time before 
I t  undergoes a sudr'en and radical change which takes place with­
in a short period of time. Foucault does not deny the continuity 
of transformation by focussing upon these points of radical
change, but delimits his analysis:
"My problem was not at a ll co say 'Volla, long live  
discontinuity, we are a ll in the discontinous and u 
gooa thing too ', but to pose the question, 'How is 
i t  that at certain moments and In certain orders of 
knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these 
hastenings of evolution, these transformations which 
fa il  to correspond to the calm, continu1st image 
that is normally accredited?'"32 
These "sudden take-offs" are not considered to have emerged j[n 
vacuo, but have their conditions of possibility in the old con­
figuration of knowledge, and therefore, in concentrating upon 
"discontinuities", or points where a radical transformation 
occurs, Foucault's archaeology does not amount to a complete 
dismissal of continuity in history. Rather, Foucault's emphasis 
upon radical transformations implies a critique of continuous 
history, which attempts to homogenize and unify events into a 
single sequence based on chronology and governed by causality.
This type of history suppresses contradictions within a discourse 
and effaces discontinuities. Thus, what is at stake is , on the 
one hand, that Foucault, in concentrating upon moments of dis­
continuity, does not deny continuity in history, and on the 
other, that the archaeology's emphasis upon these moments contains 
an Im plicit critique of continuous history, for the archaeology 
operates in the opposite direction Insofar as i t  liberates con­
tradictions that occur within * discourse in order to map the 
points of transition in their constitution.
Foucault's work, we have seen, is characterized by a fascination 
with lim its , a concept which operates correlatively with language. 
For Foucault, "limits" refers specifically to the limits of 
knowledge that function in any given spatio-temporaIity. In 
Madness and C iv iliza tio n , Foucault attempts to probe the lim its  
of history and philosophy, but flounders upon the question of his 
own a b ility  to speak of these lim its as they are scrutinized with
regard to the Other. The Birth of the Clinic takes up the 
question of the function of 'inguage In relation to knowledge 
and finds that language obeys the same laws as knowledge In the 
constitution of the space of the body as an object of knowledge. 
Here, the lim its of human existence, flr.ltude and death, are 
again found to be bound to the function of language, as language 
as such Is always situated near to the lim its of In te ll ig ib il i ty .  
His configuration of language and knowledge is scrutinized further 
In The Order of Things, In which I t  Is the central thread. In 
this work, Foucault's critique of the human sciences as bodies of 
knowledge Intent upon an analytic of finltude challenges modern 
thought's attempt to Incorporate lim its within a theory of know­
ledge33 by centring upon the figure of Man. Each book thus 
attempts to reveal the lim its of knowledge, not In order to undo 
them, but to transgress them. I t  is clear. In this regard, that 
the tr ia ls  of Madness and C ivilization were v ita lly  Important in 
the formulation of the archaeology as practice. In this work, 
the archaeology emerges as a c ritic a l practice of historical 
analysis insofar as I t  attempts to transgress the lim its imposed 
by modem anthropocentrism, and reveals the re la tiv ity  of what is 
accepted as true. This aspect of Foucault's work is maintained 
and refined in his la te r work, particularly The Order of Things, 
wherein concepts hitherto accepted as empirically concrete, are 
shown to be h istorically  constituted.
In his probing of the lim its of knovledge, Foucault found himself 
constantly facing the question of the function of language, and 
I t  is towards an elucldatlcn of this that his archaeologies tend.
In Madness and C ivilization and The 31rth of the C lin ic , his 
Interest Is focussed increasingly upon the Interstices between tne 
discursive and non-dlscurslve relations that articulate knowledge, 
discourse and the institutions of the asylum and the c lin ic . In 
the f ir s t  of those works, the function of language remains peri­
pheral to the project, plaguing i t  as a perplexing problem limiting  
the fe as ib ility  of the project yet i t  remains a problem not readily
drawn Into focus Its e lf . The la te r work situates the function of 
language in the midst of its  endeavour to trace the emergence of 
modern medical perception. The exerpts from Pomme and Bayle, with 
their total difference in perception although they are separated by 
a period of f if ty -s ix  years, frames the project of The Birth of the 
C lin ic , for i t  is this "mutation" in discourse that Foucault seeks 
to describe. Yet his description as an attempt at a "systematic 
history of discourses" combines on the one hand a f lir ta t io n  with 
structuralist concepts and terminology and on the other, a movement 
towards a specific method of analyzing discourse that is not entirely 
structuralist. In the la tte r  case, this work is a watershed, since 
i t  contains the f irs t  steps towards an archaeology concerned with 
the function of language and its  practice. Thus The Birth of the 
Clinic is more of a structuralist analysis of the mutation of 
medical discourse than a structural analysis as such. Foucault's 
interest in language is not the same as that of a structuralist 
who focusses upon the meaning and forms of language. Rather,
Foucault seeks to uncover the function of language as a practice, 
and his u tiliza tio n  of structuralist concepts thus contains a 
distortion by which they are made to f i t  In with this concern 
with language.
This Interest in language as discourse and its  association with 
knowledge emerges in its  most explic it form in The Order of Things.
In this work, Foucault is concerned with the mutations that occur 
in the posltiv itiesof philology, biology and po litica l economy.
The Foucauldian positiv ity is established as the positive existence 
of documents by which the practice of writing may be analyzed for 
the rules that operate in the formulation of coherent propositions. 
These rules are not readily apparent or visible in the documents 
themselves, and Foucault therefore posits that they must be recon­
stituted by the historian. The historian's practice is thus not 
that of grasping the empirically available facts of the world which 
l ie  awaiting his attention, but a c ritic a l practice to which nothing 
is given except the positive existence of discourse Its e lf . Foucault's
reconstruction of the rules regulating discursive practice Is 
based on the descriptive materials of the posltlv lty of discourse 
I ts e lf ,  not upon the Intentions that lay beyond I t  as the truth 
of history or upon abstract formal axioms. In this way, Foucault 
situates the archaeological analysis between the practice of 
writing Its e lf  and the rules that govern oils practice. Foucault's 
analysis of the posltlv lties of philology, biology and po litica l 
economy is not concerned with the development of truth or objecti­
vity within these bodies of knowledge, but Is situated at the 
lim its of the documents, at the point of which the discursive 
practice becomes capable of regulating the coherence of what is 
said through the imposition of rules for the formation of proposi­
tions. Hence the Importance of language In The Order of Things 
rests in the opening of the archaeological space between the 
discursive practice and its  rules of formation.
The crucial role of language in The Order of Things has led many 
of Foucault's commentators and critics  to believe that his project 
was a structuralist history. Undoubtedly, Foucault does share 
features with structuralism, the most Important of which Is a 
concern with language and the rejection of the philosophy of the 
subject. Structuralism emerged In France In the early 1960's as a 
rejection of phenomenology and hlstcHclsm .^ In rejecting the 
philosophy of the subject and a history based upon causality and 
teleology, structural ism effected a break between language and 
consciousness, problematlzlng forms of language as such by regarding 
them not as the expressions of a speaking subject but as a system of 
meaning. Foucault's archaeologies sim ilarly reject the notions of 
the subject as an organizing principle and of continuous history 
organized by causality. However, these sim ilarities are In su ffi­
cient evidence for the labelling of Foucault as a structural 1st. 
Rather The Order of Things 1s the culmination of Foucault's attempts 
to find a new domain apart from those chartered by the two main 
pillars  of twentieth century thought, namely Marxism and Structu­
ralism.35 In our discussion of Madness and C iv iliza tio n , we
noted that Foucault encountered history as a complexity of soclo- 
historical relations and that his linking of events causally had 
the touch of a Marxist's simple explicitness. Yet In his attempt 
to analyze the lim its of History, Foucault confronted an inab ility  
to speak, an in a b ility  which problematlzes the Marxist's reliance 
on the reconstruction of socio-economic relations as a means of 
explanation. Hence Foucault finds himself faced with the problems 
of discourse and its  historical function. However, this new set 
of problems does not lead him Into the camp of the structuralists. 
In his next work, his analysis of the manner in which the body 
becomes an object of knowledge cannot hinge upon the inherent 
meaning of language or Its  structure in relation to Its  object. 
Rather, 1t Is the formation of discourse and Its  function that 
demands attention. Thus, Foucault's works cannot be comfortably 
situated In either domain. The Order of Things opens a new domain 
which Foucault calls the "archaeology" where the positive existence 
of language as discourse Is analysed for the rules regulating 
discursive pract.ce. This te rrito ry  which Foucault describes as 
existing between the practice of writing and the rules governing 
the formation of that practice requires new analytical tools that 
are not readily apparent in The Order of Things and I t  Is probably 
this lack of exposition of methodology that lead so many to 
Identify the text as structuralist. In order to rectify  this and 
to dissociate himself from structuralism for once and for a l l ,  
Foucault produced a post-script to The Order of Things In which 
the archaeological tools are elucidated and the territo ry  of the 
archaeology is mapped. I t  Is to this that we must turn in our 
scrutlnlzation of ihe claims of the archaeology to be a specific 
mode of analysis with Its  own object and point of Insertion with 
regard to discourse.
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PART I I :  The Archaeology of Knowledge
Three years a fter The Order of Things f ir s t  appeared in France, 
a postscript to i t  entitled The Archaeology of Knowledge1 
was published in which the analytical method employed in the 
earlier book was elucidated. The work operates as both a dis­
course on the method of the archaeology as well as a polemical 
discourse, a dialogue with the background murmur of critics  and 
commentators. These two threads Interweave vO give the work its 
unity, as Foucault, through invoking the misunderstandings 
concerning The Order of Things and addressing them directly , 
begins to lay down the conceptual Instruments of the method 
employed therein. The pplemical style of the book dictates the 
order in which the concepts of the archaeology are presented. 
This leads to convolutions, repetitions and returns, in which 
Foucault summons the discursive unities employed by the history 
of ideas only to banish them from the space of discourse, thus 
allowing the construction and the substantiation of the archaeo­
logical concepts. This dominance of the polemical over the 
methodological discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge has as 
its  consequence the movement from discursive formations to 
statements and back to the operation of discursive formations.
I t  is necessary here to extract the methodological claims of 
the book and to order them so that their relation to one another 
may be readily ascertained. The polemics Foucault wages against 
the history of ideas w ill be taken up la ter with reference to 
lite ra ry  history specifically.
2.1: The Statement
Foucault distinguishes his mode of analysis through defining 
its  object, the statement, as an entity cistlnct from unities 
such as the sentence and the proposition. He begins this 
endeavour by positing at the most general level the existence 
of enunciations, or emlttances of a group of signs which have 
spatio-temporal Individuality. These are unrepeatable events 
for although the sa.Te grcup of signs may be emitted on several 
occasions and In several different contexts, they are not 
equivalent verbal performances as their spatio-temporal co­
ordinates are unique. The Individual act that reveals the 
enunciation as a specific act of language is the formulation.
The formulation fixes tha group of signs in its  spatial and 
temporal specificity and describes i t  In relation to an author. 
The next level upon which verbal performances or enunciations 
may be described Is that of the sentence and proposition.
These are units obeying the laws of grammar and of logic 
respectively. Here the Individualizing co-ordinates that 
specify the moment of the enunciation and its  m ateriality are 
of l i t t l e  Import, and the main focus Is upon the obedience of 
the group of signs to the system of laws that regulate gramma­
tica l and logical formulation. These units, recognized and 
accepted as sentences or propositions, are repeatable forms 
for the uniqueness of their moments of emergence are not taken 
Into account. Foucault posits a fourth level upon which the 
enunciation may be described; the level of the statement. The 
statement Is the modality of existence of a group of signs which 
emphasizes the types of relations existing between the group of 
signs and a domain of objects, of a subject as opposed to the 
author of a formulation, its  relations to other verbal perfor­
mances and its  m ateriality.
The statement differs most radical!) from the sentence and pro­
position as these la tte r  are analyzed as units, whereas the
statement Is conceived as a verbal performance which Is the 
site of operation of the enunclatlve function. In this regard, 
Foucault's use of the word has two simultaneous senses: the
predominant sense Is that of the mathematical function, a 
variable which exists In relation to other variables 1n terms 
of which I t  is expressed or oo which Its  value depends; whilst 
the secondary sense 1s that o* an Implied activ ity . The 
sentence and proposition are analyzed as static entitles which 
exist Indifferently to the spatio-temporal emergence of the 
group of signs which are scrutinized according to their adherence 
to the laws of logic and grammar. However, the analysis of the 
statement accounts for Its  relations to objects, subjects, other 
verbal performances and Its  material support. The group of 
signs as a statement Is operational and dynamic In these relation­
ships. The statement-functlon cuts vertica lly  through the levels 
of the enunciation, formulation and the sentential and preposi­
tional level, and Is both anterior to these levels of description, 
yet operative upon them. A sentence may be a statement, yet they 
' are not equivalent, for the statement may Incorporate elements 
which are foreign to this unit such as an algebraic formula. 
Likewise, the proposition and the statement d iffe r although a 
group of signs may f u l f i l l  the c rite ria  of both, for a proposition 
"No one heard" found in a novel is equivalent to the proposition 
" It  Is true that no one heard" found In the transcript of a court 
case. These two are not the same statements, however, because 
the statement is susceptible to material, temporal and spatial 
differences. In this way the statement is a more specific concept 
when a group of signs are analyzed h istorica lly . Foucault places 
the statement anterior to the level of the sentence and the pro­
position because of this historical or spatio-temporal focus and 
claims that the statement as a function, descrlbable only In and 
through Its  relations to a domain of objects, the subject, other 
verbal performances and Its  material support, determine whether a 
group of signs f u l f i l l  the crite ria  that define a sentence and a 
proposition, whether the enunciation obeys the laws of grammar
Since the statement Is not a un it. I t  cannot be described Inde­
pendently of Its  actual practice and operation as an enunclatlve 
function. Again, i t  is distinguishable from the sentence and 
proposition as its  relation to what i t  states Is not superlmposable 
upon the sentence's relation to Its  truth-value or Its  referent.
The statement Is related to a referential which exists as a domain 
of possible objects that may be designated and described 1n the 
statement, and the relations between those objects that the state­
ment may forge. (AK p.91) The level of this relation between the 
statement and its  m 're n t la l Is that of the enunclatlve level as 
opposed to the grammatical and logical levels, and i t  is here that 
the articulation of objects and their relations produced In the 
statement define the possibilities of a meaningful sentence or a 
truthful proposition. The enunclatlve level is anterior to the 
grammatical and logical levels for a description of the statement 
in Its  relation to Its  referential does not entail the search for 
meaning or verification , but describes how a meaningful sentence 
or verifiable proposition Is enunciated by analyzing the dispersion 
of possible objects and the ir relations which admit the existence 
of these units.
The statement is distinguishable on the basis of its  specific 
relation to a subject. The subject d iffers from the originating 
author whose relation to his enunciation is one of production.
The subject's relation to the statement is not external as is 
the author's to his enunciation, but rather that of "an empty 
function" (AK p.93) which does not refer to an individual, but 
a space which is f il le d  by any individual when the statement is 
formulated. The individual thus does not remain in a constant 
relation to a series of statements formulated in a conversation, 
a novel or even a mathematical treatise , but is in a variable 
relation according to what position i t  is necessary for him to 
occupy i f  he is to be the subject of that statement. Hence the
place of the subject of a statement may be f il le d  by different 
Individuals whereas there Is only one author of a formulation.
The specificity of the level of the statement and the a b ility  
to describe 1 t, Is demarcated by this description of the 
subject-functlon:
" I f  a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can 
be called 'statement', I t  Is not therefore because, 
one day, someone happened to speak them or put them 
Into some concrete form of writing; i t  is because 
the position of the subject can be assigned. To 
describe a formulation qua statement joes not consist 
in analyzing the relations between the author and 
what he says . . . ,  but 1n determining what position 
can ar.d inust be occupied by any individual i f  he is 
to be the subject of i t ."  (AK p.95-96)
Together with the referential and the subject-function, the 
statement is describable in relation to an associated domain 
or enunciative fie ld  within which i t  is related to other state­
ments. Just as the statement is anterior to the sentence and 
the proposition, so the enunciative f ie ld  Is anterior to the 
context of sentences or propositions. The condition of possi­
b i l i ty  of the context as the contextual relations that operate 
upon sentences in a novel as distinct frr^  those in a scientific  
treatise may only be revealed against the background of a more 
general relation between the formulations, which Foucault posits 
as an entire verbal network which shares the modality of existence 
of the statement. Thus, unlike the sentence or proposition which 
may be recognized as such although its  appearnace is regarded as 
autonomous and independent, the statement may only be described 
by being situated among others which i t  borders or presupposes. 
Foucault c la rifies  this nexus of the vertical relation between 
statement and sentence and horizontal relation of statement to 
enunciative fie ld :
" I f  one can speak of a statement, i t  is because a
sentence (a proposition) figures at a definite point, 
with a specific position, in an enunciative network 
that extends beyond i t . "  'AK p .99)
The statement's defin itive relation to an enunciative fie ld  is 
one instance of its  material existence. One may again d istin ­
guish the statement from the sentence and proposition on the 
basis of this fourth characteristic. For a sentence or propo­
sition to exist, its  m ateriality necessarily refers to its  
surfaces of inscription or point of utterance and the contextual 
variations that allow its  recognition as such a unit. A sentence 
appearing as a slogcn on a poster has differing c rite ria  of 
recognition than i f  i t  appears in a conversation for the surface 
of inscription of the one and the utterance of the other are 
bound within different contexts which delimit the acceptability 
of the r/oup of signs as a meaningful sentence. However, the 
statement is not only characterized by its  m ateriality, but- 
constituted by i t .  For a statement to exist, i t  must have "a 
substance, a support, a place and a date". (AK p.101) Unlike 
the sentence inscribed on a poster and that uttered in conversation 
which may or may not be accepted as the same unit of meaning, these 
groups of signs i f  they are to be considered as statements cannot 
be the same as the four constitutive elements of their materiality 
necessarily distinguish them.
Although this constitutive m ateriality of the statement generally 
precludes its  reactualization in a variety of contextual instances, 
Foucault does admit that under s tric t conditions the statement can 
be repeated. These conditions he groups under 'the rule of 
repeatable m ateria lity '. The f ir s t  of these conditions refers to 
the possibilities of reinscription and transcription. In this 
case, a group of signs occurring in different editions of the same 
book may be treated as the same statement, as the changes that 
occur in the positions of the signs are neutralized by the general 
element of the bock, by which is meant the status i t  has as an
object within the nexus of Institutional and economic relations. 
The second type of repetition that Is permitted Is that which 
occurs within a certain domain of statements In which the 
statement which Is repeated maintains a set of relations to 
the other statements with which I t  appears. The affirmations 
that the world Is round, for example, remain the same statement 
I f  Its  use and reinvestment, its  possibilities of verification  
and the fie ld  of experience to which i t  refers are equivalent. 
Hence the statement Is repeatable within a fie ld  of s tab iliza­
tio n , In which I t  enters equivalent networks of relations and 
where i t  obeys the same rules of application. However this 
f ie ld  of stabilization also delimits the threshold beyond which 
a new statement is to be recognized, as i t  Is then positioned 
In a new network; the relations 1t participated in with other 
statements and the rules of application i t  obeys being no longer 
equivalent to those of Its  predecessor. Lastly, the statement 
may be repeated In a particular fie ld  of use. The most obvious 
example of what Is meant here Is the translation of a sentence 
from one language to another. The ards and the syntax change, 
but the information content of both remains the same, as does 
the use to which they are put. Hence, although two different 
sentences may exist. I f  they are treated as a statement, 1t is 
constant and therefore repeatable.
To conclude, the statement,although its  threshold of existence 
Is the existence of signs. Is more than a mere series of traces 
or sounds, more than an object produced, manipulated and trans­
formed by speakers. Rather I t  Is an operative fie ld  in which a 
set of relations which are the conditions of the group of signs 
functioning are made apparent. These relations are constitutive 
of the statement: Its  relation to what i t  states Is one binding
I t  to a domain of objects governed by a principle of d ifferentia­
tion: Its subject as an empty function sets Into motion another
set of relations that delimit the possibilities who may speak and 
what position must be occupied i f  an Individual is to be the
subject of the formulation; the statement exists only In relation  
to others and is situated by these relations In an enunclative 
f ie ld , and fin a lly  Its  m ateriality -  Its  status, possibilities of 
transcription within a network and its  possibility of reuse - 
secures I t  in a specific site In relation to Institutional supports.
2 .2: The Discursive Formation
Foucault cautiously draws the distinctions between the statement 
and the sentential and prepositional units at every turn, for in 
order to specify the level at which the archaeological analysis 
Intervenes, the autonomy of the statement with regard to the 
levels of enunciation, formulation and grammatical and logical 
units had to be secured. The "site" of the statement is offerred 
as fixed upon two planes: ve rtica lly , cutting through these
other levels of description so that the statement Is both present 
on them yet not immediately apparent, hence I t  has a 1 quasi-  
In v is ib ility ' In that i t  Is ' iplled in other linguistic analyses 
yet never exp lic it; and i.; Is horizontally situated as a terrain  
In which the statement retains Its  in tegrity , and In which i t  
appears as a set of relations binding I t  to Its  constituent 
elements and to other statements. The statement is situated 
upon its  specific level by mapping what Foucault calls the discursive 
formation, which may be provisionally defined here as "the general 
enunclative system that governs a group of verbal perfcirrnces".
(AK p.116) This system is operative upon enunciations as one 
amongst others, such as logical, linguistic and psychological 
systems, which govern the enunciation at their appropriate levels.
In the broadest of terms, the linkage between the statement and 
the discursive formation is analogous to the sentence's relation  
to a text and the proposition's relation to a deductive argument 
as a whole. The discursive formation is then a group of related
statements, In the same way as the text Is consltuted by a 
number of related sentences. But the analogy breaks down 
once the relations of the regularity of statements to the 
discursive formation are brought Into focus, for whereas the 
regularity of the sentence Is defined by grammatical laws ana 
the proposition by the laws of logic, the statements' regula­
r ity  is defined by the discursive formation Its e lf  with no 
Interference from a pre-existent system. The two sides of the 
relation exist In a state of absolute reciprocity so that the 
description of either one w ill reveal the specificity of the 
other, or to put I t  as Foucault does: "The two approaches are
equally ju s tifiab le  and reversible. The analysis of the state­
ment and that of the formation are established corrective ly ."  
(AK p .116) The Implications of this are dlscernable from the 
correlations that may be drawn between the analytical categories 
that Foucault u tilizes  in his description of the statement and 
those outlined for the description of discursive formations, 
both of which are organized around the t wcepts of object, 
subject, fields of co-ex1ste«r* and succession, and the materia­
l i t y  of discourse, or that which brings into play the relations 
of d1scur,1 e to non-dlscursive practices. In this respect, the 
archaeological description of verbal performances as statements 
undertakes to uncover the discursive formation, or reciprocally, 
the discursive formation Is that In which the relations between 
statements which occur In a visible group may be described and 
differentiated 1n a system of dispersion. The rules of this 
formation are the conditions under which the elements of this 
system - objects, subjective modalities, concepts and thematic 
choices - are formulated and maintained or under which they are 
modified or disappear. On the basis of th is , we may make a 
further c larification  of Foucault's term discourse. On the 
broadest and most general leve l, discourse refers to a group of 
verbal performances. I t  Is a term which operates upon the level 
of formulations, referring to a group of acts, and also upon the 
sentential and proposition*! level, upon which the enunciations
of the discourse are deemed acceptable as meaningful and logical 
or not. For the archaeologist, discourse refers to enunciations 
insofar as they are statements which may be assigned a shared 
modality of existence in terms of the analytical categories of 
object, subject, fields of co-existence and m ateriality, that is , 
statements that belong to the same discursive formation are 
regarded as a discourse.
The discursive formation is analyzed in four directions, as is 
the enunciative function or statement. The f ir s t  of these traces 
the formation of objects according to the relations established 
between three coordinates which Foucault designates as the surface 
of emergence, the authorities of delimitation and the grids of 
specification. Surfaces of emergence are those social and cultural 
spheres where a discursive formation in it ia l ly  finds its  impetus, 
such as the family, the religious community and the organization of 
labour which operated in tandum to precipitate the nineteenth 
century object of madness in the discourse of psychopathology.
These surfaces of emergence were not necessarily new, but their 
organization differed suffic iently to be discontinuous from that 
of the eighteenth century. The authorities of delimitation to 
which Foucault draws attention are those of institutional recog­
nition of who may appropriate and speak about an object. Madness, 
for example, in the nineteenth century, became an object for 
primarily the medical profession; together with the legal and 
religious authorities. All of these institutional bodies are 
constituted by a group of individuals who, imbued with a certain 
knowledge and implicated in a certain practice, are recoonized as 
authorities on that object. This, by the same token, necessitates 
an exclusion of other individuals not authorized to speak, such as
the mad themselves are discovered to be silenced in the nineteenth
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century. Lastly, grids of specification operate as systems of 
the division of the object, such as 'madness', into related or 
contrasting classifications of type.
These three coordinates are bound together In a specific 
relationship which mnkes for the possibility of the formation 
of a discursive object. They do not operate outside of 
specific relations to each other, and I t  Is these relations 
to which the archaeologist gives his attention, for the 
discursive object admitted by this complex arrangement does 
not enter into a pre-existent discourse which designates and 
then classifies i t .  Rather, the discourse and the discursive 
object are in itiated  in one and the same movement, so that the 
arrangement of the relations between these coordinates forms 
the possibility of a discourse which constitutes the object.
The object of discourse is thus not what the discourse speaks 
about as a real referent existing in the real world of objects, 
but I t  is that which exists In a reciprocal relation with the 
discourse which constitutes I t  and which i t  In itia te s . In 
order to secure this differentiation between the discursive 
object and the referent, Foucault distinguishes three types of 
relations. Primary relations exist Independently of discourse 
between institutions and practices and may not be expressed in 
the formation of discursive objects. Secondary relations occur 
within discourse connecting concepts, relating Institutions and 
objects in a manner which may or may not correspond to the real 
or primary relations, but which exist in regard to the real as 
reflexive relations. These secondary relations do not coincide 
with the relations which make possible the objects of the dis­
course in which they occur, which Foucault specifies as discursive 
relations This third type are neither Internal nor external to 
the discourse, but exist at the lim it of discourse In the sense 
that they:
"determine the group of relations that discourse must 
establish In order to speak of this or that object.
In order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, 
classify them, explain them, etc. These relations 
characterize not the language ( langue) used by discourse, 
nor the circumstances In which 1t Is deployed, but
discourse Its e lf  as a practice." (AK p.46)
Hence discursive relations are not those which link words and 
the concepts and objects they deploy, but underlie them and 
determine this linkage as the conditions of possibility of 
existence of objects, concepts and strategies. The discursive 
object 1i Indissociable from Its  discourse, wherein I t  Is 
formed In the positive conditions of a complexity of relations 
that operate as rules of formation of the object and thus as 
rules specifying that discourse.
The second direction of the analysis of discursive formations 
Is that which Investigates the formation of enundative modalities, 
or the uncovering of laws operating anterior to the act of formu­
lation. Foucault Is at pains In this instance, to distinguish the 
archaeological analysis of the originator of discourse from these 
modes of analysis having recourse to a transcendental subject or 
a ps>.nolog1cal subjectivity, both of which function as unifying 
or synthesizing concepts. In preference to this unifying function, 
the subject is treated by the archaeologist In a way which 
' decentres' I t ,  displacing i t  from the position Into which 1t was 
Installed by nineteenth century post-Kantlan thought.3 In The 
Order of Things, Foucault discusses the subject In terms of Its  
installation as a central Idea which controls thought at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. He thus argues that i t  should 
be situated alongside metaphysical concepts such as God and logos, 
and in his own analytical practice, he disperses the subject by 
treating i t  as a function expressed as a series of relations that 
traverse the space of discourse. These enundative modalities are 
formulated around three questions: that of the status of the
subject; the site within an Institution from which the discourse 
emerges and its  point of application, and the position of the 
subject In an Information network. These statuses, sites of emer­
gence and application and the positions of the subject are described 
as groups of relation? that exist within the discursive formation.
The status of the speaker, his authority to offer a certain discourse.
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involves a system of differentiation in which he is situated 
in relation to other individuals whose similar status is 
acquired through the application of c rite ria  of competence, 
knowledge and a relation with an institu tion . Likewise, a 
description of the institutional site from which the discourse 
emerges and its  point of application in that institution  
situates i t  in a documentary fie ld  in which i t  enters relations 
with other discourses, and the positions of the subject in an 
information network relates him to domains of objects about 
which information circulates among a group of authorities. The 
categories of the subject are not described in isolation to each 
other, but in the complexity of their relation to each other, 
the arrangement of which is established by the specific discursive 
formation within which th.y form a system or regularity.
The discursive formation is described with regard to the, formation 
of cor. .epts. The archaeologist does not Investigate the conceptual 
apparatus of a d scourse in order to trace its  progression towards 
a true representation of its  object. In order to reconstruct out of 
the dispersion o- its  history a deductive ed ifice, but takes the 
preconceptual level as the point of Interference of his analysis.
I t  Is here, Foucault argues, that conceptual formation appears on 
the discursive level. In this Instance, the concepts themselves 
are not of interest and therefore not described in themselves, but 
the rules governing their construction and their modification within 
the statements of a certain discourse and the organization of the 
fie ld  of statements in which they occur warrants description.
Once again, Foucault posits three coordinates whose orchestration 
directs his analysis of the organization of statements with regard 
to conceptual formation. F irs tly , forms of succession of the 
statements may be analyzed for their Internal order of their 
reasoning, of inferences, implications and descriptions - which 
Foucault terms "the various orderings of enunciative series" (AK_p.56) 
for their types of dependence, such as what may be deduced or thought
probably from what was observed and described; and for the 
'rhetorical schemata' by which groups of statements are com­
bined Into successive descriptions which compose the text.
I f  these forms of succession may be uncovered operating within 
the text, the second coordinate, forms of co-existence, shifts 
the analysis towards In tertextuallty . A 'f ie ld  of presence'
Is constituted by those statements formulated elsewhere but 
activated In the discourse through criticism , discussion and 
judgement of them. A second fie ld , that of concomitance, 1s 
constituted by the statements which concern other domains s '  
objects and which therefore belong to another type of discourse, 
yet appear In the discourse being investigated. Last, Foucault 
posits a fie ld  of memory which contains redundant statement; 
reactivated in the discourse by relations of transformati* , 
and discontinuity. The last coordinate which FoucA.rlt int o- 
duces is that of the procedures of Intervention w.i Ci are 
definitive of a discursive formation. Hence, the slippage 
between two discourses is described with relation to the methods 
of rewriting, transcribing and translating statements from one 
discourse to another, and the types of transformations that 
accompany these Interventions.
Tha last direction of the analysis of discursive formations Is 
that of the formation o *  strategies, that Is , the themes and 
theories of a certain type of discourse that are formed by 
"certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, 
certain types of enunciation." (AK p.66) Because these strategies 
are organizations of concepts, objects and enunclatlve modalities, 
a number of strategic choices may coexist at any moment and two or 
more mutually exclusive theoretical architectures may appear simul 
taneously or in succession. The archaeological analysis of 
strategies concentrates upon possible points of diffraction within 
the discourse: the coexistence of two objects, concepts or enun­
clatlve types which are Incompatible with or contradictory to each 
other may appear In the same discursive formation so as to form an
alternative one to the other; or the elements of the stateglc 
choice may be equivalent, yet their organization may offer 
several alternatives. In this respect, the disperson of objects, 
concepts and enuncistive modalities are not seen as constituting 
anomalies, but as forming discursive sub-groups.
Apart from possible points of d iffraction , strategic choices 
within a particular discourse may be governed by the "economy of 
the discursive constellation",* or the relations between concomitant 
discourses. These external relations may regulate a certain dis­
course, and operate to exclude statements which would otherwise be 
possible. Foucault posits that a discursive formation:
" . . .  does not occupy therefore a ll the possible volume 
that is opened up to i t  of right by the system of for­
mation of its  objacts, its  enunciations, and its  concepts; 
i t  is essentially incomplete, owing to the system of 
formation of Its  strategic choices." (AK p.67)
Lastly, strategic choices are affected by the function of the 
discourse in the realm of non-discursive practices, by the constraints 
of its  rules placed upon the discourse, processes of appropriation by 
a specific set of individuals, and by the possible positions of desire 
in relation to the discourse. In the la tte r  case, Foucault argues 
that although lite ra ry  discourse is the most obvious example of this 
relation, i t  is not the only one, for so-called 's c ien tific1 discourses 
such as those on wealth, language and nature are also associated in a 
particular relation to desire.
2.3: The Art isolation of the Statement and the Discursive Formation
At this point, with the constituent elements of the statement described 
on the one hand and those of the discursive formation on the other, 
the question of how these two categories which are central to the
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Foucauldlan analysis are orientated with respect to each other 
must be posed. We began our discussion of the discursive 
formation with the analogy of the statement's relation to the 
discursive formation as superficially similar to the sentence's 
relation to the text. However, that analogy, though I t  offered 
a good point of departure, broke down once the specific state­
ment - discursive formation relations were traced. Indeed, the 
articulation of these two analytical categories needs to be 
brought mo. a into focus and discussed in more depth than Foucault 
offers.
Foucault's conception of discourse is consistently portrayed In 
terms of a series of layers or strata. The statement Is dis­
tinguished from ether units or groups of signs by defining the 
levels upon which the group of signs may be apprehended, from 
the broadest and most flexib le level of the enunciation, to the 
formulation which ties the group of signs to an act made by a 
certain Individual or consciousness, to the level upon which the 
group of signs is analyzed for coherence in terms of logical and 
grammatical laws, fin a lly  to the level of the statement upon 
which the archaeological analysis of the group of signs takes 
Its  point of interference. In Foucault's discussion of this 
stratification  i t  Is clear that relations operate not only upon 
each of the levels he has separated out, but on the vertical axis, 
so that a group of signs may f u l f i l l  the crite ria  of each stratum 
and thus may be scrutinized in a variety of ways. The specificity  
of the analysis of the statement Is derived from the vertical 
relations i t  enters with the levels posterior to I t  and from the 
relations specific to Its  level that give 1t value as a function. 
However, Foucault asserts that:
"To describe a statement is not a matter of Isolating 
and characterizing a horizontal segment; but of 
defining the conditions In which the function that 
gave a series of signs . . .  an existence, and a specific 
existence, can operate." (AK p .108)
Here Foucault stresses that the archaeology does not refer to 
a concrete object per se but to a set of relations or conditions. 
These conditions, that of the emergence of objects, the position 
of the subject, the succession or coexistence of the statement 
in connection with other statements and Its  m ateriality, thus 
operate In a relation of vertica lity  anterior to the enunciation 
as a mere group of signs, and may be apprehended upon the enun- 
ciative level as a specific level of description which they 
traverse. The linkage between statements and their discursive 
formation Is a horizontal relation, occurring upon the enunciative 
level, for the discursive formation Is , at the most basic level of 
definition, the characterization of a group of statements. The 
four systems of formation that together define the discursive 
formation arc set In relation to each other as a second s t r a t if i ­
cation, or "a vertical system of dependence" (AK pp.72-73) which 
delimits the conditions of possibility of the appearance of certain 
objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. A set 
of relations thus operates from the anterior level of the formation 
of objects to the level of the formation of strategies, whereby the 
formation of an object mediates the rules of formation of enuncia­
tive modalities, concepts and strategies. Likewise, a strategic 
or theoretical choice may moderate the formation of concepts, 
enunciative modalities and objects, so that a set of relations 
operating from the posterior level to the anterior level are 
established. These reciprocal relations which modify the four 
systems of formation are maintained by the discursive practice, 
yet are at the same time constituent of i t .  This double set of 
reciprocal relations is c larified  In Foucault's definition of the 
system of formation:
"By system of formation, then, I mean a complex group of 
relations that function as a rule: I t  lays down what
must be related, In a particular discursive practice, 
for such and such an enunciation to be made, for such 
and such a strategy to be organised. To define a system 
of formation In Its  specific individuality 1s therefore
to characterize a discourse or a group of statements 
by the regularity of a practice." (AK p .74)
We may from this develop the following picture. The statement 
as a function cannot be described on Its  own: I t  Is expressed
through the relation of variables which prescribe Its  position
1n a network of other statements:
"There Is no statement that does not presuppose 
others; there Is no statement that is not surrounded 
by a fie ld  of coexistence, effects of series and
succession, a distribution of functions and roles."
(AK p.99)
This grouping of statements 1s mediated by the regularity of the 
discursive practice which In a reciprocal movement determines the 
character of the discourse constituted by the group of statements. 
The analysis of the discourse as a system of formation articulates 
discursive events with series of events occurring in the socio­
cultural and institutional spheres, the discursive practice with 
non-dlscurslve practices. Given this configuration of statement, 
discursive practice and discourse, Foucault now proceeds to unrave, 
the complexity of relations that lend such entitles as concept, 
object, subject and theory or theme the appearance of concrete, 
empirically available or 'rea l' existence. Here Is the point 
which distinguishes the Foucauldlan treatment of discourse from 
other forms of analysis. I f  the objects, concepts, subject and 
theories of a discourse are treated as given wholes, then the 
analysis of the discourse Is caught upon the level of describing 
the objects themselves, the representational values of the concepts 
as true to Its  object, and the theory or theme's value as meaning­
fu l. In short, the analysis of the discourse resorts In this 
respect to the analysis of what i t  speaks about, what I t  means.
What Foucault's archaeology does, and this Is oerhaps why I t  1s 
well-named. Is to s if t  apart the levels Inherent In the discourse 
until the stratum at which these objects, orcepts and strategies 
may be revealed as groups of relations, and not as concrete unities.
He posits that this level at which these elements are not 
analyzed in themselves (for their truth or meaningful ness) is 
the level upon which their rules of formation are exposed in 
the integration of such diverse elements as institutions, 
techniques, social groupings and perceptual organizations.
Hence the interaction of the statement and its  discursive 
formation may be spatialized according to the vertica' and 
horizontal relations that characterize Foucault's conception 
of discourse. We may say that the relation of statements 
constituting a discursive formation occurs upon the same level, 
the enunciative level. This is the horizontal relation between 
the statement and those that surround i t  in the discursive 
formation. Yet as we have already noted the description of the 
statement in Its e lf  does not wholly depend upon a certain hori­
zontal plane, but one which is traversed by vertical relations 
of its  conditions of possibility, which reside anterior to the 
statement Its e lf . Likewise, the c rite ria  of their relationship 
to the discursive formation are set upon a vertical axis. In 
this regard, the question of whether Foucault's assertion that 
the analysis of the statement and that of the discursive forma­
tion are correlative must be posed. In fact, i f  one attempts 
to superimpose the four categories of the statement and those 
of the discursive formation, one finds that each of the four 
elements of discourse are treated sim ilarly. In both the analysis 
of the statement and that of the discursive formation, the object 
I ts e lf  is not assigned overriding importance, but what is sought 
is the principle of its  differentiation in a domain of possible 
objects, and, likewise, the subject is not regarded as an 
authority or originator, but is decentred and dispersed among a 
set of relations. In his discussion of the formation of concepts 
Foucault parallels his criteriology for the analysis of the 
associated domain - both focus upon forms of succession, simulta­
neity and coexistence within a discursive network. Lastly, the 
formation of strategies and the materiality of the statement are
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in te rio rlty , a founding consciousness of an originator. State­
ments are situated in a fie ld  of dispersion in which they exist 
anonymously, as objects, and may thus be treated in terms of 
" it  is said" rather than through the assignment of an individual's 
psychological, biographical and sociological background. In the 
la tte r  case, the discursive realm is vacated as the analysis 
quests after an explanation that is seen to be rooted in the 
processes taking place in the consciousness of a transcendental 
subjectivity. The archaeology, on the contrary, remains within 
the discursive space i t  sets out to map, revealing the dispersion 
of statements therein with no recourse to a unifying subject s 
an origin, for the enunciative domain is autonomous in this 
respect. In effect i t  is this domain that defines the positions 
of the subject, and not the subject as an origin which defines the 
unity of the text.
Lastly, in place of the search for a lost origin (where its  
meaning is supposed to lie )  which is t vealed by invoking through 
interpretation the forms of memory hidden within i t  from the act 
of formulation, Foucault introduces a principle of accumulation 
in accordance with which the archaeological analysis is motivated 
in the opposite direction. Statements are aot described through 
the trac ’ ig backwards from the finished product tc the moment of 
inception, but rather with regard to the use to which they are 
put, their conditions of recurrence and reactivation, and their 
possibilities of transformation. The archaeology in accordance 
with the principle of accumulation thus traces the statement from 
the moment i t  is said through to its  present mode of survival. I t  
is treated in the form of a specific addivity which Foucault 
explains with reference to malhumatlcal statements. These, he 
argues,
" . . .  are not added to one another in the same way as 
religious texts or laws (they each have their own way 
of merging together, annulling one another, excluding 
one another, complimenting one another, forming groups
that are In varying degrees indissociable and endowed 
with unique properties)." (AK p .124)
The emergence of a certain statement affects the relations that 
others In that discourse have with one another. Consequently, 
the forms of addivity of a group of statements are not constant 
through time, but may offer up new configurations within which 
statements are resituated, reactivated or destroyed.
2.5: The Archive
The description of statements according to the principles of 
ra r ity , exteriority and exclusion reveal them as having a para­
doxical existence as both objects and events that are dispc.aed 
within a certain discursive space or a limited space of 
communication which Foucault calls a positiv ity . The positivity  
characterizes the unity of statements through time, and i t  is 
within this space that dispersed statements may be revealed as 
belonging to the same discursive formation or to another, perhaps 
co-existant or successive, discursive formation, both of which 
exist as divisions within this space. The pos<+' y is made 
possible by the historical a p r io r i, or the gr of rules that 
characterize a discursive practice. Foucault designates the a 
priori "historical" in order to clearly distinguish i t  from the 
Kantian formal a p r io r i: what is meant by the a priori in this 
case "is not a condition of valid ity  for judgement, but a condition 
of reality  of statements". (AK p.'27) I t  takes into account that 
the rea lity  of statements, of discourse, is constituted not only 
by meaning and truth but by a specific history that belongs to 
those statements or that discourse alone.
The archaeological space in which statements are dispersed is thus 
differentiated according to specific rules and practices, forming 
positivities of discourse according to their historical a p rio ris .
All these systems of statements, these regularities, together 
constitute the archive. In keeping with his basic premise 
that language Is an act, Foucault's archive Is not an Inert 
store of a ll of a culture's textual productions, but the 
system that makes the emergence of statements as unique events 
possible; the system of their enunciabillty, of their 
fu . lonlng and of their transformation. I t  defines the level 
at which discourses are differentiated by their practices, 
causing "a m ultip lic ity of statements to emerge as so many 
regular events, as so many things to be dealt with and mani­
pulated". (AK p .130) Hence the archive cannot be completely 
described, even though i t  Is f in ite  In that I t  Is constituted 
by a ll the statements that have been formed. In this respect, 
the archive forms the "general horizon to which the description 
of discursive formations, the analysis of p o s ltlv ltles , the 
mar g of the enunciatlve fie ld  belong". (AK p .131) The 
analyses of these regularities - of the m ultip lic ity  of relations 
that govern the grouping of statements and their division within 
this horizon - does not propose to find a point of origination 
hidden beneath the discursive leve l; Instead Its  purpose Is to 
remain upon this level of the mode of existence of that which Is 
said, and describe "discourses as practices specified In the 
element of the archive". (AK p .131) Foucault has often referred 
to himself as an archivist, and to the archaeology as the an#lysis 
of the archive, for i t  Is In this extended space of discourse 
that Foucault postulates the play of rules determining the 
appearance and disappearance of statements within a culture. 
Foucault's own archaeological histories may then be conceived as 
focussing upon certain delimited localities within the archive, 
within which the play of discursive rules are traced with regard 
to a particular posltlv lty , governed by a particular discursive 
practice.
The generality of the archive is best understood with regard to 
Foucault's distinction between 'connalssance' and 'savoir', both
of which are translated into English as 'knowledge'. Connais- 
sance denotes for Foucault a particular corpus of knowledge or 
a discipline, whereas savoir is used to define knowledge in 
general. Foucault c la rifies  the distinction in these terms:
"By connaissance' I mean the relation of the subject 
to the object and the formal rules that govern i t .  
'Savoir' refers to the conditions that are necessary 
in a particular period for this or that type of 
object to be given to 'connaissance' and for this or 
that enunciation to be formulated." (AK fn p .15) 
Foucault's regularities of statements - discursive formations and 
positivities -  do not constitute disciplines or connaissance;, 
but are conceived on the basis of savoir. The linkage is clear 
i f  one compares Foucault’ s c larification  of the distinction 
between connaissance and savoir given above and what he defines 
as the analysis of positiv ities:
"To analyse positiv ities is to show in accordance with 
which rules a discursive practice may form groups of 
objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices. 
The elements thus formed do not constitute a science, 
with a defined structure of ideality ; their system of 
relations is certainly less s tric t . . .  They are that 
on the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) proposi­
tions are bu ilt up, more or less exact descriptions 
developed, verifications carried out, theories deployed. 
Tney form the precondition of what is la ter revealed 
and what later functions as an item of knowledge or an 
illusion . . . "  (AK pp.181-182)
When Foucault speaks of knowledge, he thus distinguishes i t  from 
science, for although a science is i body of knowledge, there are 
bodies of knowledge Independent, or science. Knowledge is there­
fore that produced by a discursive practice, in the formation of 
a domain of objects, of enunciative modalities, concepts and 
strategies of use and appropriation. On the basis of th is ,
Foucault distinguishes between scientific  domains and archaeo­
logical domains; the former referring to the space of a 
connalssance governed by formal rules 1n the production of 
propositions, whilst the la tte r  refers to savojjr, the space 
of knowledge In which sc ien tific , philosophical and literary  
texts are treated the same on the basis that they may operate 
according to the same rules of formation.
Within this archaeological te rr ito ry , a delimited locality in 
the archive, which may be seen as the site of operation of the 
Foucauldian history, the discursive formation may be traced as 
I t  passes across what Foucault terms "thresholds'1 indicating 
different levels of formal systemacity. Each of these thresholds 
offers a point of Interference of historical analysis. The 
lowest level at which a discursive formation is systematized. Is 
at the threshold of positiv lty , at which a "single system for 
the formation of statements Is put Into operation" (AK p.186) 
and when a discursive practice gains its  individuality. The 
threshold of epistemologization is crossed when the operation 
of a discursive formation dominates knowledge through claims of 
validation and norms of verification. The threshold of scientl- 
f ic lty  1s crossed when the discursive formation and Its  episte- 
mological figures obey formal laws of construction In formulating 
statements as well as the archaeological rules of Its  practice.
The histories of science that take this threshold as their point 
of Interference are exemplified by G. Bachelard and G. Canguilhem. 
These histories trace the discourse's movement from pre-science 
to science, and is necessarily concerned with oppositions of truth 
and error, sc ien tiflc ity  and n o n -sd en tlfld ty . Foucault terms 
these histories as epistemologlcal. Lastly, when the scientific  
discourse Is able to "define the axioms necessary to i t ,  the 
elements that i t  uses", (AK p.187) its  legitimate propositions 
and transformations. I t  crosses the threshold of formalization. 
The model that Foucault uses to exemplify a discourse which has 
crossed this level of rigorous systematization is mathematics.
and the historical analysis of such a discourse 1s "recurrential", 
such as the history of mathematics as undertaken by Serres.6 The 
way In which a particular discursive formation passes through 
these thresholds, Its  transitions through them In either direction, 
or across several of them at once, constitutes the specific 
history of that discourse. I t  is at these levels posltlv lty / 
eplstemology that Foucault focusses his analysis. The Order of 
Things describes the eplstemologlzatlon of the parallel discourses 
of philology, biology and political economy, which give rise to 
the same eplstemologlcal figures almost simultaneously. The 
complexity of relations that exist between these positlvities and 
which fa c ilita te  this coexistence of eplstemologlcal figures in 
each of them is thus the episteme. Foucault regards a history of 
discourse at this level as an archaeological history, one which 
uncovers how discursive practices give rise to a body of knowledge 
that may or may not attain the thresholds of sc lenV flc lty  and 
formalization. In positing the archaeological history of discourse 
at the level of eplstemologlzatlon, Foucault provides an analysis 
that is free of the restriction of the science/non-science 
opposition. Rather than circumscribing the analysis, the science/ 
non-science, or science/Ideology opposition is Included in that 
which is to be investigated along with the c rite ria  of sc lentific ity  
I ts e lf ,  as the archaeology traces the shifts that the discursive 
practice undergoes in order to be constituted as such, to formulate 
eplstemologlcal figures in so far as the discursive practice gives 
rise to a body of knowledge, and the implementation of the c rite ria  
to which i t  must adhere i f  i t  is to assume the status of a science. 
What the archaeology focuses upon, therefore, is not those elements 
that a science has sloughed off in order to constitute Its e lf  as 
such, but the modifications that a discursive formation and its  
posltlvlty have undergone. The archaeology thus sets out to:
" . . .  reveal between po s itiv ities , knowledge, eplstemo­
loglcal figures, and sciences, a whole set of differences, 
relations, gaps, shifts , independences, autonomies, and 
the way in which they articulate their own historic ities
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on one another." (AK p .191)
Foucault's interest does not l ie  with the epistemological 
question of truth and error in relation to knowledge. The 
intricate articulation Df discursive practices and knowledge 
are formulated precisely to evacuate the domain of investigations 
based upon the science/non-science/ideology distinction. In 
order to distinguish the fie ld  of analysis in which the archaeo­
logy operates from such investigations, Foucault Introduces the 
distinction between 'connaissance', knowledge which is articulated 
with science, ard the more flex ib le  concept of 'savoir' with 
which he is working. This opens the archaeological fie ld  of 
analysis to Include any discursive practice, whether scientific , 
philosophical or lite ra ry .
The Archaeology of Knowledge presents us with a new register of 
concepts which are proposed as descriptive constructions by 
which the archaeology functions as a mode of discursive analysis.
A comparative investigation of these concepts reveals the basic 
theoretical tenants that u n d e r l ie  the archaeology as a practice. 
These we may enumerate as the discernment of levels upon which 
discourse operates and upon which i t  may be analyzed, the frag­
mentation of unities, the dissolution of traditional oppositions 
and the focus upon functions and relations.
Foucault elucidates the concept of the statement by breaking 
down the verbal performance into constitutent level of operation 
upon which i t  may be appropriated. This reveals the variety of 
ways in which discourse may be analyzed: as a formulation 
originating fron a concrete individual which is analyzed according 
to Interpretative methods; as a linguistic unit of truth or 
meaning which is the object of structuralism, and as a statement 
- the level upon which the archaeology finds its  point of inter­
ference. Discourse is thus regarded as having a variety of modes 
of being. Likewise, Foucault posits that i t  has a variety of 
historical analyses which are situated at a series of levels or
thresholds of formal systematlclty at which discourse may be 
analyzed for Its  acquisition of a set of rules of formation, 
eplstemologlzatlon or sc len tlflc lty . In this way Foucault 
delimits the space of the archaeology as separate from 
eplstemologlcal and recurrentlal historical analyses by 
situating I t  with regard to these other types of histories 
of knowledge.
This discernment cf levels of appropriation of verbal perfor­
mances and their histories as discourses amounts to the 
fragmentation of Discourse and History as supposed concrete 
entities . This fragmentation of empirical unities pervades 
the whole of Foucault's project. In his description of the 
statement and its  correlative, the discursive formation, the 
unities of subject and object are presented as false. Rather 
than speaking of the subject or the object, Foucault presents 
a web of relations that form what appears to be a unity, and 
i t  is the archaeologist' . task, he proposes, to unravel these 
relations in a ricorous description of the statement or 
discursive formation. The 'subject1 of a verbal performance 
is not external to i t  i f  i t  is to be treated as a statement, 
because the concept of the statement is constructed in a space 
distinct from hermeneutics which has recourse to a transcendental 
subjectivity which is external source of verbal performance and 
from structural ism which excludes the problem of the subject 
altogether. Rather the subject is dispersed within the discursive 
formation as a number of positions and functions within discourse 
its e lf .  Concepts and theoretical strategies are also not taken 
at face value, but are shown to be a mass of relations of 
succession, co-existence and reactivation. These relations that 
provide the positive conditions for the existence of objects, 
subject •functions, concepts and strategies also decompose the 
traditional opposition of the discursive and non-discursive, as 
they exist at the lim it of discourse, combining into a set of 
rules which are imminent to a discursive practice's formation.
This fac ilita tes  the Incorporation of Institu tional, p o litic a l, 
economic and cultural relations where they affect the formation 
of discourse. Sim ilarly, the opposition of sc len tlfic ity  and 
non-sclentificlty Is redundant to the concerns of the archaeology, 
as the decomposition of the unities of concepts and theoretical 
strategies Into sets of relations re latlv lze  the formal crite ria  
of sc len tlfic ity  and truth through the historical analysis of the 
discourse In which those relations an* to be found.
Foucault accomplishes this discernment of levels of functioning, 
fragmentation of unities and decomposition o ' traditional opposi­
tions through perceiving discourse In terms of a practice. This 
appropriation of his object as the practice of writing concentrates 
the analytical gaze upon the rules that sustain and regulate the 
act of writing. These rules are not themsel/es visible in the 
discourse under scrutiny, but must be constructed from the 
relations and functions that are dispersed within the tissue of 
discourse. The statement as the site of the enunclatlve function 
is thus analyzed according to the web of relations by which 
objects, subject positions and so on are formulated. These 
relations may be seen to be variable according the spatio- 
temporal existence specific to that statement. The discursive 
formation as the correlative of the statement, is the space in 
which a dispersion of statements is analyzed for the sets of 
relations that operate as rules for the formation of those 
statements. These rules, according to which objects, enunclatlve 
modalities, concepts and strategies are formulated, collectively 
constitute the historical a priori which Is the condition of 
existence for statements occurring In a particular positiv ity.
The combined posltlvltles of a particular period form the archive 
In which the conditions of knowledge ( savoir )  are accessible, 
as I t  1s here that the comparative analysis of posltlvltles,showing 
the rules according to which discursive practice forms Its  
enunciations, objects, concepts and theoretical strategies, may be 
conducted.
The archaeology Is thu; a method of discursive analysis that 
neither deploys the subject as a transcendental category nor 
excludes the subject entire ly , but traces i t  and other empi­
ric a lly  'given' entitles as a conglomeration of relations and 
functions that exist In discourse and which become apparent 
when Writing is regarded not as an object, such as a system, 
but as a practice. The site of operation of such an analysis 
Is thus the space between discursive practice and the rules 
that sustain a*d regulate i t ,  and i t  questions a discourse at 
the level of Its  existence as a practice situated among other 
statements and discursive formations as practices within the 
archive. In is respect, the archaeology of knowledge, since 
i t  traces conditions of knowledge to the generality of Che 
archive which is h istorically  delimited and since i t  treats 
a ll statements In a ll posltlv ltles at the level of their 
spatio-temporal m ateriality, that Is , their specific historical 
emergence, relatlvlzes knowledge and the function of language. 
Hence, the archaeology as a mode of discursive analysis dis­
tinguishes Its e lf  from structuralism through a return to 
history In which, berjuse language and knowledges have histories 
specific to them, there are no absoli .e truths. Furthermore, 
because language and knowledge are h istorically  constituted, 
there can be no form of objectivity which Is invariable. The 
archaeology does not, therefore, attempt to analyze discourse 
In order to uncover models In the system of language that 
might be applied elsewhere, but rather, discourse Is analyzed 
In Its e lf . Foucault regards the difference between the archaeo­
logy and structuralism in these terms:
"I am at the difference from those we call structuralists 
for I am not very Interested In the formal possibilities  
offered by a system like language (la langue). Personally, 
I am above a ll haunted by the existence of discourses, by 
the very fact that speaking has taken place as events In 
relation to their original situation, and that they have 
le ft  behind traces which continue to exist and exercise.
in their very subsistence Internal to history, a 
certain number of manifest or secret functions."7 
Foucault does not approach questions of the meaning or forms 
of language its e lf ,  but proposes an analysis th it  in tricately  
articulates language, knowledge and history in its  treatment 
of discursive practices.
Despite the differences between structuralism and the archaeology 
enumerated here, many critics  and commentators8 have attempted 
to subsume the la tte r  under the former with regard to The Order 
of Things, and to discern a break or total change in direction 
between that book and The Archaeology of Knowledge. The basis 
for their arguments is that the central concept employed in 
The Order of Things is thereafter discarded, and that i t  has no 
place in the conceptual framework elucidated in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge. I t  I f  thus to this question that we turn in order 
to test the coherence of Foucault's project in The Order of 
Things with the conceptual framework offered in The Archaeology 
of Knowledge.
2.6; Conclusion: The Articulation of the Episteme and the 
Archaeology
In the f ir s t  part of this thesis in which the archaeologies were 
discussed, i t  was proposed that the archaeology as a method did 
not emerge ready-made and complete, but underwent a series of 
refinements brtween Madness and C ivilization and The Order of 
Things. However, i t  wac also seen that these refinements do not 
constitute substantial 'breaks' between the works, but rather 
shifts in emphasis that occur as r *:ucault becomes more and more 
fascirated by the configuration of knowledge and discourse. 
Foucault himself was aware of this, as he writes in the intro­
duction to The Archaeology of Knowledge;
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"At this point there emerges an enterprise of which 
my earlier books . . .  were a very Imperfect sketch.
An enterprise by which one trie ; to measure the 
mutations that operate In general In the fie ld  of 
history; an enterprise in which the methods, lim its , 
and themes proper to the history of Ideas are ques­
tioned; an enterprise by which one tries to throw 
off the last anthropological constraints; an 
enterprise that wishes, in return, to reveal how 
these constraints could come about. These tasks 
were outlined in a rather disordered way, and their 
general articulation was never clearly defined. I t  
was time that they were given greater coherence - or, 
at least, that an attempt was made to do so. This 
book Is the result." (AK p.15)
Despite this statement which defin itive ly  binds The Archaeology 
of Knowledge to the earlier works, some of Foucault's critics  
have determined to f  a discontinuity between them. The 
basis for these arguments Is Invariably the specious linkage 
between the episteme and structuralism, and their logical form 
generally follows the deduction that as Foucault rejects 
structural Ism as a blanket term under which his analysis may be 
placed, he therefore must relinquish the concept of the episteme 
<n order to validate the separation of the archaeological analysis 
from structural analyses. Brodeur accounts for the supposed dis­
appearance of the concept of the eplsv^me in these terms:
"Now I t  happened that structuralism, with which Foucault 
had become Identified, was progressively transforming 
I ts e lf ,  a fter having borne its  fru its , Into what 
appeared at best as an abstract form of ideology and at 
worst as an empty fashion. Thus Foucault, in 
L'archeologle, as Is evident In the conclusion of that 
book, Is very eager to dissociate himself from what 
structural 1sm had become. I t  may well be that he thought
that this might be most e ffic ien tly  achieved In 
discarding one cf the most obviously structuralist 
of his methodological concepts, that of the 
eplsteme."^
Likewise, Dominique <. :ourt places some emphasis on the "very
remarkable absence"10 of the eplsteme In The Archaeology of
Knowledge. Lecourt regards this book as something of a paradox,
for although I t  proposes to undertake a methodological review
of the earlie r works, i t  jettisons "their principal component".11
He proposes that Foucault realizes the error Inherent in the
structuralist aspects of the eplsteme, and, under "the thick
growth of new words" and the "renewed luxu* tee of the style
of The Archaeology of Knowledge, attempte tn extricate himself
from the ideological impasse of structural.sm. Wh*t is fin a lly
at stake in Lecourt's account of the book, is that Foucault, in
straying from the fold of Marxism, s himself trapped in
Ideology; and having realized th is , reactivates the Marxist
concepts "in displacement", so that The Archaeology of Knowledge
becomes an elaborate disguise for its  writer's return to historical 
12materialism. In keeping with this argument, Lecourt assert * 
that "a decisive dividing line between The Archaeology of 
Know!edge and The Order of Things'" 3 is established by the 
introduction of the categor> of discursive practice into the 
la ter work. This notion is reiterated by Cavallan:
"While (The Order of Things) was centred primarily on 
a conception of discourse as object, product, and 
configuration, . . .  (The Archaeology of Knowledge) 
implied an Important step toward the effective Incor­
poration of the notion of discursive practice - that 
is , an idea centred on the categories of ac tiv ity , of 
active production of utterances, and hence an idea 
inevitably linked to the themes of m ateria lity ."1* 
Undoubtedly, the spectre of Marxist-Structural 1st polemics is 
at work in this regard, and i t  may be the case that this notion 
of the sudden appearance of the category of discursive practice
In The Archaeology of Knowledge 1s founded upon the proposi­
tion that the concept of the episteme - a concept seeped in 
structuralism and as such antithetical to the Althusserian 
category of practice - was purged as ideology, fac ilita tin g  
the appearance of discursive practice as a scientific  category. 
However, this notion is unfounded for two reasons. F irs tly , 
the category of discursive practice is far from lacking in the 
earlie r works: The Order of Things, as Sheridan15 points out, 
"is about l i t t l e  else"; while The Birth of the Clinic analyzes 
the myriad of relations between a discursive practice consti­
tuting the body as object and its  corresponding non-discursive 
practice in the c lin ic ; and sim ilarly, in Madness and 
C iv iliza tio n , the discursive practice constituting madness as 
an object is scrutinized In relation to the emergence of non- 
discursive practices in the asylum.
The second reason for rejecting the notion that the episteme 
was necessarily jettisoned before the archaeology was able to 
incorporate the category of discursive practice leads us back 
to the complexity of misunderstandings that surround the concept 
of the episteme its e lf . The basis of our argument here is that 
far from being absent from the exposition set out in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, the concept of the episteme is its  
raison d 'e tre , that the book is in fact a rigorous elucidation 
of the procedure by which the episteme is uncovered. The 
structure of the book its e lf  suggests this. In dealing with 
the discursive formation f ir s t ,  Foucault confronts problems that 
emerge from those disciplines
" . . .  so unsure of their frontiers, and so vague in 
content . . .  that we call the history of ideas, or 
of thought, or of science or of knowledge." (AK p.21) 
After suspending notions that conspire in the theme of conti­
nuity such as traditions and evolution and rejecting the 
apparent unities of the subject, object, science and discourse 
that characterize these disciplines, Foucault establishes "an
entire fie ld  (that) Is set free" (AK p .26) In which the 
dispersion of statements may be apprehended In their proper 
occurrence. From the mapping of this liberated f ie ld , the 
archive, and the regularities that function within I t ,
Foucault moves on to describe the articulation of discourse 
and knowledge. The hinge pin of this articulation Is the 
concept of discursive practice, as Foucault makes quite 
clear when he writes:
"there is no knowledge without a particular dis­
cursive practice, and any discursive practice may 
be defined by the knowledge that i t  forms." (AK p.183) 
The description of this discursive practice/knowledge (savoir) 
juncture involves the analysis of the regularities of discourse, 
of discursive formations and p o s itlv itles . In relation to the 
epistemological figures that emerge there, and this Is , indeed, 
the analysis of the eplsteme. The description of discursive 
practices and that of the eplsteme are correlative, for the 
description of one leads to the uncovering of the other, as is 
apparent in Foucault's second definition of the eplsteme:
"By eplsteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of 
relations that unite, at a given period, the dis­
cursive practices that give rise to jplstemologlcal 
figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems."
(AK p .191)
I t  Is clear from this reciprocity that exists between Foucault's 
concepts of discursive practice and of the eplsteme, that I t  Is 
utterly  specious to argue that they are mutually exclusive. In 
fact, the description of the regularities of discourse given In 
The Archaeology of Knowledge is the "methodological signposting" 
(AK p .16) that Foucault fe lt  was lacking in The Order of Things, 
which gave rise to the multitude of mlsrecognitlons of the 
eplsteme and consequently his project In that work, for what was 
at work there was precisely this discursive practice/knowledge 
configuration, named the eplsteme.
Foucault's rejection of structuralism as an apt label for his 
mode of analysis thus cannot be seer In terms of the substitu­
tion of discursive practice for the eplsteme, but the question 
s t i l l  remains as to whether the analytical tools he constructs 
in The Archaeology f  Knowledge are related to structuralism. 
Although this question has been approached above, and I t  must 
be allowed that discussion at length Is necessary to dispatch 
I t ,  le t I t  suffice, however, to make a few more observations 
In this Instance. The term 'Structuralism' has been applied 
to describe a great variety of theorists' work, from Levl- 
Strauss' structural anthropology, Althusser's scientific  
Marxism, Lacan's psycho-analysis to Barthes' erotic criticism , 
to name but a few. However, each of these theorists operate 
In recognized disciplines, something that cannot be said of 
Foucault. In fact, Foucault's aversion to this particular 
label probably springs from the Impossible endeavour of struc­
turalism, in which I t  has attempted to Institu te its e lf  as a 
specific discipline in the form of semiotics or the science 
of signs, yet I t  has always been faced with Its  inab ility  to 
mark out a space specific to I t .  I t  Is a generic term neces­
sarily  attached to something else. However, for the sake of 
sim plicity. I f  one were to regard structuralism as that which 
attempts to analyze signifying systems and the production of 
meaning in those systems, we find a clear distinction between 
th<* and the work of Foucault. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
K  j i t  constantly draws distinctions between language and 
discourse through the differentiation of the statement from 
sentential and prepositional units. His Interest does not lie  
in the function of language as a signifying system producing 
meaning but as the basis of discursive practice producing 
knowledge, and his concern Is not with how meaning Is con­
structed, but with the conditions affecting the emergence of 
statements.
Apart from a supposed interest in language, other points of
connection that are regarded as characteristic of both 
structuralism and Foucault are an interest In the structure 
of unconscious thought, the severence of the production of 
meaning from the private experience of the subject and a 
conviction that the text can be studied exclusive of the 
rea lities  of the text's  production, the emphasis being upon 
the laws governing the textual system's functioning. However, 
as we shall see, Foucault does not offer in the eplsteme a 
reconstruction of the thought of an age, and, although he 
does displace the subject as a transcendental category, he 
does not relegate i t  to the margins, but fragments I t  into 
a set of relations operating from different points within 
discourse. Lastly, as regards the tex t, we shall see later 
that Foucault's treatment nf the text Is not as a system In 
its e lf .  In short, there is no direct relation between the 
structuralist endeavour to aoily a linguistically  based 
model and the FoucauIdlan arcnaeology.16
One of the foremost misconceptions that emerged in the critical 
wake of The Order of Things is that the work attempted to 
present a theory of cultural to ta lit ie s . Maurice Cranston 
dismisses the book in terms of "something employed to explain 
everything, ends up explaining nothing",1 whilst Hayden White 
agrees that "Foucault aims at a system capab"e of explaining
1 Q
almost anything". Indeed, Fouc«ult does refer to the eplsteme 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge as an "Inexhaustible fie ld" and 
an "Indefinite fie ld  of relations". (AK pp.191-192) However, 
this Is not a denegration of the concept that appeared so 
dominantly 1n The Order of Things, but the couching of the 
concept In Its  broadest terms. The eplsteme as I t  appears In 
The Order of Things does not refer to the Incefinlte fie ld  of 
relations that is opened up by the archaeological ill story, but 
i t  is In specific reference to the posltlvltles defined by the 
discursive practices of general grammar, natural history and 
the analysis of wealth and their corresponding mutations into
linguistics, biology and political economy. Hence Foucault 
cannot be said to be attempting to provide a system of uni­
versal explan.' ion. As Foucault points out in an interview:
"I ' we never hi.a the intention of doing a general 
hi$wury of the human sciences or a critique of the 
possibility of the sciences in general. The subtitle 
to The Order of Things is not 'the archaeology', but
IQ
'an archaeology of the human sciences'."
Foucault makes two important points here: f ir s t ly ,  that the
episteme as i t  is constructed in The Order of Things is open 
to extension, that the archaeological analysis of the positi- 
vities being scrutinized is not a closed or final picture of 
the mutations they undergo; and secondly, that the analysis 
undertaken in this work is merely one of a number of possible 
histories of the human sciences.
20Jean Piaget critic izes Foucault for the "homogenization" of 
a ll sciences in the concept of the episteme. Piaget attests 
to the assertion that biology remained "arrested at th \ 
taxonomic level", but argues that Foucault's eighteenth 
century episteme cannot account for the progress of mathematics 
and physics beyond this leve l. He finds that the most glaring 
error of which Foucault is gu ilty , is that he bases too much
on synchrony, and i t  is for this reason that his work becomes
21"too easy prey for history". As regards the f irs t  charge, 
that the episteme is insufficient to describe physics and 
mathematics in the eighteenth century, we have already seen 
that this was not Foucault's purpose, and that the extension 
of the episteme to incorporate those formal sciences is 
possible even though The Order of Things does not venture into 
this sphere of relations. However, the second charge opens a 
new set of problems. Piaget conceives of Foucault's epistemes 
as to ta lly  discontinuous blocks governed by "conceptual arche­
types":
"His epistemes follow upon, but not from one another.
whether formally or d la lectlca lly . One episteme Is 
not a ffilia te d  with another, either genetically or 
historically  . . . " 22 
This, Piaget argues, devalues history and genesis, and 
consequently, where Foucault has promised an eplstemological 
structuralism, he merely supplies structures that are arb itrarily  
constructed as he relies 'on Intuition and substitutes specula­
tive  improvisation for methodological procedure". Thus the 
eplstemes are "mere diagrams, not transformational systems".23
I f  Piaget's view of the episteme as a to ta lly , discontinuous, 
arbitrary structure represents one extreme of the c ritica l 
spectrum, the other extreme Is occupied by those critics  and 
commentators who attempt to find some principle governing the 
transformation from one episteme to the next. Hayden White 
goes so far as to contend that: -
" . . .  Foucault does have both a system of explanation 
and a theory of the transformation of reason, or 
science, or consciousness, whether he knows I t  or 
w ill admit I t  or not."2*
White finds Foucault's eplstemes analogous to Vico's "cycles 
through which consciousness passed", and through this analogy,
he finds that Foucault's eplstemes have an Im plicit Vlchlan
25system of explanation. V1co argues that there are four 
principle tropes - metaphor, metonoiqy, synecdoche and Irony - 
from which a ll figures of speech are derived and which, when 
analyzed, provide for the understanding of the phases of con­
sciousness which pass in the evolution of c iv iliza tion . Through 
the study of human a rtifac ts , he discerned four such phases 
through which any c iv iliza tio n , such as that of Ancient Rome or 
European Christianity, pass. The cycle begins with the age of 
gods, In which man Is but one step away from his natural state 
of bestia lity . In this phase of social evolution, the family 
comes Into being, wherein, alongside bonds of kinship In the 
organization of the family, there exist bonds of servitude.
These la tte r  bonds between kinsmen and their servants are the 
point of emergence of the next phase. In which the conflict 
between patricians and pleblans, kinsmen and serfs, *p11ts 
society into two classes - the patricians joining forces to 
protect and preserve their position and rights against the 
pleblans who mutiny in the pursuance of their own betterment. 
Gradually, this class struggle leads to the admittance of the 
pleblans to the rights once held solely by the patricians, to 
give rise to democratic or free popular republics. This new 
phase of social evolution Vico calls the age of men. Finally, 
the social solidarity, discipline and respect for law that 
had maintained the patricians Is eroded In an age of decadence, 
in which a slackening of public sp irit occurs through the 
re lie f  of a ll people of t'.e lr  public responsibility. Thus the 
c iv iliza tion  Is prone to Internal breakdown or external conquest.
The key to understanding Lie development of c iv iliza tion  was 
for Vico the poetic wisdom of man, or 'sapienza poetlca', 
which Is operative in the myths and symbols created by man.
Hence Vico asserted that an account of the development of reason 
could only be made comprehensible through the scrutiny of human 
a rtifac ts , the major medium of which Is language. Language is 
thus the moulding principle of such an account, as Its  use Is 
the determining principle of the social structure. To follow 
these changes 1n language 1s to understand how change occurred 
In human society, for man constructs himself and his world 
according to the communicative means at his disposal. In this 
regard, Vico argued that human nature its e lf  Is not a constant, 
but w ill vary according to the phase of soda! structure dominant 
at the time. However, because myths and symbols constituted 
'Imaginative unlversals' in that they are the creations of 
'sapienza poetlca', human artifacts are able to reveal the 
Intentions harboured 1n the minds of men. Vico this proposed 
that the understanding of man differed substantially from the 
understanding of nature, for whereas natural phenomena may only
be described and classified, man-made phenomena could be 
understood by grasping these Intentions, by reconstructing 
what as going on In the minds of men.
Superficially, 1t seems as I f  there are a number of points 
where the Foucauldlan archaeology and the Vlchlan account 
intersect. However, upon a closer analysis, Hayden White's 
analogy proves specious, for these supposed points of In ter­
section which Hayden White takes as the basis for his 
argument, name.y the categories of man, language and history, 
are entirely different In the work of Vico from that of 
Foucault. F irs t, le t us take the category of man and his 
guises as consciousness, reason and 'thought'. Although Vico, 
like  Foucault, does not regard human nature as a constant, he 
does rely upon the transparent quality of language to offer an 
understanding of the minds of men, of the various forms that 
consciousness takes. Although Vico does not Install human 
nature in general as a constant and transcendental figure, 
he does substitute a part of i t ,  namely man's poetic wisdom, 
as a metaphysical principle, which on the one hand, governs 
the progression of c iv iliza tio n , but which on the other hand, 
is subject to shifts Its e lf  in that i t  changes Its  content, 
yet not Its  form. As we have seen, Foucault's projects are 
motivated by the endeavour to decentre the subject and the 
various forms i t  takes, and to analyze I t  in Its dispersion In 
discourse. In the Foucauldlan archaeology, there Is therefore 
no place for man. I t  Is an analysis that takes no stock of 
human intentions, for Its  object Is not the history of forms 
of consciousness, thought or reason. What, then, one may ask.
Is the object of the archaeology? This brings us to the second 
category of difference between Foucault and Vico. Foucault's 
archaeology offers a mode of analysis of discourse, In and for 
Its e lf .  Vico's Investigation Is of language as the vehicle of 
human creation and the window through which the historian may 
view the phases of consciousness of civilized man, which Is a
decidedly Classical endeavour and one which cannot be homo­
genized with the modern conception and analysis of language, 
le t alone with the Foucauldlan appropriation of discourse as 
I t  has been discussed above. Finally, the VIchi an concept 
of history Is nothing but antithetical to the archaeology. 
Vico's phases of the development of c iv iliza tion  each have 
Its  root In its  predecessor. They constitute an evolution 
which is predetermined and Inevitable as the course which 
any c iv iliza tion  must run from Its  birth through to Its  
decay and death. As we have already noted, this evolution 
Is governed by a metaphysical principle through which I t  is 
also made comprehensible. The Vichian history Is a linear 
and continuous progression that begins from the Book of 
Genesis and professes to explain a ll facets of huma- lifrt.
I t  Is precisely against this type of history that jne 
Archaeology of Knowledge is written. Foucault posl-j, in 
place of a genesis, a dispersion; against the cu.idnuity 
of time, he argues for a set of discontinuities or ruptures 
which Involve the conjuncture of specific events, and against 
the notion of explaining to ta lit ie s , he proposes that, far 
from offering an explanation that encompasses a ll phenomena 
of a given period, only a description of a specific and 
localized set of relations is possible. Hence, where Vico 
proposes history, Foucault proposes an anti-history - a claim 
which we shall take up la ter. What is at stake nere, is that 
Hayden White's analogy is without ground. The episteme can­
not be likened to Vichian "cycles through which consciousness 
passed", for the episteme is neither a cycle nor does i t  
pretend to reconstruct the consciousness of the past. Rather 
than the reconstituted "system of postulates that governs a ll 
the branches of knowledge (connaissances) of a given period", 
(AK p .191) the episteme is the condition of possibility of 
epistemological figures in discourse. The description of the 
episteme thus focusses, not upon the propositions made and 
held as true in a certain period, but upon the relations
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Imposed upon discourse, which fa c ilita te  Its  appearance and 
which also constrain and lim it I t .  Where Vico Interprets 
human artifacts of the past in ordir ' > each behl i them 
and reconstruct e Intentions of the Amative consciousness 
of each age, Foucault rejects ; »erp,otat1on and the notion 
of the Subject order to describe discourse and the 
discursive relations that regulate the appearance of epl- 
stemologlcal figures In each eplsteme.
I t  Is clear, then, that Hayden White builds his analogy 
linking Vico and Foucault on the employment of the categories 
of the Subject, language and history, but as we have seen, 
this basis of hV argument Is the misrecognition of the 
function of these categories In Foucault. Indeed, White In 
his summing up of The Order of Things as "an Important inter­
pretation of the evolution of the 'formalized1 consciousness
26of Western man" reveals the three areas in which the 
archaeology is misapprehended: interpretation refers more
to the "meaningful" sentence rather than the archaeological 
statement, evolution Is a concept of history purged from 
Foucault's anti-history and fin a lly , Foucault does not 
present a thesis concerning consciousness, but tracing the 
transformations of discursive regularities. These areas of 
misrecognition and confusion are found In the works of a 
number of other critics  and commentators of whom we shall 
take only a few.
27P. Major-Poetzl proposes to find a binary principle at 
work In the arrangement of tie  eplstemes. She suggests that 
the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries represent Interpretative 
modes of knowledge whilst the Classical and Contemporary 
eplstemes are representative of formalist systems. From this 
she concludes:
"Foucault's history of Western thought may then be 
regarded not as a series of unconnected ruptures
between periods, but as an enUless oscillation  
between two modes of thought."?8 
Like Hayden White, Major-Poetzl regards The Archaeology of 
Knowledge as a "science of thought",29 but where White 
Imposes on the seeming radical discontinuity of the epistemes 
a tropologlcal system akin to something of a natural progres­
sion of the civ ilized mind, Major-Poetzl imposes a system of 
periodicity, in which change is accounted for In terms of a 
predetermined pendulum-like movement between two poles, which 
operate as the essences of the ages of the c iv iliza tio n . Akin 
to this Interpretation of the Foucauldlan archaeology, Is the 
thesis put forward by David Carroll. Carroll argues that 
the eplstem* Is the organizing principle of Foucauldlan 
history, and as such is the "subject" of the archaeology, as 
I t  U  a form of collective consciousness. Correlative to this 
proposition, Carroll proposes that the eplsteme 1s experlenceable.
.e Carroll asserts that "the^e Is a decidedly Hegelian aspect 
to Foucault’s a n a l y s i s " T h e  eplsteme Is regarded as deter­
mining:
" . . .  the possibilities and limits of any period or 
context; and when these possibilities have been 
realized, when the space has been saturated, then a 
break occurs and a new eplsteme is born with the 
process beginning anew."31 
Two misconceptions characterize this view of the Foucauldlan 
archaeology, and both attempt a re&rtlculatlon of I t  with 
notions of traditional history which Foucault attempts to sever 
from his own work. F irs t, Carroll regards the eplsteme as an 
organizing principle and "subject" - a view which amounts to 
reinstating a centre or metaphysical category where Foucault 
has In itiated a decentring. However, Carroll's thesis Is not 
acceptable because he conflagrates the eplsteme with represen­
tation and order In regard to the Classical eplsteme, and 
regards them a ll as a singular form of consciousness. In this 
respect, he transforms the eplsteme Into something like the
Hegelian Ideal. This leads to the second point of divergence 
between the Foucauldlan archaeology and the interpretation of 
i t  by Carroll - the notion of history Carroll regards the 
episteme as a self-contained process of evolution, the seed 
of which is contained in its  predecessor, and which endures 
through a process of growth towards a final decay. I t  is 
not surprising that i f  the episteme is viewed in these terms, 
Foucault's analysis might be regarded as Hegelian.
Common to a ll the Interpretations thus far discussed. Is the 
inclusion of the category of consciousness in some form in 
the make-up of the episteme or the archaeology as a whole, 
and the attempt to find some principle of connection or con­
tinuity  at work in the discontinuity from one episteme to thv 
next. This is no coincidence, for, i f  the archaeology Indeed 
does uncover structures of consciousness or thought, then the 
ostensible radical discontinuity between ;1stemes poses a 
problem. Consciousness or thought sure y does not undergo 
radical change without cause. In the "Foreword to the English 
edition" of The Order of Things, Foucault stresses the 
problem of causality and causal explanation is suspended, the 
work therefore being an attempt "to describe the combination 
of corresponding transformations that occur in the empirical 
sciences." He continues:
" It  «eemed to me that i t  would not be prudent for 
the moment to force a solution I fe lt  Incapable, I 
admit, of offering: the traditional explanations 
- s p ir it of the time, technological or social change. 
Influence of various kinds - struck me fu* the most 
part as being more magical than effective." (OT p .x ili)  
I f  one regards Foucault's description of the transformations 
affecting the empirical sciences as one based upon change in 
consciousness, the suspension of causality and explanation 
diminishes the import of the thesis as a history. The novel 
approach instigated by the work is negated as i t  is drawn back
towards the traditional notions of history and its  articula­
tions with the transcendental Subject and ciusality , both of 
which are glaringly absent from this work. I t  is perhaps for 
this reason that these critics  feel compelled to find in the 
'unsaid' of The Order of Things some principle of homogeneity 
or determinism at work in the ordering of the epistemes, to 
posit some principle of continuity in the ruptures that 
separate them, whether i t  be a principle of natural progression 
of the c iv ilized mind, a periodicity governed by alternate forms 
of consciousness, or the elevation of the episteme Its e lf  to a 
deterministic principle to which a ll phenomena may be traced 
back to in a relation of causality. What seems to be essentially 
at stake here, is that these critics  have taken the meat of the 
episteme but rejected the bones of the archaeological concept of 
history which gives i t  shape. Instead they reinsert the 
traditional conceptions of histo.y into the body of The Order of 
Things. No doubt, they thus perceive a different animal to that 
for which Foucault would take responsibility!
But what, then, is the episteme? In an Interview in 1968 Foucault 
explained his use of the term 'archaeology' in regard to the 
episteme:
"By 'archaeology' I wirh to name not a discipline exactly, 
but a fie ld  of research, which could be described as 
follows: In any society, the knowledge, the philosophical
ideas, the ordinary day-to-day beliefs, and, moreover, the 
institutions, the commercial and political practices, the 
social customs - a ll these lead us back to a certain 
Im plicit episteme which belongs to that society. This 
episteme is profoundly different from the knowledge found 
in the scientific books, the philosophical theories, the 
religious apologetics, but i t  is what makes pc ible the 
appearance at a given moment, of theories, beliefs, 
practices."32
The episteme is thus an intricate part of the archaeology and cannot
be spoken of except with respect to the mode of analysis 
which uncovers I t .  The second point to which Foucault 
draws attention. Is that the eplsteme Is not an empirically 
available entity, but constructed In the analysis of a 
combination of po s ltlv ltles , so that the configuration of 
knowledge that the eplsteme reveals Is not that which the 
discourses speak of themselves, but that which makes possible 
the emergence of such propositions and through which they are 
assigned meaning and truth value. Although I t  may appear 
from the broad spectrum of Institutional and discursive 
categories that Foucault lis ts , that the eplsteme is a l l -  
inclusive, In the practical application of the eplsteme In 
The Order of Things, I t  Is not the description of a social 
to ta lity . I t  is presented here as a theoretical concept and 
couched In Its  broadest terms as that which extends across 
a ll discursive practices. However, In practical terms, the 
simultaneous and comparative analysis of a ll discursive 
formations functioning at any one time or within a particular 
period Is hardly possible. Hence, Foucault posits that the 
same eplsteme exists for a ll discursive practices at any time, 
but In the practical application of the concept, I t  w ill 
appear through a local analysis of related posltlvltles and 
w ill transform according to those Included in the analysis.
In this regard, the eplsteme is a heuristic concept, for I t  
fac ilita tes  the uncovering of the relationships and junctures 
that characterize related discourses, yet at the same time, 1s 
postulated as a flexible configuration that may be uncovered 
further In the analysis of other discursive practices. In 
short, the eplsteme as a theoretical postulation Is an open. 
Inexhaustible fie ld  of relations that unite the discursive 
practices of a certain spatio-temporality yet Its  efficacy 
In practice lies in the localized analysis characteristic of 
the archaeology. The spisteme Is thus coherent with Foucault's 
concept of anti-history as opposed to history, or of a general 
history as opposed to a total hlscory to which we now turn In
a comparative description of the archaeology with regard to 
lite ra ry  history.
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PART I I I :  Towards an Archaeological Historiography of Literature
In an Incisive artic le  entitled "The Fall of Literary History",1 
Ren5 Wellek registers the failures of lite rary  history as a 
discipline capable of coming to terms with Its  object. There 
can be l i t t l e  doubt of the valid ity of Wellek's pronouncement 
that the fie ld  has declined and fallen Into crisis through the 
realization that notions of progress or development are llluslonary.2 
The lack of methodological direction that besets the lite rary  
historian may be compared, according to Roman Jakobson, to "police 
who are supposed to arrest a certain person, arrest everybody and 
carry o ff everything they find In the house and a ll the people who 
pass by chance In the street. Thus the historian of literature  
appropriates everything - the social setting, psychology, politics, 
philosophy. Instead of lite ra ry  scholarship we got a conglomeration 
of derivative d<sc<p11nes".^
The task of this section is to transpose the Foucauldlan archaeo­
logy as a method of discursive analysis Into the sphere of lite rary  
texts. However, before this transposition can be effected In a 
meaningful manner, the existing conditions of knowledge related to 
the literary  domain must be traced. This Is necessary for two 
reasons. F irs tly , to be true to our stance, i t  must be admitted 
that the terrain of historical literary  study is already complexly 
inscribed and thus these inscriptions cannot be Ignored In the 
transference of archaeological concepts for fear of offerring a 
mere tautology. Our second reason is perhaps more Important, for 
I f  one 1s to regard oneself as a student of texts, the form of 
knowledge that exists before a transference of archaeological 
methodology and alms must be understood so that the efficacy of 
the archaeology and the valid ity of Foucault's claims can be fully  
ascertained, as the requirements of an In te llig ib le  method and
material form of knowledge w ill have been gathered from the 
analysis of the obstacles and Impasses besieging the traditional 
domain.
3.1: The Crisis of Literary History
Although Wellek essentially retracted his thesis towards a 
lite ra ry  history In "The Fall of Literary History",4 his earlier 
work, especially his and A. Warren's Theory of Literature" has 
become something of a touchstone in the fie ld . For this reason,
I t  offers a good point from which to begin an analysis of the 
conditions of knowledge that operate In the traditional domain 
of lite rary  history.
Wellek asserts in this work that history appears as a "meaningless 
seHes of events" or a "meaningless flux of change", a disorder 
which may be unravelled through Its relation to a norm. This 
relation mediates between the individual work and the general 
historical process of which I t  is a part in such a way that the 
autonomy and 1 dividuality of that work Is not Impaired. His 
supporting argument for this proposition Is as follows:
"Only then can the apparently meaningless series of 
events be sp lit Into its  essential and Its Inessential 
elements. Only then can we speak of a historical 
evolution which yet leaves the individuality of a 
single event unimpaired. By relating an individual 
reality  to a general value, we do not degrade the 
individual to a mere specimen of a general concept but 
Instead give significance to the Individual. History 
does not simply Individualize general norms (nor is i t  
of course a discontinuous meaningless flu x ), but the 
historical process w ill produce ever new forms of value, 
hitherto unknown and unpredictable. The re la tiv ity  of
the Individual work of art to a scale of values is 
thus nothing else than the necessary correlative of
Its  Ind ividuality ."6
This scale of values Is provided by history, so that a 'logical 
c irc le ' Is apparent In which the historical process produces 
the scale of values by which I t  Is to be judged in return and 
ordered Into periods of lite ra ry  history. This logical circle  
Is unavoidable, Wellek claims. I f  the process of history Is tc 
bo made In te llig ib le .7
This process of reasoning by which an absolute principle Is 
obtained from history and then reimposed upon I t  as an ordering 
principle Is pertinent to many other theses of lite ra ry  history.
The l is t  Is endless, but we may take a few examples to Illustrate  
the point. This process of reasoning linked to the idea of the 
autonomy of lite ra ry  history as found In Wellek was already 
evident In H. W dlfflln's Principles of Art History.8 a pioneering 
text In art history which has formed the basis of theses in 
lite rary  history such as the work of David Lodge, Strlch and W.T. 
Jones.9 Wttlfflln proposes that a 'visual schema' or 'visual 
denominator' underlies a variety of works that appear at a certain 
time, and I t  Is these universal forms of representation that define 
the epoch or period. The possibilities of an epoch are formulated 
according to the opposition of basic s ty lis tic  elements which gain 
ascendancy over each other alternately giving rise to a historical 
periodicity. Like Wellek, Wfllfflln contends that the historical 
process is made In te llig ib le  through grasping the essential elements 
of I t :  Inner logic or 'Inner necessity'.10 These elements them­
selves are extracted and reinvested In the history of those works 
as a principle of organization.
Whereas Wellek and WdlffUn propose anonymous histories in which 
norms, values, standards and visual possibilities govern as uni­
versal:, Ernst Gombrlch11 proposes a subject-centred art history 
which strongly advocates the Importance of the Idea of art as a
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human activ ity . Although Gombrlc. 1s concerned mainly with art 
history, the method and conceptions he employs permeate the 
domain of lite rary  history and nvy be found entombed already 
In such works as Legouls and Cazamian's History of English 
Literature. 12 Gombrlch proposes:
M. . .  'works of a r t1 are not the result of some 
mysterious ac tiv ity , but objects made by human beings 
for human beings . . .  everyone of their features Is a 
result of a decision by the a r t is t ." ^
Gombrlch's history of artists 1s organized by a rtis tic  In itia tive  
and perlodlzad according to generations. The organizing principle 
of such a history Is thus o rig in a lity , the peaks of which are 
represented by the 'great' a rt is t. This Is apparent In his view 
of nineteenth century art:
"The history of the nineteenth century, as we usually 
see I t  today, Is really the history of a handful of 
such sincere men whose integrity of purpose led them 
to dery convention, not In order to gain notoreity, 
but so they might explore new possibilities undreamt 
of by previous generations."14 
Thus although Gombrlch's conception of history Is entirely at odds 
with those of Wellek and W tilfflIn, the same process by which history 
Is organized is at work. Gombrlch s ifts  through the chronological 
order of historical events In order to define points of orig inality  
from which a period or ' generation' of repetition ensues. Thus a 
principle - that of creative innovation - is extracted from the 
works and reinvested in order to demarcate a generation as a time 
period grouping se,eral artis ts .
Although Wellek does not countenance any reference to socio-economic 
and political history In order to explain change In literary  history, 
WOlffMn and Gombrlch admit this as a second avenue after Innovation 
and the Inner logic of the historical process. This avenue often 
takes overriding precedence over others for Marxist historians such 
as LuMcs15 who regards the specificity of literature as lying in
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Its  relation to the 'substructure'. Literature Is reduced to a 
'reflection of r e a l i ty '^  which fa lls  Into the Ideological and 1s 
therefore explicable In terms of the socio-economic forces that 
underlie historical events. Whereas many Marxist theorists rely 
too heavily on the base-superstmcture model for explanations of 
so-called a rtis tic  endeavours, linking such endeavours directly  
to the class struggles, as for example Nlcos Hadjlnicolaou does 
in Art History and Class Struggle. 17 An,old Hauser18 manages to 
balance the methodological tools of a Marxist approach with the 
concerns of the domain of art history. The mediation between . . 
society and the work of art is described by Hauser in these terms: 
"Culture serves to society. Spiritual creations,
traditions, conventions, and institutions are but ways 
and means of social organization. Religion, philosophy, 
science and art a ll have their place In the struggle to 
preserve society."18 
All the elements of a Marxist elucidation are there - Ideology, 
society and tho struggles that oc ir therein. Haucer regards 
works of art as historical products of societies, and artists are 
situated in specific soclo-hlstorlcal contexts In which they act 
according to the socio-economic relations, often unconsciously 
and without intention. Class situations and Interests are 
proposed as an objective, institutional structure which affect 
the product.on of 'a rt ' rather than subjectively varying mental 
conditions. Despite these hallmarks of Marxist analysis, Hauser 
suggests:
" . . .  i t  would be a mistake to suppose that social 
conditions produ-e the forms 1n terms by which the 
a rtis tic  revolution expresses its e lf ,  these forms are
just much the product of psychological and s ty lis tic
on
as of sociological factors.'
I;, this regard, Hauser Is concerned with how much of the work is 
attributable to 'personal In it ia t iv e '.21 This Is to be analyzed 
with reference to social presuppositions, Hauser suggests, for to 
preserve the Individuality of every phenomenon in the history of
literature or art means that the historian 1s limited to purely 
descriptive accounts of the historical process, a return perhaps 
to Wellek's 'meaningless flux of change'. Hauser argues that 
systematic research aims to establish the common character of a 
m ultip licity of objects In order to make these more manageable 
for analysis and more comprehensible. In this respect, one needs 
a standard by which to compare works and judge the representative 
significance of each for history. Hauser proposes that this 
Standard is style.
This notion of perlod-style which Is sought In the texts and then 
deployed as a standard relies upon the same process of thought 
found In Wellek, WOlff1 in and Gcmbrich. A group of texts of a 
given time segment of history are analyzed for common aesthetic 
tra its  which are then imposed as the qualitative principle of the 
formation of those texts. I f  we take Hauser's definition of 
style:
"Historical structures such as tradition, convention, 
level of technique, prevalent a rtis tic  effects, current 
rules of taste, or topical subjects set objective, 
rational, superpersonal goals and bounds to the irrational 
spontaneity of psychological functioning, and in co­
operation with this la tte r produce what we call a 'style'",22 
and compare i t  with Wellek's definition of the period as a normative 
system:
" . . .  a time section dominated by a system of literary  
norms, standards, and conventions, whose introduction, 
spread, diversification, integration, and disappearance 
can be traced",23 
i t  is clear that we have come fu ll c ircle. So one could go on, 
taking up other such theories and theses that occupy the domain of 
lite ra ry  history, or art history for that matter, and the l is t  of 
those that rehearse the process of abstracting such organizing 
principles as those elucidated here would grow endlessly. One need 
only take up such varied offerrings as in the Proceedings of the
Seventh Congress of the Internatlonal Comparative Literature 
Association, volume 2 ^  to find that the process of abstraction 
is embedded on the level of the problematic of the fie ld  of 
lite rary  history and that i t  therefore permeates through much 
of the work carried out in that fie ld .
Let us restate the process by which these theories operate in 
terms of a conception of knowledge, for, after a l l ,  the activ ity  
is bound within a discipline professing to know texts. The 
conception of knowledge within the domain of literary  history is 
constituted by a process which takes place between a subject and 
an object, the relation between these given unities defining in 
turn the theoretical fie ld  in which 'to know' is the abstraction 
by the subject of the essence of the object. Louis Althusser 
describes this operation as the basis of the empiricist conception 
of knowledge:
"To know is to abstract from the real object its  essence, 
the possession of which by the subject is then called 
knowledge. Whatever particular variants this concept 
of abstraction may adopt, i t  defines an invariant struc­
ture which constitutes the specific index of empiricism."^ 
As Althusser makes clear, the problem with such a conception of 
knowledge is its  treatment of the object as constituted by essential 
and inessential elements. In the abstraction of the essential 
element, the inessential is stripped away, purged and eliminated to 
reveal the essence in its  pure form. The formation of the organizing 
principle of lite rary  history involves the isolation of such an 
essence and the elimination of the supposedly inessential elements 
which are considered as veiling the 'true' nature and in te llig ib ility  
of history. However, the process thus employed is invariably and 
necessarily circular by virtue of the aim of their studies. The 
essential features of the real object of criticism is sought through 
the separation of essence from the inessential, and to complete the 
circ le , this essence is reapplied to the historical object of 
analysis with the aim of defining this object as a whole. The
conception of the organizing principle thus is the point of 
Interaction between historical and critica l studies of 'a r t ' .
I f  one can extract the essence of 'a r t ' ,  one can know a rt, and 
therefore one can know its  history. The organizing principle 
is both the essence of the object and the means of the in te l l i ­
g ib ility  of its  history.
From this, i t  is clear that there is a double emphasis on the 
event its e lf;  f irs t ly  as that which contains the essence of 
its  own existence, and secondly as the constituent of history.
The event is the single level at which the traditional approaches 
to lite rary  history propose to operate, and whatever extrinsic 
factors are taken into account, they are regarded as contingent 
upon the identity of the event. The event as the real object 
of knowledge is regarded as containing the knowledge of its e lf  
within its e lf  as & hidden essence. Thus the object takes on a 
new existence - the existence of its  own knowledge which implies 
that the event as object is able to self-elaborate.
In order to make the event speak of its e lf ,  the historian relies 
upon the practice of interpretation. The text is translated 
through interpretation into a commentary which paradoxically 
professes to reveal the content of meaning unchanged yet at 
the same time, stripped of the inessential ornamentation that 
conceals its  meaning. The economy of the text is thus simulta­
neously revealed and destroyed, as the event as object is with 
the same movement elucidated by its  fragmentation into essential 
and inessential elements. Pierre Macherey points out the 
inherent contradictions of such a practice:
"Interpretation is a repetition, but a strange repetition 
that says more by saying less: a purifying repetition, 
at the end of which a hidden meaning appears in a ll its  
naked truth. The work is only the expression of this 
meaning, an ore which must be smelted to extract its  
precious content."26
The practice of interpretation Is thus a process of abstraction 
which Is end.essly repeatable, since as we have seen, the 
element regarded as constituting the essence Is not the same 
for every interpreter. Hence lite rary  history becomes a mere 
tautology as each interpretation of history and literary  events 
appropriates the object o ly partia lly  with the weight of the 
study placed f irs t  in one place and then in another and so on 
ad Infinitum.
At the heart of the empiricist conception of knowledge lies the 
misconception that the real object Is the object of knowledge. 
However, as we have seen, the real object Is conceived as being 
constituted by both essential and Inessential elements, the 
former of which 1s the object of knowledge. Thus two objects 
become apparent when the object Is questioned: the rough and 
Impure real object and the purified essential object of know­
ledge. The fundamental fault of the empiricist conception of 
knowledge therefore lies In the process of knowledge its e lf  
which simultaneously creates and negates the distinction between 
the real object and the object of knowledge.
These misconceptions and contradictions in the treatment of the 
object are not apparent in the empiricist fie ld  of knowledge 
because the concept of the object Is not questioned but assumed 
to be an 'obvious' unity or a 'given' In that 1t is concrete and 
empirically observable 1n the real. Likewise, the subject is 
assumed as obvious. Appearing under the guises of consciousness, 
reason and thought, the subject of knowledge occupies a position 
from which a ll or* history may be commanded In an act of se lf-  
consciousness. Just as the author as subject operates as the 
principle of the unity of a group of works, as the point of their 
genesis, so the knowing subject becomes the principle of the unity 
of history and the centre of its  being In that the process of 
knowledge organizes the chaos of the past Into a meaningful and 
progressive continuity. The literary  historian is thus situated
in an emplrlco-transcendental site from which he is engaged in 
the empirical analysis of human representations determined by 
the labour of writing, the repetitions of desire and the con­
straints of language, and >et implicated in the transcendental 
through the process of abstracting an Absolute which organizes 
history. This places the pric ice of lite ra ry  history in the 
modern space of knowledge as i t  is mapped in The Order of Things.27 
The literary  historian occupies the site of Man in that space, 
and he is thus forever caught between the premise that Man is 
f in ite  ana its  correlative that his representations are entirely  
knowable, and the problem of the valid ity of that knowledge.
For this reason, he attempts the impossible in attempting to 
regard tne transcendental catego of philosophy in order to 
overcome the characterization of his knowledge of finitude while 
simultaneously gazing at the representations of Man's finitude.
This accounts for the continual oscillation between the analysis 
of lite rary  texts and the reapproximations of them made on the 
theoretical level that characterizes the traditional endeavours 
of lite rary  history.
A third concept which remains unquestioned in the epistemological 
fie ld  of lite rary  history is that of historical time. Once more, 
like the object and the subject of knowledge, time is Introduced 
as having an immediate empirical existence. The simplic.ty of 
such chronologically-based evolutionary histories such as Legouis 
and Cazamian's History of English Literature^  has long since 
fallen into disrepute and historians such as Rene Wellek have 
realized the nted to confront the complexities of history, as he 
writes:
"What is needed . . .  is a modern concept of time, 
modelled net on the metric chronology of the calendar 
and physical science, but on an interpenetration of 
the causal order in experience and memory. A work of 
art is not simply a member of a series, a link in a 
chain. I t  may stand in relation to anything in the
past. I t  1s not only a structure to be analyzed 
descriptively . . .  I t  Is a to ta lity  of values 
which do not adhere to the structure but constitute 
its  very nature. All attempts to drain value from 
literature have failed and w ill fa ll because Its  
very essence is value."30 
Despite Wellek's dismissal of chronology as a basis for his­
torical study, he docs not question the concept of time that 
is operative in such histories. The elements of obviousness 
are s t i l l  present in phrases such as "causal order" and 
"to ta lity  of values" remain. Both the histories Wellek attacks 
and the history he proposes take over misconceptions from the 
Hegelian notion of historical time. For Hegel, historical time 
is the mere reflection in the continuity of time of the essence 
of the historical to ta lity . This essence is for Hegel the 
moment or present of the development of the Idea. I f  we sub­
stitute Wellek's value for Idea, i t  is clear that the concept 
of time in Wellek's argument is indeed Hegelian.
Althusser in Reading Capital31 isolates two essential charac­
teristics of Hegelian historical time; the homogeneous 
continuity of time and the contemporaneity of time, or the 
category of the historical present. The homogeneous continuity 
of time is the reflection of the continuity of the dialectical 
development of the Idea. We can see that WOlfflin advocates 
this conception in its entirety, but other historians of the 
art forms have found this idea to be problematical in its  direct 
application because of the Hegelian 'end of history' thesis. 
However, their modifications of this conception of the historical 
process have been mainly on minor issues. They remain true to 
this Hegelian thesis as they s t i l l  treat time as a continuum 
which may be divided according to a periodization corresponding 
to a succession of ono to ta lity  after the other. The periods 
that are traditionally accepted are believed to accurately 
divide the continuity of time according to clearly definable
moments of development, or 'presents'.
This leads us to Althusser's second Isolated characteristic - 
that, of the 'con tempo re ity  of tim e', the historical present.
This lie finds to be the condition of possibility of the notion 
of a homogeneous continuity of time. His argument is as follows: 
" ... i f  historical time is the existence of the social 
to ta lity  we must be precise about the structure of 
this existence. The fact that the relation between 
the social to ta lity  and its  historical existence is 
a relation with an immediate existence implies that 
this relation is Its e lf  immolate. In other words: 
the structure of historical existence is such that 
* '  the elements of the whole always co-exist in one 
and the same time, one and the same present, and are 
therefore contemporaneous with one another in one 
and the same present."32 (His emphasis)
He proposes that this type of structure of the historical 
existence of th, social to ta lity  allows an "essential section" 
to be made. T;, s Althusser describes as "an intellectual 
operation in which a vertical break is made at any moment in 
historical time". 33 This section reveals the 'present' in 
such a way that all the parts of the whole may be viewed in 
an immediate relation to one another which expresses their 
essence, as these parts of the whole existence in a co-presence. 
I t  is specifically the 's p ir itu a l' unity of this to ta lity  that 
allows this operation, as this unity Is that of an expressive » 
to ta lity . This means that a ll the elements of the whole are 
expressions of the whole and thus of the essence of that whole. 
Althusser describes the Hegelian to ta lity  as that which:
"has a type of unity in which each element of the 
wnole, whether a material or economic determination, 
a political institution or a religious, a rtis tic  or 
philosophical form, 1; never anything more than the 
presence of the concept with Its e lf  at a historically
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determined moment."
I t  Is clear from Althusser's elucidation of the Implications of 
the Hegelian concept of historical time-, that i t  is not only 
the Romantic-aesthetic school of historians who u tilize  the 
essential section in the form of the 's p ir it  of the age', but 
that its arch-enemy; the Marxist historian is implicated in 
the same gesture. Lukacs, for example, sees lite rary  history 
as a "moment" of general history in the sense that the former 
is a reflection of the struggles that give Impetus to the 
la t te r .35 This implies that a ll social practices express the 
historical essence of the time. Such attempts to explain the 
emergence of a text or a period through the incorporation of 
socio-cultural evidence finds their philosophical basis in the 
Hegelian notion of expressive causality, which is inextricably 
connected to this view of the social to ta lity . Socio-cultural 
evidence is used to gain an insight into the present of the 
lite ra ry  endeavours under analysis and thus supplies the know­
ledge of the historical essence, be I t  class struggle or 's p ir it '.  
In short, this notion relies upon the self-consciousness of the 
present and literature Is analyzed as a form of this self- 
consciousness, as an expression of i t .
For Althusser, this conception of history is by definition  
historic ist. Foucault refers to i t  as total history, the defi­
nition of which he phrases in >rms of a distinction with his 
own concept of general history:
"A total description draws a ll phenomena around a 
single point - a principle, a meaning, a s p ir it, a 
world-view, an overall shape; a general history, on 
the contrary, would deploy the space of dispersion."35 
I t  is clear that Foucault proposes his own project as that which 
is in opposition to the traditional endeavours of literary  history 
The archaeology as the methodology of that history becomes a 
method of resistance, the terms of which are the basis for
Foucault's claim that he has evacuated the traditional domain 
of histories of culture and thought. I t  Is to these terms of 
resistance that we turn In order to test Foucault's claim that 
the archaeology Is not embroiled In the same conglomeration as 
the history of ideas, ^f culture and art.
3.2: The Archaeology as a Method of Resistance: Memory and
Counter-Memory
Traditional literary  history Is formulated through the empiricist 
conception of knowledge, which is defined by the acceptance of 
'given' unities. The subject of knowledge, the object and the 
notion of time are not questioned because of their obviousness.
The aim of such a history is to reconstruct the to ta lity  of the 
past as the memory of tha present. History thus becomes an act 
of remembrance, a backward gaze from the vantage point of the 
present, from which the entire horizon of the historical domain 
may be viewed in a gaze down the tunnel of time. In this concep­
tion of knowledge, one finds, as Walter Benjamin writes, "time 
f il le d  by the presence of the now".37 From the place of the 
subject of knowledge, history appears as a continuous association 
of memories, the knowledge of which is possible through the self- 
consciousness of each moment in the continuum. The gaze of the 
historian is rather like a beam of light from a searchlight that 
traverses the domain, illuminating the ages of Man in a succession. 
Man is thus both the subject and the object of history, and the 
process of knowing that history is aimed at reconstituting the 
past moments of Man's development in a series of continuous 
memories.
In order to secure the difference between this empiricist or 
total h*story, Foucault offers the concept of counter-memory as 
the basis for historical knowledge. Whereas memory emphasizes
temporality and succession, counter-memory spatialIzes history 
In order to reassert the possibilities of discontinuity. Rather 
than attempt to return the to ta lity  of the past to memory, 
counter-memory concerns the topography of carefully delimited 
localities in which a relational network of discursivity is 
uncovered. History is thus regarded as a multi-layered space 
in which events are dispersed according to the specificity of 
their conditions of possibility which must be activ ily  exhumed. 
The object of knowledge is thus no longer the assumed unity of 
a text or group of texts but the relations of discursivity that 
enabled such a text or texts to appear. Likewise the subject 
of knowledge no longer resides upon the vantage point of the 
present, passively awaiting the self-consciousness of history 
to reveal knowledge in the form of a return of memory, but is 
separated from the events of the past by irreversible ruptures 
and discontinuities. History is no longer a continual pro­
gression towards ourselves in the present, but a series of 
discontinuous rearticulations and reconfigurations. The concept 
of counter-memory thus rests upon the deconstruction of the 
obviousness of temporality the subject and the object.
The formation of the concept of counter-memory as that which 
distinguishes general history rests upon two interrelated 
methodological decisions. The f irs t  of these is a rejection 
of Hegelian concepts and categories of thought that seeks to 
constrain the anarchy of history through dialectics and a 
belief in the k,ussib111ty of a synthesis. The second decision 
that Foucault makes becomes the basis #or the archaeology, that 
Is the decision to describe the differences that are liberated 
with the suspension of categorical thought. He contends:
" . . .  i t  was necessary to free ourselves from Hegel - 
from the opposition of predicates, from contradiction 
and negation, from a ll dialectics . . .  The most 
tenacious subjection of difference is undoubtedly 





condition where being maintains Its  undifferentiated 
repose at the highest level. Categories organize the 
play of affirmations and negations, establish the 
legitimacy of resemblances within representation, 
and guarantee the objectivity and operation of 
concepts. They suppress the anarchy of difference, 
divide differences Into zones, delimit their rights, 
and prescribe their task of specification with respect 
to Individual beings. On one side, they can be under­
stood as the a priori forms of knowledge but, on the 
other, they appear as an archaic morality, the ancient 
Decalogue that the identical Imposed on difference
Difference can only be liberated through the invention
38of an acategorlcal thought."
The endeavour to formulate the archaeology as a mode of historical 
analysis is synonymous therefore with this Invention of acategorlcal 
thought.
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault begins with exactly this 
project, for he suspends the homogenizing notions of tradition, 
development, evoliZ.on, s p ir it and Influence which are the ha ll­
marks of Hegelian categorical thought.3^  These principles of 
classification and assumed unities are the conditions of possibility 
of continuous history which Its e lf  Is regarded as pre-existing the 
process of knowledge. From our previous discussions regarding total 
history's reconstruction of memory, 1t Is clear that the knowing 
subject occupies a transcendental position with regard to the 
historical domain, and for this reason Foucault argues that the 
suspension of the categories of total history and the decentring 
of the Subject are necessarily correlative:
"Continuous history 1s the Indlspenslble correlative of 
the founding function of the subject: the guarantee
that everything tt.at has eluded him may be restored to 
him; the certainty that time w ill disperse nothing 
without restoring I t  in a reconstituted unity; the
A
promise that one day the subject - In the form of 
historical consciousness - w ill once again be ab 3 
to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, a ll 
those things that are kept at a distance by 
difference, and find in them what might be called 
his abode."40
The lite rary  historian thus u tilizes the categories of tradition, 
development and evolution as the apparent means by which a ll 
phenomena may be brought into a coherent whole and by which 
this to ta lity  may ue apprehended and explained. The position 
that the historian takes In relation to the material of which 
he wishes to gain a knowledge Is defined by the history that 
he undertakes. This position 1s, for Foucault as i t  Is for 
Althusser, that dictated by the empiricist conception of 
knowledge.
The Subject also operates as a part of the material analyzed 
In the form of the author. , ditional literary  history relies 
upon the author as a principle of the unity of a group of works 
and as the point of genesU cf those works. The author 1s 
regarded as Important In the search for an explanation of the 
contend o f  the works, hence biographical and psychological data, 
and social experi nces such as class position are Invoked 
together In a single gesture towards the author as the creator 
of otherwise enigmatic events. The author as creator 1s the 
node of Intersection of spiritual or idealist and materialist 
elements. He Is the mediator between society and a rt, yet 
also the spring of the creative urge, the gifted perpetrator 
of the 's p ir it  of the times'. In the effort to uncover a 
causality capablj of explaining thr emergence of the work, 
literary  critics and historians have teen caught oscillating  
between these two poles, referring to the author's socio­
cultural environment or his experience of l i f e ,  and when this 
does not account for every facet of his work, the individual's 
creative In itia tiv e  1s Invoked to account for the remainder.
Thus the author 1s accorded both an empirical and a transcen­
dental status, from which he exerts a unifying force over his 
work and, conversely, to which the unity of meaning Is 
attributable. Foucault contends that the author as subject 
Is relied upon as a concrete unity. This unity operates to 
elide the dispersion of history:
"Governing this function (of the author) is the 
belief that there must be - at a particular level 
of an author's thought, of his conscious or 
unconscious desire - a point where contradictions 
are resolved, where the Incompatible elements can 
be shown to relate to one another or to cohere 
around a fundamental and originating contradiction."^ 
This founding contradiction which cannot be resolved is that 
unstable ground upon which the author stands In relation to his 
experience of empirical existence and to his Intentions In 
representing that experience.
Since Foucault rejects the sovereignty of the Subject,42 the 
apparent unities of the book and the oeuvre are rejected in 
Its  wake. In the domain of traditional literary  history the 
problem of how the Individual text Is to be situated within 
the period and the general continuum of history, 1s recurrent. 
This problem is rooted in the designation of the book as an 
'obvious' object, the unity of which Is the centre of Its  
Individual value. Thus the sovereignty of the book Is to be 
protected at a ll costs, especially when that individual value 
1s aligned with creative value. This In itiates a return to the 
founding function of the Subject. In questioning the unity of 
the Subject, finding I t  a fa ls ification and dlsiv.ntllng i t  into 
a series of variable relations that comprise the enunclatlve 
function, Foucault brings into question the unity of the book 
and the oeuvre. Instead of a concrete object, Foucault finds 
a myriad of relations that stretch beyond the Inner coherence 
of the book. This set of relations forming the referential,
are variable as the referential Is relative to the discursive 
network in which i t  is situated. Likewise, the question of 
what is to be Included In the oeuvre, the problem of q u a lifi­
cation • grids of specificity, authorities and institutional 
constraints - collapses the myth of the oeuvre's self-evidence. 
The acceptance of the oeuvre as an a priori form of knowledge 
is objectionable as it  refers back to the homogenization of 
categorical thought which admits the presence of the Subject: 
"One is admitting that there must be a level (as 
deep as i t  is necessary to imagine i t )  at which the 
oeuvre emerges, in a ll its  fragments, even the 
smallest, the most inessential ones, as the expression 
of the thought, the experience, the imagination, or 
the unconscious of the author, or, indeed of the 
historical determinations that operate upon him.
But i t  is at once apparent that such a unity, far 
from being given immediately, is the result of an
operation; that this operation is interpretative
«43
The operation of interpretation thus assumes a point of genesis 
that is explanative of the book or oeuvre. This fundamental 
beginning is reconstituted in memory through the synthesis of 
oppositions such as society/individual, trad ition /text and 
experience/1ntention. These oppositions collapse when the 
unities of the Subject as creative source and the object - book, 
of the 'moment' of history and the expressive to ta lity  of 
societal experience, are pulverized. In their place, Foucault 
finds multitudes of relations of difference dispersed in the 
multi-leveled space of discourse. I t  is in this space that 
Foucault constructs the conceptual apparatus of the archaeology.
I t  is clear that the archaeology is not to be subsumed under 
the history of ideas as the projects undertaken by general and 
total histories are opposed.44 Where total history seeks to
Impose continuity and unity through locating points of genesis, 
general history allows the free play of difference and disper­
sion. Where total history reconstructs memory through synthesis, 
general history allows differentiation and divergence by acknow­
ledging the space of discourse. This counter-memory requires, 
Foucault contends, a new kind of thought:
"The freeing of difference requires thought without 
contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; 
thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought 
whose Instrument is disjunction; thought of the 
multiple - of the nomadic and dispersed m ultip licity  
that Is not limited or confined by the constraints 
of sim ilarity; thought that does not conform to a 
pedagogical model (the fakery of prepared answers), 
but that attacks insoluble problems - that Is , a 
thought that addresses a m ultip licity of exceptional 
points, which are displaced as we distinguish their 
conditions and which insist and subsist in the play 
of repetitions."45 
This claim that Foucault makes for a new thought or new process 
of textual knowledge is a heady one. I t  has been seen to func­
tion effectively in The Order of Things which is , I have argued, 
the work in which the archaeology is employed in its  truest 
form in that i t  is here that i t  appears free of the tendencies 
towards Marxist or structuralist concepts and strategies which 
were apparent in the earlier texts. However, the positivities  
analyzed in The Order of Things function in substantially d if ­
ferent ways to the body of texts that fa ll under the umbrella 
term of 1 lite ra tu re1. The question remains as to efficacy of 
this new process of knowledge and the conceptual apparatus i t  
engenders in the space of this peculiar discourse.
3.3: L iterary Discourse and Knowledge
Although Foucault does not focus upon literature to any great 
extent In his archaeologies, lite rary  texts occupy particular 
sites with regard to knowledge (savolr) which Is consistent 
in the three books. In Madness and C iv ilization , Foucault 
situates the f irs t  sign of the rupture between the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance in the division of the visual arts and 
literature's perception of madness.46 Since the sixteenth 
century, two conceptions of madness are found in literature .
On the one hand, the majority of texts remain at a distance 
from madness, judging i t  from the safety of the rule of reason 
whilst on the other, a few texts express what Foucault calls 
the "tragic or comic experience of madness"47 - the madness 
which has escaped confinement by rational discourse as found 
in the works of Bosch, Artaud and Nietzsche. In his attempt 
to probe the limits of reason, Foucault returns to the la tte r  
expressions of madness in his conclusion for i t  is these that 
teeter on the outermost lim its of what may be said. Likewise, 
in The Order of Things lite rary  texts are situated at the 
moment;; of transformation described in the work, at the limits 
of the epistemes. Between the Renaissance and the Classical, 
Foucault places Cervantes' Don Quixote in which the limits of 
resemblance are played off against Classical discourse of 
representation, with the result that the search for s im ili­
tude' appears to enter the realm of imagination, illusion and 
madness. Sade holds sway at the juncture of the Classical 
and the Modern, at which the limits of classical discourse 
are buffeted violently by the upsurgance of desire. Finally, 
Foucault turns to Nietzsche, Nerval, Artaud and MallarmS in 
his discussion of the modern episteme, as i t  is in the work 
of these writers that Foucault anticipates, but as yet cannot 
define, the birth of a new episteme.
In a ll cases, literature can be seen to be intricately related
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than to others whose relations to the discursive object are 
more rig idly Institutionalized.
48David Carroll has argued that the literary  texts in 
Foucault's archaeologies are "a subversive, disruptive form 
of 'lite ra tu re '" **  with which Foucault identifies his own 
critica l perspective. These texts, Carroll argues, are both 
the source of Foucault's c ritic a l enterprise as well as its  
limiting condition. In the light of this argument, he says 
of Madness and C iv iliza tion:
"The History of Madness narrated by Foucault would 
then be the culmination of this series of fictions  
(texts, paintings) that remain vigilant in darkness, 
that resist the obscuring c la rity  of rational philo­
sophical discourse. In other words the darkness of 
the night in which they are rooted is the source of 
its  c ritica l c la rity ; this is the reason i t  is able 
to describe both sides of the division, to describe 
the extra-discursive silence of madness as well as 
the confining discursiveness of reason."50 
These texts are then regarded as "outside history", and are 
regarded as "meta-archaeological texts"51 which lie  outside 
the different eplstemologlcal configurations that are traced 
by the archaeology of madness. Carroll finds the literary  
texts in The Order of Things to have the same function of source 
and delimitation with regard to the archaeology, and concludes:
" It  Is as I f  the hidden purpose of The Order of 
Things is to highlight the radical nature of those 
disruptive texts that escape archaeological 
classification and are thus extra-epistemological.
In this sense. The Order of Things would be as 
much about the disorder of these disruptive texts 
and everything that escapes determination by an 
episteme, as about the order of words or things
CO
determined by the episteme."
From this perspective, Carroll therefore argues that these 
lite ra ry  texts cannot be included in the archaeological 
enterprise, but that they stand in relation to its  critica l 
gaze as a "sovereign form of discourse" which is an escape 
route by which the archaeology bypasses the "traps set by 
history, philosophy, literature and p o litics ."53
#
Carroll's arguments find tneir foundation in a number of 
misapprehensions concerning the archaeology's relation to 
the episteme. Primarily he advocates the view that the 
epistemes are to ta lly  discontinuous, having no possible set 
of relations in common, Although Foucault acknowledged that 
The Order of Things does allow one to understand the epistemes 
as to ta lly  discontinuous blocks, such a notion, as we have 
seen, is dispelled in The Archaeology of Knowledge. But more 
importantly, the lite rary  texts sited at the points of trans­
formation between epistemes bear witness to the fact that such 
transformations are not total disjunctures. Don Quixote and 
the works of Sade contain elements of both configurations 
which clash with each other. Foucault's discussion does not 
place them outside configurations of knowledge, but rather shows 
the heterogeneity of epistemic elements they contain. His 
reference to Artaud and Nietzsche are not with regard to their 
disruption of traditional rationality per se, but of their in­
congruity with the modern episteme. Foucault Invokes them, 
therefore, as the site from which one might anticipate the
emergence of a new episteme. When Foucault speaks of the 
"sovereignty of these experiences"^ In reference to the work 
of BataHle, Blanchot and others, he does so not to place them 
outside history, but rather 1n regard to their transgression 
of the modern eplstemlc configuration. He contends that one 
day they must be asslmulated and he means this as a movement 
into a new episteme.
Carroll assumes that the function of the literary  texts in 
Madness and C ivilization and The Order of Things Is equivocal, 
however what he has in fact done. Is transpose the conditions 
of the earlier book onto the later book. In our discussion of 
Madness and C ivilization^  we found that the insurmountable 
obstacle that led to the in feasib ility  of the book was what 
Foucault called the "simple problem of elocution",56 in other 
words, the impossibility of speaking outside the bounds of reason 
and history. In this work, therefore, the literary  texts discussed 
by Foucault are implicated in his dubious attempt to speak of the 
Other. However, in The Order of Things, this attempt has been cast 
aside, and the function of lite ra ry  texts in this work cannot be 
seen in the light of the earlier work. On the contrary, these texts 
are discussed in terms of epistemic shifts, and are shown to be 
participants in knowledge. As the function of language in these 
texts is that characteristic of the different epistemes. One last 
point must be made In this regard: Carroll writes that Foucault 
" . . .  has argued that his own c ritica l perspective is not 
determined by any particular epistemology or ideology and 
that i t  is situated outside or at the limits of history 
i ts e lf ." 57
Undoubtedly, we have seen Foucault's interest in limits to be a 
basic component of his project, but Foucault cannot be understood 
to have situated his project beyond the limits of history. This 
endeavour amounts to an impossibility as is clear from our earlier 
discussion of Madness and C ivilization. However, that Foucault 
situates his work at the limits of history is an entirely different
proposition, as this Is feasible given the assertion in the 
conclusion to The Order of Things that the present Is a moment 
of transformation.
What Foucault's use of literature 1n his work does show Is that 
literature is in knowledge, and hqs specific relations of Its  
own to historical knowledge. Together with this, Foucault's 
analysis of these texts is seen to operate on the same level as 
the works which are embroiled in the positlvlties of natural 
history, the analysis of wealth and general grammar. They are 
not Included as Illustrations of what was transforming in 
literature alone, but within the configurations of knowledge 
that support the bodies of knowledge that became the human 
sciences, configurations that delimited certain functions of 
language. The common ground where the analysis of the 'scientific ' 
pursuits of natural history, the analysis of wealth and general 
grammar may be aligned with that of literatu re , is the concept 
of savolr that Foucault proposes as the knowledge that Interests 
the archaeologist. I t  is at the level of savoir that the condi­
tions of knowledge that are necessary for this set of discursive 
practices to exist. Thus, although the three positlvlties under 
analysis make claims to the status of Truth as Institutionally  
recognized disciplines or conalssances, at the level of savoir, 
the conditions of tnelv possibility coincide with those of 
lite rary  discourse. An essential difference between the positl­
vlties of scientific pursuits and lite rary  discourse 1s thus 
clear here. Whereas the former Install themselves as conalssances 
with claims to Truth, lite ra ry  discourse remains at the level of 
savoir 1n its  relation to knowledge. By remaining at this leve l, 
literature Is not constrained by the authority of conalssance - 
both Institutional and Intra-dlscurslve - and thus need not 
address a single object nor conform to the recognized appropriation 
of an object. Rather, I t  Is a parasitic discourse in this sense, 
1n that I t  takes over the verified objects of other discourses and 
treats them according to the ruler, v Its own discursive economy.
This economy, however, 1s s t i l l  Implicated In savolr, in its
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configuration of possibilities end Its transformations. Thus 
lite rary  discourse, by Its  situation In the space of savolr ,  
is nomadic, traversing this space and alighting where i t  w ill.
I t  reactivates the verifications and validations of conaissances 
in the margins through referential relations that situate i t  in 
the broader discursive network of the archive, and the episteme. 
Literature as a nomadic discourse may also activate discursive 
relations from a variety of localities and in so doing, may 
reveal nexes of contention, of transformation, of reversal or 
rupture.
I t  is this feature of literature that draws Foucault's interest, 
and which he reveals in The Order of Things by placing certain 
lite rary  texts at the points of transformation of epistemic con­
figurations. What is at stake in this situation of literature  
in The Order of Things, is that this discourse is able to reveal 
the transformations of discursive relations with great clarity  
because i t  is not confined by the authorities that control the 
production of Truth in discourses of conalssance.
Thus we may conclude that literature is in knowledge. Whereas 
discourses of conalssance present themselves as objects of know­
ledge in that they aspire to disseminate knowledge in the form 
of Truth; lite ra ry  discourse, by making no claim to the status 
of conalssance, is immediately analyzable as an object in know­
ledge (savolr). Although literature is non-referent Ial since 
i t  makes no claim to speak of a real object in terms of v e r if i­
cation; i t  does appropriate and disseminate the conditions of 
knowledge tnat make possible the discursive objects of conaissances. 
The consequence of this is that literary  criticism and history 
cannot remain mesmerized by the illusive spectre of art for its  
own sake, but instead becomes invested with the historical know­
ledge of culture as a product of textuality.
Edward Said describes the new face <"*f  literary  analysis in the 
light of the Foucauldian process of knowledge:
"Criticism cannot assume that its  province is merely 
the text, not even the great literary text. I t  must 
see its e lf ,  with other discourse, inhabiting a much 
contested cultural space, in which what has counted 
in the continuity and transmission of knowledge :ias 
been the s ign ifier, as an event that has le ft  lasting 
traces upon the human subject. Once we take that 
view, then literature as an Isolated paddock in the 
broad cultural fie ld  disappears, and with i t  too the 
harmless rhetoric of self-delighting humanism.
Instead we w ill be able, I think, to read and write 
with a sense of the greater stake in historical and 
political effectiveness that literary  as well as all 
other texts have had."^®
Such an argument for the situation of literary  analysis in a 
"contested cultural space" where the historical import of 
textuality is at stake rests upon the concept of savoir, for 
i t  is this knowledge that pervades the space of discursivity 
and which enables the appropriation of a ll discourse at the 
same level. Since literature may be analyzed as an object in 
knowledge (savoir). i t  follows that the conceptual apparatus 
of the archaeology must be apnlicable in practice to literary  
discourse.
3.4: A Practical Application of the Archaeology to Literary 
Discourse
Between the publication of Henry Fielding's The Life of Mr. 
Jonathan Wild the Grrat (174J)59 and Laurence Sterne's The Life 
and Opinions of Tristram Shandy (1759-1767)60 is a period of a 
mere sixteen years. Yet these two fictional biographies, which
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are often grouped together by traditional literary  history in 
the same period,61 apprehend the function of language, the 
nosition of the subject and the project of writing a novel in 
decidedly different fashions. I t  is points of disparity such 
as this, that Interest the archaeologist, for one has what 
appears to be a possible point of rupture despite the chrono­
logical proximity of these two events. The set of discursive 
relations that operate within and anterior to these events and 
the transformations they have undergone from one event to the 
other demarcates a certain locality in the literary  space where 
transformation * disc, sive practice may be investigated 
as regards t  i of situating Sterne's novel, a problem
that has perplv literary historians considerably.
Our analysis of these texts w ill have its  emphasis on the 
concepts of the statement and the discursive formation, but 
w ill necessarily be incomplete. This is for two reasons, 
r  rs tly , the archive as the space of savoir and the horizon 
of the archaeological analysis admit., the necessity of the 
tracing of inter-discursive relations betw^n a lite rary  text 
and the discursivities that border that text in terms of its  
objects' referential* or the adoption of strategies and concepts. 
This truly archaeological analysis of the two literary  texts 
reaches beyond the scope of this thesis, but i t  w ill suffice to 
show the directions open to such analysis in this respect. The 
second reason is correlative to the f ir s t ,  as the aim of this 
textual analysis is to show the archaeological concepts at work 
and our emphasis remains with the possibilities of these con­
cepts in a scrutiny of literature. We shall thus take each work 
in turn and analyze the type of statements and the epistemic 




"Roguery, and not a rogue, Is my subject."62
Jonathan Wild appeared almost twenty years after the execution 
of the real individual, who was hanged at Tyburn in 1725. Wild 
was notorious for pioneering organized crime in London. His 
death was immediately followed by innumerable accounts of his 
l i fe .  Most of these accounts combined journalistic, biographical 
and fictional elements6  ^ and sensationalized the exploits of the 
criminal. Despite this, these accounts a ll had the 're a l1 indi­
vidual as their referent to some degree.
Fielding's novel denies this referential relation to the 're a l' 
or empirical individual, and introduces in its  place a conceptual 
framework into which a type of human nature may be placed and 
evaluated. The object of the novel is encompassed in *he intro­
ductory statement:
"I do by no mean, intend in the character of my hero 
to represent (human) nature in general."6*
The basis for such a statement is the classificatory doctrine of 
human nature that is exposed in the introduction. The "true 
sublime" consists of a fusion oi the good and great in human 
nature, and raises such a being "above the order of this creation".65 
The "good" is described as that in which "our wonder ceases; our 
delight is lessened; but our love remains".66 Lastly the "great" 
or "false sublime" is that in which "pride, ostentation, Insolence, 
cruelty, and every kind of villainy" is found. I t  is this la tte r  
case that becomes the object of the novel.
The proposal of this classificatory grid of specification of human 
nature and the denial of any link between the novel and the real 
Jonathan Wild opens a space in which the language of ideas and the 
language of fiction interplay. I t  is in this space that the relation 
between the enunciative function and the 0uoact is operative. The
opening of Chapter I I I ,  which describes "The Birth, parentage, 
and education of Mr. Jonathan Wild the Great" exemplifies this: 
" It  is observable that nature seldom produces any 
one who is afterwards to act a notable part on the 
stage of l i fe ,  but she gives some warning of her 
intention . . .  giving us warning, as i t  were, and 
crying:
- Venienti occurrite morbo".^'
The position of the subject or the enunciative function is that 
of the distanced observer of experience. This relation is uni­
form throughout the novel, and is reiterated in such statements 
as:
"We must beg leave to observe that Nature is seldom 
so kind as those writers who draw characters 
absolutely perfect."68 
In statements such as these, the site of the aul.jr-function  
remains above the action, resting on the authority of the 
earnest scrutineer of experience and the learned authority of 
a man of ideas adept at observation and discriminatory judge­
ment:
"We w ill endeavour . . .  to describe them a ll with 
as much exactness as possible. 169
Observation, exact description and ,ement demarcate the space 
in which the discursive object Is ..unstructed. The enunciative 
series of the novel is a series of scenes in which the experience 
of the false sublime is ordered from its  genesis to its  final 
"highest consummation of human GREATNESS".  ^ The novel progresses 
towards a final tabulation of the characteristics of the false 
sublime:
"Jonathan Wild had every qualification necessary to 
form a great man. As his most powerful and predominant 
passion was ambition, so nature had, with consummate 
propriety, adapted all his faculties to the attaining 
those glorious ends to which this passion directed him.
He was extremely Ingenious In Inventing designs, 
artful In contriving the means to accomplish his 
purposes, and resolute 1n executing them: for
as the most exquisite cunning and most undaunted 
boldness qualified him for any undertaking, so was 
he not restrained by any of those weaknesses which 
disappoint the views of mean and vulgar souls, and 
which are comprehended In one general term of 
honesty, which is a corruption of HONQSTY, a wo.d 
derived from what the Greeks call an ass. He was 
entirely free from those low vices of modesty and 
good-nature . . .  His lust was inferior only to his 
ambition; . . .  His avarice was immense . . .  his 
rapaciousness was indeed so violent, that nothing 
ever contented him but the whole . . .  The character 
which he most valued himself upon, and which he 
principally honoured in others, was that of 
hypocrisy."71
The register of characteristics that define "greatness" is 
constructed around the name. "Great" and "Greatness" is the 
centrifugal point of the narrative. Hardly a chapter t i t le  
passes without the inclusion of either word and hardly an 
incident is recounted without direct recourse to the nature 
of this being.
The object is broken down into its  constituents and observed in 
operation upon various surfaces of emergence such as the family, 
marriage and business, as well as the legal and moral which are 
sustained throughout the novel. Wild is portrayed in a ll areas 
of social existence and each statement in the enunciative schema 
binds these spheres together in a movement towards naming the 
very nature of that existence. This taxonomy of Qualities combine 
to designate "greatness'', the general law of its  being and the 
conditions under which i t  is knowable. But this is only one 
direction in which the enunciative series moves, the other is the
deconstruction of the object through a moral grid of specifi­
cation. In this way, the components of the object are analyzed 
through comparison to Its opposite, "goodness", as represented 
In the character Heartfree. Through the intersection of these 
two directions, the place of the name Is secured. Thus the 
force of the discourse In Its  search for the proper place for 
the proper name can be eplstemlcally situated in Classicism 
through Its treatment of its object. Observation, analysis, 
comparison and mathesis combine in the task of designation.
In this designation, a dislocation of representation is present. 
Derivation, or a slippage of signifiers from their designated 
objects in the real world, occurs and the concept of the object 
is therefore distorted. I t  is here that the satirical elements 
of the novel find their source, as derivation here operates as 
a reversal of signifiers on the moral level; the false sublime 
and goodness occupy reversed places in the moral space of the 
novel, as do their related attributes of low and high action.
In Book I I ,  Chapter IX, the tender feelings of Mrs Heartfree 
towards her children and her distress over her husband's predi­
cament are described as "low" in comparison to Wild's v illa iny; 
"These are circumstances which we should not, for 
the amusement of six or seven readers only have 
Inserted had they not served to show that there 
are weaknesses in vulgar l i fe  to which great minds 
are so entirely strangers that they have not even 
an idea of them; and secondly, by exposing the 
fo lly  of this low creature to set o ff and elevate 
that greatness of which we endeavour to draw a true 
portrait in this history."72 
Through this semantic slippage, the Internal relation of Classical 
representation between the Idea and the word is reversed, dis­
torting the outward relation between thought and being in the 
world so drastically that the satirical attack on mis-representation 
is heightened. Thus the differentiation between the false sublime
and goodness Is purposely unfulfilled In order to deepen the 
sense of Illo g ic a lity  of the mistaken synonomy between good 
and great.
The two main characters. Wild and Heartfree, are not developed 
as characters but remain as types, or conglomerations of 
opposing attributes which suspend the taxonomic grid of the 
experience of human nature through observation comparison 
and judgement. The discourse of Jonathan Wild endeavours to 
set names and attributes In their proper places in the table 
of knowledge of human nature. Truth is equivalent to the 
clarity  of discourse, and the semantic reversals in the discourse 
represents the corruption of value in the corruption of words.
The discursive formation in which Jonathan Wild operates is 
immersed in the Classical episteme. Its  rules of formation of 
its  object and conceptual strategies are governed by the possi­
b ilit ie s  of representation - designation, derivation, attribution 
and articulation. The enunciative modality of its  statements 
is formulated by the exclusion of the Classical observer from 
the table of representation to which i t  relates. The focus of 
the discourse is upon the name and the enunciative series defines 
a taxonomy which drives towards the ultimate clarification of 
experience to thought: to know is to speak correctly. In this
novel, as Classical discourse, this speaking is not focussed by 
language its e lf ,  but by truthful representation.
3.4.2: Tristram Shandy
"I wish either my father or my mother, or indeed both 
of them, as they were in duty equally bound to i t ,  
had minded what they were about when they begot me; 
had they duly considered how much depended upon what
they were then doing; - that not only the production 
of a rational Being was concerned in i t ,  but that 
possibly the happy formation and temperature of his 
body, perhaps his genius and the very cast of his 
mind; - and, for aught they knew to the contrary, 
even the fortunes of his whole house might take their 
turn from the humours and dispositions which were 
then uppermost: - Had they duly weighed and considered 
a ll this, and proceeded accordingly, - I am verily  
persuaded I should have made quite a different figure 
in the world, from that, in which the reader is 
like ly  to see me."73 
Whereas in Jonathan Wild, the enunciative function maintains a 
distance from its  object, in The l i fe  and Opinions of Tristram 
Shandy they slide into each other: the object being the speaking
subject, the place of the speaker being that of the object. 
Tristram is both subject - "I" - and object - "me", and both the 
expression of inner self and the third person, the observer and 
the observed, the speaker and that which is spoken of.
From this whimsical beginning, the novel spins out into a chaotic 
play with language. Actions and conversations break o ff suddenly 
only to resume several chapters la ter after circuitous digressions; 
the past, present and future run together, the past overtaking the 
future and the future laying seige to the present:
We'll not stop two moments, my dear S ir, -  only, as 
we have got through these five volumes, (do. S ir, s it 
down upon a set - they are better than nothing) le t us 
just look back upon the country we have passed through *
- What a wilderness has i t  been! and what a mercy that 
we have not both of us been lost, or devoured by wild 
beasts in i t ! " 7*
This "wilderness" is the very depth and density of language, its  
obstinacy and incapacities. In Jonathan Wild, this "jeopardy
they were then doing; - tha t not only the production 
o f a ra tiona l Being was concerned In I t ,  but that 
possibly the happy formation and temperature o f his 
body, perhaps his genius and the very cast o f his 
mind; - and, fo r aught they knew to the contrary, 
even the fortunes o f his whole house might take th e ir 
turn from the humours and dispositions which were 
then uppermost; - Had they duly weighed and considered 
a l l  th is ,  and proceeded accordingly, -  I am v e r ily  
persuaded I should have made quite a d iffe re n t figure 
In the world, from that, in  which the reaoer Is 
l ik e ly  to see me."73 
Whereas In Jonathan Wild, the enunciative function maintains a 
distance from its  ob ject. In The l i f e  and Opinions o f Tristram 
Shandy they s lide  in to  each other:: the object being the speaking 
subject, the place o f the speaker being tha t o f the object. 
Tristram is  both subject - " I "  - and object - "me", aid both the 
expression o f inner s e lf and the th ird  person, the observer and 
the observed, the speaker and that which is  spoken o f.
From th is  whimsical beginning, the novel spins out in to  a chaotic 
play with language. Actions and conversations break o f f  suddenly 
only to resume several chapters la te r a fte r c ircu itous digressions; 
the past, present and future run together, the past o/ertaking the 
fu ture and the fu ture laying seige to the present;
We'll not stop two moments, my dear S ir, - on ly, as 
we have got through these fiv e  volumes, (do, S ir , s i t  
down upon a set - they are bette r than nothing) le t  us 
ju s t look back upon the country we have passed through -
- What a wilderness has i t  been! and what a mercy that 
we have not both o f us been lo s t, or devoured by w ild 
beasts in i t ! " 7*
This "wilderness" is  the very depth and density o f language, i ts  
obstinacy and incapacities. In Jonathan Wild, th is  "jeopardy
75o f words" does not present I t s e l f ,  as language as discourse 
Is bound between knowledge or Ideas ana representation. The 
question o f meaning is  posed In terms o f the precision of 
nomination, o f th inking and speaking co rrec tly . Tristram 
Shandy probes the problems o f w ritin g  and speaking in ways 
tha t are inconceivable In Jonathan Wild. The table o f repre­
sentation has shattered, and the safety o f discourse is  lo s t 
in  the libe ra tion  o f language as an object. Time and space 
ordered by the table o f know,edge are fragmented, and language, 
meaning and knowledge no longer appear commensurate w ith each 
other. Each character speaks and understands in his own 
"hobby-horslcal" way: Uncle Toby's l in g u is t ic  world is  
governed by the science o f fo r t if ic a t io n s ,  w h ils t Dr. Slop's 
In te rest in  obste trics and Walter Shandy's own peculiar 
systems o f thought pervade th e ir  grasp o f meaning. Language 
is  thus presented as fragmented according to  th e ir  subjective 
grids of spec ifica tion . Words, therefore, no longer reta in  
th e ir  spec ific  s ite  w ith in  a table o f representational value 
in  which th e ir  c la r ity  o f meaning is  secured, but are free to 
undergo slippage:
" . . .  - ' t i s  a p ity ,  cried my fa the r, putting my 
mother's thread-paper in to  the book fo r a mark, as 
he spoke - that tru th , brother Toby, should shut 
herse lf up in such impregnable fastnesses, and be 
so obstinate as not to surrender herse lf sometimes 
up upon the closest siege - " . 76 
While Walter battles to make sense o f Slawkenbar^ius, in which 
words do not represent w ith c la r ity  and precision, Uncle Toby 
latches upon the word "siege" and translates in to  his own 
lin g u is t ic  g rid . Within th is  g rid , his response "Can noses be 
dissolved?" has meaning, yet located as i t  is  w ith in  Walter's 
argument, i t  has no re la tion  at a l l .  Language is thus perceived 
as the human act o f speaking, open to misunderstandings and mis­
appropriations. Of th is , Tristram is a ll to aware:
"Now before I venture to make use of the word Nose a
second time, - to avoid a ll confusion . . .  i t  may not 
be amiss to explain my own meaning, and define, with 
a ll possible exactness and precision, what I would
w illin g ly  be understood to mean by the term . . . ”77
The Lockean procedure of controlling meaning through de fin ition , 
which results in an exact correspondence of a word to an idea, 
is upstaged, fo r Tristram regards the process as one by which 
words are a r t i f ic ia l ly  restrained. As he te lls  Eugenius:
" . . .  to define - is to d is tru s t". His de fin ition  is thus not
so much an enclosure but a liberation of the word:
"For by the word Nose, throughout a ll th is  long 
chapter of noses, and in every other part of my 
work, where the word Nose occurs, - I declare, by
78that word I mean a Nose, and nothing mere, or less." 
Definition is in su ffic ie n t, no matter how i t  is phrased and what 
its  content, fo r by its  very nature i t  is in su ffic ie n t to its  
task as i t  cannot reach the depths of language that is opened 
through the collapse of representation.
The in a b ility  of language tc represent with precision in the 
novel are glaring in the instances of Yorick's death, of silence
and of particular movements. In these cases, Tristram resorts
79to visual alternatives - the black page representative of 
death s ign ifies a mystery that is fixed beyond the sway of 
words; Uncle Toby's humming as he read the le tte r  containing
80the news of Bobby's death i< represented by a number of dashes
and the movement of the corporal's stick in a flourish  that is
81represented with a scribble. Likewise, i t  is the density of 
language that confounds Unc'e Toby in his attempts to describe 
the manner in which he was njured. He too withdraws from the
realm of words, supplementing his language with maps and the
bowling green upon which he designates through exact recon-
82structions of events.
With the fracturing of the table of representation, language as
co-extenslve w ith that space and as a log ica l successive 
process loses its  p riv ilege  as the organizing p rinc ip le  of 
ideas. In Tristram Shandy, the succession of scenes is that 
o f a complexity o f tem poralities. Time is  no longer the 
linea r succession o f ideas, as Walter fo llow ing Locke contends, 
as the continuum o f being which was the condition o f the
Classical table is fragmented. In its  collapse, the confusion
o f h is to ry  wells up, threatening to swamp Tristram:
"My mother, you must know, - but I have f i f t y  things 
more necessary to le t  you know f i r s t ,  - I have a 
hundred d if f ic u lt ie s  which I have promised to clear
up, and a thousand distresses and domestic misadven­
tures crowding in upon me th ick and th ree fo ld , one 
upon the neck of another, . . .  - Of a ll the perplexi­
tie s  a mortal author was ever seen in , - th is  
ce rta in ly  is  the greatest, . . . " 83 
The sim ultaneity o f events crowd and d isrupt the process o f 
s ig n ifica tio n  which cannot represent that immediate experience 
o f memory. Hence the temporality o f f ic t io n  is  thrown out o f 
jo in t ,  and the novel's aspiration to represent l i f e  is reduced 
to an absurdity:
" I  am th is  month one whole year older than I was 
th is  time twelve-month; and having got, as you 
perceive, almost in to  the middle of my fourth 
volume - and no fa rthe r than to my f i r s t  day's 
l i f e  - ' t i s  demonstrative that I have three 
hundred and s ix ty -fo u r days more l i f e  to w rite  
ju s t now, than when I f i r s t  set out; so that 
instead o f advancing, as a common w r ite r, in  my 
work with what I have been doing at i t  - on the
contrary, I am ju s t thrown so many volumes back 
ii 84
The space o f the novel is c lu tte red with the fragments of ex­
perience freed from the table o f representation, th e ir  existence 
no longer analyzable according to the sequential ordering
appropriate to that fable. Rather they c ircu la te  about the 
consciousness j f  Tristram himself. The upshot o f the above 
passage Is tha t Tristram attempts to represent the en tire ty  
o f consciousness ju s t as I t  Is presented to him in the simul­
tane ity  o f imagination and memory. His in a b il i ty  to do so in 
what James Swearingen refers to as the "sing le blinding flash 
o f the syllable"®5 Is consequential upon the lim its  o f language 
as logical sequence. Time in the novel is  thus necessarily 
repeated as events are interrupted and characters le f t  suspended
in conversation or action In order to " . . .  bring up the a ffa irs
86. . . t o  the same period" where these a ffa irs  have the same 
temporality. The function o f the subject, Tristram, is  thus 
constantly changing as he nrets the r iv a l necessities of repre­
senting d iachronica lly the recognition o f sequence on the basis 
o f his immanent experience o f memory or thought, and of repre­
senting these experiences synchronically.
Whereas the enunciative series o f Jonathan Wild is  ordered by the 
sequentia lity  o f discourse's representational power, Tristram 
Shandy is organized around the consciousness o f the subject which 
attempts to represent i t s e l f  fu l ly .  The epistemological figure  
o f Man thus appears as the centre around which experience is 
ordered: on the one hand, s p a tia lly , as the sequence o f scenes 
refers to the movement o f consciousness, and on the other, tem­
po ra lly , as i t  is  the subject's immanent experience o f sequence 
that governs the succession of events. From the f i r s t  words " I 
wish", the subject constitutes himself as the seat o f desire, 
introduces himself in to the realm o f language as the source o f 
language and thus sets himself in the centre o f the novel. 
Foucault contends that Man's attempt to th ink himself reveals 
hint as a being tha t is already anticipated by l i f e ,  language 
and labour as contents o f knowledge that are ex te rio r to him.
This is  apparent in Tr.stram Shandy: fo r although Tristram
introduces himself as the speaking subject, language operates 
throughout the novel as tha t which precedes the speaker, and
which Is never fu l ly  w ith in  the subject's con tro l. Hence the
misunderstandings or battles w ith words as exemplified by Uncle
Toby's misconstruction of "siege" reveals language as not only
part o f the subject's singular lin g u is t ic  universe - his
"hobby-horse", but as that which is ex te rio r to him, defining
the lim ita tio n  o f his being yet impossible to grasp. Thus, Man
or consciousness can never fu l ly  apprehend I t s e l f ,  and Tristram
is  therefore faced w ith an in f in ite  regression o f representation,
87or an in f in i ty  o f language.
Contingent upon the construction o f Man or consciousness in the 
realm o f Knowledge is  the introduction c f his fin itu d e . Indeed, 
the proxim ity o f death hounds consciousness throughout the novel: 
Tristram nearly dies at b ir th ,  he suffers the ravages o f con­
sumption and the threat i t  pos»s in that i t  might end his l i f e  
before he has completed the boo. , and the deaths o f Yorick,
Bobby an.: Toby's brother, Le Feve, combine to make death as 
prominent a figure  as the subject himself. In Volume V II, the
two mee' ce to face:
'Now as fo r  my s p ir i ts ,  l i t t l e  have I to lay to th e ir  
charge - nay so very l i t t l e  . . .  that on the contrary,
I have much - much to thank 'em fo r: . . .  in no one
moment o f my existence, that I remember, have ye once 
deserted me, . . .  in  dangers ye gilded my horizon with 
hope, and when DEATH himself knocked at my door - ye 
bad him come again; and in so gay a tone o f careless 
indifference d'H ye do i t ,  tha t he doubted o f his 
commission -
' - There must ce rta in ly  be some mistake in th is  
m atter", quoth he
Now there is  nothing in  th is  world I abominate worse,
88than to be interrupted in a story . . . "
Death as fin itud e  hangs over consciousness, enclosing and lim itin g
i t ,  as i t  does the work o f language. Yet language has a dual 
re la tion  w ith death; on the one hand, death is  the limH- of 
language, the end to what may be said, and on the other hand, 
death lie s  at the centre o f language's p ro life ra tio n , fc r  
language serves to postpone death.89 Tristram figh ts  against 
the -a ages of the "v ile  cough" of consumption, and runs f / O  
death to the Continent, " fo r  I have fo rty  volumes to w rite , 
and fo rty  thousand things to say and do". Thus with the 
emergence of language in i t s  own r ig h t between the things said 
and the person speaking, i t  enters a dual re la tion  with death 
against which i t  struggles and on the basis o f which i t  
m u ltip lies  i t s e l f .
I t  is  at the emergence of re la tion  that Foucault situates
the appearance of the mode -pace of lite ra tu re .
"The space of language today is  not defined by 
Rhetoric, ’“ ' t  by the L ibrary; by the ranging to 
in f in i ty  > fragmentary languages, substitu ting  
fo r  the double chain o f Rhetoric the simple, 
continuous, and monotonous lin e  o f language le f t  
to its  own devices, a language fated to be in f in ite  
because i t  can no longer support i sel. upon the 
speech of in f in i t y .  But w ith in  i t s e l f ,  i t  finds 
the p o s s ib ility  o f its  own d iv is io n , o f i t s  own 
re p e titio n , the power to create a ve rtica l system 
of m irrors, self-images, analogies. A language 
which repeats no other speech, no other Promise, 
but postpones death in d e fin ite ly  by ceaselessly 
opening a space where i t  is  always the analogue of
i t s e l f . " 91
Thus modern lite ra tu re  occunies the s ite  at which "books are 
a ll recaptured and consumed".92 Tristram Shandy occupies such 
a s ite  w ith its  reactiva tion o f statements from Locke, Deventer 
among others, i t s  inc l"« ion  o f re lig ious and legal statements, 
and the numerous digressions In which tales l i f te d  from else-
where are recounted. Such a work, therefore, does not tes t 
the lim its  o f the book, but approaches the Library space of 
modern f ic t io n a l discourse in  which language, having acquired 
i t s  own density, plays to In f in ity .
3.5: Conclusion
From our cursory examination o f the formation o f objects, concepts, 
strategies and enunciative functions o f Jonathan Wild and Tristram 
Shandy, i t  is  c lear that the p o s s ib ilit ie s  o f appearance of these 
two regu la rities  o f statements are decidedly d iffe re n t. Jonathan 
Wild is  epistem ically based w ith in  the p o s s ib ilit ie s  o f represen­
ta tio n  tha t characterizes general grammar, the analysis of wea l th  
and natural h is to ry  in  the Classical episteme. The formation of 
the object and the re la tion  between the discursive object and the 
enunciative function are typ ica l o f the taxonomic savoi£ o f the 
episteme. Likewise, Tristram Shandy's conditions o f formation 
can be seen to be decidedly Modern in  the appearance o f the 
speaking subject as object, and the concepts o f death and language 
as an object o f density. These two re gu la ritie s  form only a pa ir 
o f nodes w ith in  the discursive f ie ld  o f re la tions tha t are opera­
tiv e  in the 11V  rary production o f the eighteenth century. The 
uncovering o f a ll the re la tions chat operate between these two 
points in  the archive would require a study in its  own rig h t to 
do the archaeological method o f discursive analysis ju s tic e , but 
our discussion of these two novels does allow fo r a few conclusive
remarks.
Most apparent from our discussion, is the fac t that the archaeology 
and the episteme are necessarily inter-dependent. The analysis of 
statements in terms o f objects, concepts, strategies and enunciative 
functions leads to the s itua tion  o f texts w ith in  an epistemic 
configuration. The rules o f formation that the archaeology aims to
uncover are governed by the p o s s ib ilit ie s  of d i s c u r s i v i t y  that 
are available in the configuration o f knowledge o f that specific 
spatio-tem porality. The u t i l iz a t io n  or rea liza tion  o f these 
p o s s ib ilit ie s  does not necessarily amount to an homogenization 
o f textual production. Rather, the enunciative modal 1 t ie *  that 
are operative in d iffe re n t re gu la ritie s  may reveal mutations or 
Internal transformations o f discursive re la tions giving rise  to 
d iffe re n t but simultaneous discursive formations. Thus the 
rules o f formation evidenced in  Jonathan Wild are not universally 
applicable to other regu la ritie s  o f statements tha t find  th e ir 
conditions o f appearance in  Classical savo ir. An analysis of 
these other l ite ra ry  statements would lead to a discernment of 
d iffe re n t rea liza tions o f epistemic p o s s ib ilit ie s  and a re a r t i­
culation o f discursive re la tions in to  unique rules of formation.
From th is , co-existent discursive formations would be definable.
The linkage between the employment o f the archaeological concepts 
and the construction o f epistemic configurations finds i ts  basis 
in  the two related concepts o f savoir and discursive practice.
Savoir as the level o f knowledge that underpins and supports the 
formally accepted Truths o f a p a rticu la r time is  the level upon 
which the episteme is  uncovered, and upon which discursive 
re la tions combine in to  the rules o f formation of objects, concepts 
and strategies. These are ac tive ly  u tiliz e d  in  the production of 
discourse as practice. The concept of discursive practice is  thus 
inextricab ly  linked to the concept o f savo ir, fo r  the practice o f 
w ritin g  is  an a c t iv ity  engaged in  knowledge in  that the p o ss ib ility  
o f what may be said is governed by savo ir. The implications of 
th is  are profound fo r  lite ra ry  studies, fo r no longer can lite ra tu re  
be analyzed fo r i ts  own g ra tif ic a tio n  alone. The scope o f lite ra ry  
analysis is  broadened to include the ram ifications of the dissemi­
nation and c ircu la tio n  o f knowledge in  society. As statements do 
not ex ist in  vacuo, so the p o s itlvU y  o f lite ra tu re  cannot be 
analyzed without regard to i t s  place in  the archive. This reinstates 
the importance of the concept o f the episteme, which is  formulated
through the comparative scrutiny o f the deployment of s a y o j£  
In d iffe re n t discourses.
Foucault's archaeology thus o ffe rs  a t ig h t ly  kn it framework 
fo r the analysis o f discourse in  terms o f h is to ry and knowledge. 
Th: question remains as to whether the archaeology o ffers 
lite ra ry  students an avenue out o f the impasse of tra d itio n a l 
lite ra ry  h is to ry . In our analysis of the problematic o f  t ra ­
d itio n a l l ite ra ry  h is to ry . I t  was found tha t the princ ip les of 
such analysis rest uoon out-moded conceptions o f h is to ry and 
knowledge, namely h ls torlc lsm  and empiricism. The archaeology 
Is formulated in  resistance to these conceptions, and, as i t  
Is clear In The Archaeology o f Knowledge, sets out to reformu 
la te  the concepts o f h is to ry and knowledge In terms which are 
excluded by the problematic o f thn h is to ry  of Ideas under which 
lite ra ry  h is to ry  is  subsumed. Where the h isto ry o f ideas postu­
lates homogeneity, genesis and con tinu ity  o f memory, Foucault 
anticipates d iffe rence, dispersion and counter-memory. In place 
o f an emphasis on temporality and categorical thought, the 
archaeology proposes s p a tia lity  constituted by a multitude of 
levels upon which and across which re la tions o f d ifference are 
interwoven. In place o f the homogenizing force o f the speaking 
subject, the archaeology situates discourse as practice , so that 
the analysis o f discourse remains at the level o f anonymous 
statements which are scrutinized fo r th e ir  conditions o f appear­
ance in terms o f the rules o f i ts  practice rather than in  terms 
o f the in te rp re ta tion  o f meaning.
I t  is  on the basis o f the reconstruction o f h is to ry as general 
h is to ry in  opposition to to ta l h is to ry , and of knowledge as 
re la tions o f savoir as opposed to categorical thought that the 
archaeology as a method of discursive analysis is  formulated. 
The statement defies the search fo r  intenoed meaning, as the 
discursive formation denounces the homogenization of discourse 
on the basis o f tem porality. Likewise, the p o s it iv ity  as
situated In the archive ordains an approach to lite ra tu re  as 
a discursive practice analyzable In terms of its  re la tions 
In knowledge (savoir). F in a lly , the concept of the eplsteme 
binds together the function of discourse as h is to rica l 
practice *:1th the concept o f savo ir, o f knowledge on the 
level o f what may be said in a pa rticu la r spatio-tem poralIty.
In th is  respect, the eplsteme Is the hlnge-pln of the archaeo­
log ica l framework of knowledge /  discourse /  h l- to ry .
The reconstitu tion  o f the concepts of h is to ry  and knowledge 
and the methodological framework that Is subtended by these 
newly wrought concepts opens up new d irections fo r the 
analysis of lite ra tu re . Not only does the archaeological 
concept o f savoir allow 'o r  the s itua tion  o f l ite ra ry  discourse 
in knnwleJie, but lite ra tu re  appears as the discourse most 
ready to reveal the re la tions of savoir in  that i t  makes no 
claims to the status o f conaissance. Rather, i t  remains at 
the thresholu o f p o s it iv ity  which the archaeology takes as its  
domain o f application. Lastly , i t  is  c lear that the archaeo­
logy cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of the h is to ry  of 
ideas, but operates as a method o f resistance to the p it fa l ls  
that have plagued that d isc ip lin e . As such, i t  opens up a new 
te rra in  with new p o s s ib ilit ie s  fo r  the m a te ria lis t analysis of 
l ite ra ry  discourse. In th is  regard, a reassessment of the 
Great Tradition o f l ite ra ry  production is  not only possible, 
but necessary i f  l i te ra ry  analysis is  to f in a l ly  leave the 
c lo is te rs  o f i t s  own contemplation and to y ie ld  a knowledge 
o f the functioning o f lite ra tu re  as a discursive practice im­
plicated in savo ir.
 _____  M l
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